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Abstract
George Bush entered the presidency constantly compared and contrasted with his 
predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Lacking Reagan’s eloquence and adept use of the media, 
Bush was lambasted by the press as Reagan’s “lapdog” and labeled a “wimp.” The 
press pushed Bush to establish themes to match policy goals and to use the bully 
pulpit to lead the national debate on issues. His refusal prompted journalists to 
characterize the Bush presidency as lacking an agenda. Reagan’s success with the 
media and Bush’s failure have produced a misconception about the successes and 
failures of each president’s policies. Thus, the period usually is referred to as the 
“Reagan-Bush years,” indicating that Bush’s term can best be explained as Reagan’s 
third term. This distinction is partly a result of the misconception that the Cold War 
was basically over by the end of the Reagan administration and that Bush merely 
signed agreements Reagan had already negotiated. This ignores the instability of the 
Soviet Union, as well as the potentially explosive situation in Central and Eastern 
Europe, that still existed when Reagan left office.
This dissertation explores how differences between Ronald Reagan and George 
Bush affected the end of the Cold War, examining Bush’s use of the media, the 
restructuring of the National Security Council, the subsequent fundamental shift in 
foreign policy approach to the Soviet Union, and the use of personal diplomacy in the 
reunification of Germany and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Bush led a transition: a 
transition from the Cold War to a post-Cold War world. Bush’s diplomatic strengths 
proved as great as his media skills and domestic agenda were weak. Bush and his
V
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advisors managed the end of the Cold War, helping it end not with a bang, but a 
peaceful whimper. This dissertation is funded by a Peter and Edith O’Donnell Grant 
from the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation and is based on interviews with 
Bush administration officials such as Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Colin Powell, 
Marlin Fitzwater, and Jack Matlock, plus many recently declassified documents.
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Introduction
The end of the Cold War has brought about a reinvigoration of the debate over how 
historians examine the Cold War period. John Lewis Gaddis, in particular, has drawn a 
distinction between “old” Cold War history and “new” Cold War history. Before the 
end of the Cold War, Gaddis suggests, American historians gave the United States 
disproportionate attention, wrote a history of a war before they knew the outcome, and 
emphasized interests, which they defined in material terms. Gaddis views these as 
deficiencies and welcomes the “new” Cold War history, with its multiarchival attempt 
to draw upon the records of all major participants, its ability to place the Cold War 
within a broader comparative framework because it knows both the beginning and the 
end, and its emphasis on ideas—what people believed, or wanted to believe. Elizabeth 
Cobbs Hoffman hails the New Diplomatic History as making a “contribution to a 
fuller representation of American life by portraying the interaction between the United 
States and the rest of the world and then tightly braiding that story together with both 
domestic and world history.”1 But in many respects, much of the “new” Cold War 
history is a reconceptualization of older approaches to the study of American foreign 
relations that have been around since its inception. In reality, there is little that is 
methodologically new in the “new” Cold War history approaches. In a rush to produce 
a truly international history, behavior of western leaders has been neglected in favor of 
revelations from the archives of the former Soviet Union. Although Gaddis hails this 
as “affirmative action,” it has distorted the current view of the Bush administration in
l
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particular, one covered almost entirely by “new” Cold War historians.2 The Cold War
can now be placed in its historical context. Members of Reagan’s and Bush’s foreign
policymaking apparatus, however, did not know the outcome nor were they privy to
archival information now available. They made their decisions and shaped policies
with the same blinders that Gaddis sees as deficiencies of the “old” Cold War
historians. Modem Cold War historians, whether “old” or “new,” should place the
Cold War within its proper context and examine the decisions made by people at the
highest levels, remembering the perceptions under which the participants at the time
operated. This requires a synthesis of the two approaches. Finally, the importance of
ideas over interests that is advocated by much o f the “new” Cold War history has
produced a distorted picture of the final years o f the Cold War. As Gaddis explains:
The ‘new’ Cold War history will take ideas seriously: here the way the conflict 
ended is bound to reshape our view of how it began and evolved. For the 
events of 1989-91 make sense only in terms of ideas. There was no military 
defeat or economic crash; but there was a collapse of legitimacy. The people of 
one Cold War empire suddenly realized that its emperors had no clothes on. As 
in the classic tale, though, the insight resulted from a shift in how people 
thought, not from any change in what they saw.3
According to this view, the participants were only important in regards to the ideas
that they promoted. That is why Reagan and Gorbachev, who embraced strong
ideological rhetoric, are seen as the major players and why Bush, who, in the words of
his press secretary, “didn’t give a damn about his public image,” was seen as a
1 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a 
Global American History,” Diplomatic History 21 (Fall 1997): 500.
2 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Tragedy of Cold War History,” Diplomatic History, vol. 
17, no.l (Winter 1993): 9.
3 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), 283.
2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
non-factor4 This view discounts the type of practical diplomatic negotiations that led 
to the end of the division o f Europe and neglects the fact that decisions were made for 
purely political or economic reasons rather than because of ideology. This is not meant 
to diminish the importance of ideology during this period but simply to underscore 
that ideology alone does not explain the end of the Cold War. The Cold War was a 
process that only came to an end when there was a resolution o f the ideological 
differences as well as the material interests of both sides. This study seeks to examine 
that process to determine what role the Bush administration played in ending the Cold 
War.
The end of the Cold War is a process that has engendered much debate among 
specialists in the history of foreign relations; to the general public it is quite simple. A 
political event, the end of the Cold War is seen as the action of personality. Causation 
is thus reduced to the story of Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, and George Bush:
(1) The defense buildup and Cold War rhetoric of Reagan’s foreign policy 
convinced the Soviet Union that it could not win an arms race. Despite 
Reagan’s stem talk about the Soviet Union being “an evil empire,” he was 
determined to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviets
(2) Gorbachev represented a new generation of Soviet leaders. He set about to 
aggressively improve East-West foreign relations in order to free his 
energies and financial resources so that he could address pressing domestic 
problems
(3) By the time Bush came to office, the Cold War was winding down. A 
caretaker president, Bush simply continued the polices set by Reagan, 
finished negotiating the arms treaties, and performed some simple “clean­
up” diplomacy
Such an explanation distorts the end of the Cold War. It personalizes complex 
situations and processes and obscures the truth that the participants often had 
complicated motives and confused, often contradictory, objectives. As a result, such
4 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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symbolic explanation does not adequately portray the process by which the political 
actors ended the Cold War.s Historians must, however, examine symbolic language so 
that a clear perception of the end of the Cold War emerges. Some authors rushed 
books to press before the Cold War had even concluded.6 Others simply updated 
earlier work to include a few new chapters on the last years of the Cold War.7 None of 
these books examine the Bush presidency carefully. Books that focus on Bush attack 
his deficiencies in domestic policy and his inability to deal with the press.8 The books 
written about George Bush and foreign affairs centered almost exclusively on the 
Persian Gulf War. One of the few exceptions is Michael Beschloss and Strobe 
Talbott’s book, At the Highest Levels, which attempts to describe the last few years of 
the Cold War.9 It is based entirely on interviews with officials for whom the authors 
will neither name nor provide transcripts. Almost a decade after these interviews were 
conducted, they remain closed. The one area where there has been a wealth of
5 See for example Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End 
o f the Cold War (Columbia: Missouri UP, 1997); Jeffrey Gedmin, The Hidden Hand: 
Gorbachev and the Collapse o f East Germany (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992).
6 William G. Hyland, The Cold War is Over (New York: Random House, 1990); Allen 
Lynch, The Cold War is Over—Again (Boulder: Westview, 1992); John Lewis Gaddis, 
The United States and the End o f the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, 
Provocations (New York: Oxford, 1992).
7 See for example Raymond L. Gartoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet 
Relations and the End o f the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994); Don 
Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet 
Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1998).
8 See for example Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status 
Quo Presidency o f George Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Charles Kolb, 
White House Daze: The Unmaking o f Domestic Policy in the Bush Years (New York: 
Free Press, 1994); David Mervin, George Bush and the Guardianship Presidency 
(New York: S t Martin’s, 1996); Mark J. Rozell, The Press and the Bush Presidency 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).
9 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f 
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993).
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published material concerning the Bush administration and the end of the Cold War 
has come in the form of a multitude of memoirs, diaries, and papers of Bush 
administration officials.10 There have also been several memoirs from foreign officials 
that figured prominently in the ending of the Cold War.11 Supporting these accounts 
has been the release of many official documents from both American and Soviet 
archives. This dissertation draws on these sources, plus the author’s interviews with 
prominent Bush administration officials, such as James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Colin 
Powell, Jack Matlock, and Marlin Fitzwater, to gain a clearer understanding of the 
process that led to the end of the Cold War.
George Bush entered the presidency constantly compared and contrasted with 
his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Lacking Reagan’s eloquence and adept use of the 
media, Bush was lambasted by the press as Reagan’s “lapdog” and labeled a “wimp.” 
The press pushed Bush to be more Reaganesque: to establish themes to match policy 
goals and to use the bully pulpit to lead national debate. His refusal to make thematic 
addresses and create a “line of the day” for daily news cycles prompted journalists to
10 See for example George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New 
York: Knopf, 1998); George Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and 
Other Writings (New York: Scribner, 1999); James A. Baker with Thomas M. 
DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (New 
York: G.P. Putman’s Sons, 1995); Jack F. Matlock, Autopsy On An Empire: The 
American Ambassador’s Account ofthe Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York: 
Random House, 1995); Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Perisco, My American Journey 
(New York: Random House, 1995); Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and 
Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade With Presidents and the Press (New York: Times 
Books, 1995); Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe 
Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard, 1995).
11 See for example Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1995); Boris 
Yeltsin, The Struggle fo r Russia (New York: Times Books, 1994); Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect o f Germany’s 
Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1998).
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characterize the Bush presidency as lacking an agenda. One difficulty that the Bush 
staff encountered in attempts to create a positive media image originated in the fact 
that Bush, did not like being “handled.” Unlike Reagan, who would meticulously 
memorize entire speeches written by his advisors, Bush rarely stayed faithful to a 
prepared text, preferring merely to use it as an outline from which he would ad lib. 
This provided ample room for mistakes as well as unfocused messages that did not 
make clear the administration’s agenda. Too much access compounded the problem: 
Bush held more than 280 twenty-minute press conferences open to questions on any 
subject. Bush was more accessible to the media than any other modem president 
before him, yet he has been viewed as failing miserably in his relations with the press, 
especially when compared to Reagan. The problem lay in how each man viewed the 
role of media. Bush felt that it was his obligation to meet with the press, a task to be 
endured, a task less important than governing. Reagan, on the other hand, relished the 
time he spent in front of audiences and the camera and utilized the media to promote a 
positive image of himself and his policies. Reagan’s success with the media and 
Bush's failure have produced a misconception about the success and failure of each 
president’s policies, especially in foreign policy where most Americans’ opinions are 
based on information filtered through the media. Part of Bush’s problem was of his 
own making. During his term as vice president, Bush refused to disagree publicly with 
President Reagan, even during the Iran-Contra Affair. One of the main drawbacks of 
Bush’s quiet loyalty to Reagan was that it did not allow him to establish a strong 
image that was distinct and independent of Reagan. His weak image intensified during 
the 1988 election when Bush billed himself as the candidate of continuity. The vice
6
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president who had faithfully served an enormously popular president pledged to 
continue in his footsteps. Bush won the election of 1988 on the strength of Reagan’s 
popularity, along with negative campaign ads attacking his inept Democratic 
opponent, Michael Dukakkis. The campaign rhetoric, however, did more than just win 
Bush the election—it shaped how the public, and many historians, viewed these years. 
Thus, the period is usually referred to as simply the “Reagan-Bush years,” indicating 
that Bush’s term can best be explained as Reagan’s third term. This is partly a result of 
the misconception that the Cold War was basically over by the end of the Reagan 
administration and that Bush merely signed agreements Reagan had already 
negotiated. This ignores the instability of the Soviet Union, as well as the potentially 
explosive situation in Central and Eastern Europe that still existed when Reagan left 
office. This image was compounded by Bush’s poor media skills, a subject central to 
this dissertation.
Bush did not merely continue on the foreign policy path set by Reagan. He 
made a fundamental shift in foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union. Determined to 
make his own mark, Bush appointed Brent Scowcroft, a vocal critic of the way the 
Reagan administration had managed foreign policy, as his national security advisor. 
During arms control negotiations, Reagan emphasized numbers, eliminating certain 
kinds of weapons. Scowcroft believed that simply getting rid of certain kinds of 
weapons did not achieve the overall goal of arms control, which was to improve 
stability. Instead, he wanted to reduce the chances that in a crisis either side would 
resort to the use of nuclear weapons for fear of some vulnerability in the nuclear 
arsenal. This goal could not be accomplished simply by a shift in numbers. He wanted
7
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to shift the focus from aims control to Eastern Europe, to encourage the Red Army to 
leave Eastern Europe. This meant de-emphasizing arms control until the situation in 
Eastern Europe unfolded, something that would require a fundamental change in U.S. 
foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Bush gave Scowcroft the authority needed to 
make such a change by issuing National Security Directive I , which reorganized the 
National Security Council. Bush’s years of experience in foreign affairs led to a more 
hands-on approach markedly different than Reagan’s desire to delegate foreign policy 
decision-making authority. Bush enjoyed debating issues with his advisors. He asked 
question after question, provoking people to defend their views. This helped him 
clarify the issues in his own mind and allowed him to make what he felt were prudent, 
well-reasoned decisions. This was a markedly different process than that which 
occurred during the Reagan administration. Reagan’s seventh national security 
advisor, Colin Powell, described Reagan’s National Security Council as “rudderless, 
drifting, demoralized.”12 Reagan downgraded the post of national security advisor 
shortly after taking office. For the first time since the National Security Council’s 
creation in 1947, the national security advisor lost direct access to the president. 
Reagan made clear that the State Department would handle foreign affairs decisions in 
his administration while the National Security Administration would “integrate” 
policies proposed by the State Department. Reagan established a complex web of 
planning groups that allowed officials, such as Colonel Oliver North, to establish 
personal domains. Lack of cooperation became evident during the Iran-Contra Affair. 
Bush’s National Security Council, conversely, was an inner circle of highly
12 John Barry and Evan Thomas, “Colin Powell: Behind the Myth,” Newsweek, 5
8
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experienced men who enjoyed Bush’s complete confidence. At the center were Brent 
Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker, both of whom, along with the 
president, would prove to be the chief architects of Bush’s foreign policy. These three 
men, who had been friends since their days working in the Ford administration, 
formed an experienced triumvirate that ensured foreign policy decisions would be 
made only at the highest levels.
The Bush administration decided to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. 
policy toward the Soviet Union. The press interpreted the “pause” as another sign of 
Bush’s lack of vision. In 1988-89, as the United States entered a critical period of 
foreign policy, many pundits wondered if Bush was the right man to replace Reagan. 
Bush had to prove to the press, accustomed to the public, charismatic styles of Ronald 
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, that his private, quiet style o f diplomacy could be 
effective. Bush spent most of the summer of 1989 addressing the changes that were 
taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. He did not urge ferment in Eastern 
Europe. Instead, he encouraged incremental reform at a pace not threatening to the 
Soviets. Bush hoped to promote change, not direct intervention. Bush made two 
European trips to further this goal. The first, in the spring of 1989, was to Western 
Europe and coincided with the NATO summit scheduled to celebrate the 
organization’s fortieth anniversary. The second was in the summer of 1989 and 
focused on Eastern Europe, ending with the G-7 economic summit in Paris. These two 
presidential trips, along with domestic speeches scheduled for the commencement 
season, gave the administration the opportunity to lay out its new policy initiatives and
March 2001,36.
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put pressure on other governments to respond. This was, in reality, a diplomatic 
offensive that finally allowed the new administration to break free from the Reagan- 
era policies and forge a new course more in line with Scowcroft’s goal of capitalizing 
on ferment in Eastern Europe. On November 9,1989, East Germany relaxed its 
border-control policy with West Germany. Bush received news of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall with much personal pleasure, but in public expressed caution. He feared that a 
Western celebration of the wall’s collapse might encourage a backlash by hard-liners 
in East Berlin and Moscow. To a skeptical public, Bush’s actions built upon the 
images created by his lengthy foreign policy review and upon his timid reaction to the 
Tiananmen Square massacre. This indicated that Bush, as a symbolic leader, could not 
follow in the steps of Reagan. What the public did not know was that Bush was acting 
on a request sent to him by Gorbachev that very day. Bush hoped that his 
acquiescence to Gorbachev’s request would prove fruitful in the meeting the two men 
were scheduled to share the following month. In December 1989, during a historic 
meeting in Malta, Bush sought to test the intentions of the Soviet Union, to move 
beyond the Containment Doctrine that had dominated U.S. Cold War policy, and to 
establish a new relationship with the Soviet Union. The U.S.-Soviet relationship that 
was fostered by Malta would be essential in ensuring that reform meant political and 
economic progress rather than chaos and disorder. George Bush’s quiet style achieved 
what he most wanted—the peaceful transfer of power in Eastern Europe.
President Bush used the new U.S.-Soviet relationship that he had forged at 
Malta to gain Soviet acceptance of a unified Germany within NATO. This acceptance 
occurred over a period of months involving private meetings, letters, and phone
to
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conversations between leaders from both the East and W est Personal diplomacy 
proved decisive. Bush used personal diplomacy to achieve what had seemed 
unthinkable. Convincing the Soviet Union to allow a unified Germany to remain in 
NATO was an important foreign policy achievement for the Bush administration. To 
achieve this goal, the United States created the Two-Plus-Four plan, which provided a 
diplomatic process for carrying out rapid reunification in a way that everyone 
accepted. The first step was to unite Western leaders. Bush accomplished this through 
extensive meetings, letters, and telephone conversations with Western leaders. This 
was particularly important in relations with Helmut Kohl. Bush had to make sure that 
the Germans would remain in NATO. Bush ensured Kohl’s partnership by offering 
him full support for his plan for German reunification. The Bush-Kohl meeting at 
Camp David on February 24,1990 proved crucial. Persuading the Soviets to accept 
what had been difficult even for some Western leaders to accept proved much more 
difficult. America’s strategy depended on Western solidarity and Soviet unwillingness, 
or inability, to take decisive action. Persuading a defeated Soviet Union to accept a 
major realignment of the European balance of power meant waiting for an opening. 
That occurred when Gorbachev simply could not provide an acceptable alternative to 
the position taken by the United States. Not having an acceptable solution of his own, 
facing increasing domestic problems, and desperately needing foreign financial 
assistance, Gorbachev broke with hard-liners and agreed on June 1,1990, at the 
Washington Summit, to allow, in principle, a unified Germany to remain in NATO. 
Bush persuaded Gorbachev to be more flexible about German membership in NATO; 
in return, Gorbachev reached a trade agreement with the United States to help his
l l
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struggling domestic economy. Bush set out to eliminate Gorbachev's remaining 
reservations by pushing through a plan for a new NATO structure, which would 
change NATO's traditional role to that of a political alliance. On July 14,1990, during 
a meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, Gorbachev agreed to German reunification 
within NATO without conditions or reservations in exchange for massive German 
economic assistance. The Washington Summit allowed Gorbachev to accept the final 
terms without, at least in his mind, appearing to concede to Western ultimatums. The 
reunification o f Germany within NATO, in conjunction with the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops in Eastern Europe, marked the end of the Cold War.
The new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
evident during the Persian Gulf War when the Bush administration was able to garner 
Soviet support for UN resolutions against Iraq. Soviet support of coalition efforts 
against a former Soviet client state could not have taken place during the Cold War.
As former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock suggests, Soviet 
support of the United States during the Gulf War proved the Cold War rivalry had 
ended.13 Members of the press now accused him of being too loyal to Gorbachev. This 
relationship was jeopardized in August 1991, as a coup attempt sought to remove 
Gorbachev from power. The Bush administration had always been worried about hard­
liners in Moscow. In fact, one of the reasons that the Bush administration had been 
slow in embracing Gorbachev was an uncertainty as to whether he would stay in 
power. Thanks to determined maneuverings of Boris Yeltsin and George Bush, the 
coup collapsed. Yeltsin’s actions made him a force to be reckoned with, and
12
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Gorbachev faced a very difficult political situation. Central Soviet authority declined 
at an accelerated rate and the Communist Party was discredited. This did not go 
unnoticed by Bush, who switched his support to Yeltsin. The failed coup accelerated 
the rise of Yeltsin and the republics and the demise of Gorbachev and the Soviet 
Union. Gorbachev urged a union of sovereign states, a confederate state that would 
carry out the functions delegated to it by the various republics. Yeltsin wanted a 
commonwealth of fully independent states. The decision was reached during a secret 
meeting held by Yeltsin and other republic leaders in the first days of December 1991. 
Only after the leaders reached full agreement and called Bush to ask for his support 
did Yeltsin call Gorbachev to inform him on what had been decided. A furious 
Gorbachev relinquished his duties as president and the USSR came to an end. During 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a long process that began with the August 
coup and ended with Gorbachev’s resignation on Christmas day, Bush played a pivotal 
role in the peaceful transition of power between Gorbachev and Yeltsin.
President Bush was a cautious pragmatist who preferred gradual change to 
reckless impatience that might lead to disorder. The result was a foreign policy based 
on personal diplomacy and incremental change. This brought criticism from those who 
favored bold action. Bush’s preference for quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomatic 
maneuvering made for slow newsdays but good leadership. An unflattering media 
image, however, affected Bush’s public approval ratings, which steadily declined 
following the end of the Persian Gulf War in early 1991. This, combined with a flawed 
domestic agenda, led to his defeat in 1992. No one leader can be credited with ending
13 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a  luncheon for the Society for Historians of
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the Cold War. Neither Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, George Bush, or any other 
single leader had that much impact But each influenced when and how that end would 
occur with both their foreign policy successes and mistakes. Ultimately, the Soviet 
Union could not afford to maintain the high level of defense spending that was 
bankrupting the country. In order to achieve domestic economic reforms, the rationale 
for the Red Army had to be broken; a “gilded age” of Soviet power ended. This forced 
Gorbachev to loosen his grip on Eastern Europe, unleashing forces that he could not 
control. Bush, to his credit, skillfully managed the end of the Cold War. It was during 
Bush’s administration that the Cold War ended and Germany was reunited. The 
United States led the alliance that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi control; and the Soviet 
Union collapsed and the former Soviet Bloc countries began the transition to 
democracy and market economies. Bush led a transition: a transition from the Cold 
War to a post-Cold War world. Bush’s diplomatic strengths proved as great as his 
media skills and domestic agenda were weak. This dissertation explains how the Bush 
administration managed the end of the Cold War, helping it end not with a bang, but a 
peaceful whimper.
American Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
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-Chapter 1- 
Media Image Building: 
Reagan, Bush, and the “Wimp” Factor
January 21, 1985, was an extremely cold day in Washington, D.C. So cold, in fact, 
that the inaugural parade was cancelled; President Ronald Reagan’s inaugural address 
was held in the Rotunda of the Capitol rather than on the West Portico of the Capitol.1 
The cold weather outside, however, did not stop the seventy-four-year-old Reagan 
from using rhetorical skills honed in nearly forty years of public speaking. He began 
with a silent prayer, combining politics with religion. His ability to infuse secular 
political events with religious ritual gave his speeches a sacred quality. No president 
since Franklin D. Roosevelt had used such spiritually laden rhetoric so effectively. 
Reagan combined this rhetoric with an emphasis on heroes such as George 
Washington, value-centered appeals to freedom and progress, and repentance and 
reformation of the existing order with a prophecy of a God-given destiny for the 
United States. This mix entailed heavy use o f anecdotes and examples. Reagan was a 
master storyteller; his audiences were treated to simple stories that had at their center a 
moral, political, or economic lesson.2
Reagan began his public speaking career in the late 1940s, giving speeches in 
opposition to communism while co-chair of the Motion Picture Industry Council and a 
board member of the Screen Actors Guild. His early political career was based on
1 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 
1980-1988,1985, Book I- January 1 to June 28, 1985 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1988), 55-58.
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strong anticommunist rhetoric. He joined the Republican Party to be in the company 
of other right-wing spokesmen, such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy. The 
rhetoric of Reagan's early career permeated his political terminology, culminating in 
his 1987 reference to the Soviet Union as an “evil empire.” Reagan’s ability as 
president to communicate with the American public did not suddenly materialize, nor 
was it a natural ability that Reagan possessed from the beginning. The skills he used as 
an orator, as well as the themes that he would stress as president, slowly developed 
over a long career. At the heart of this process was Reagan’s commitment to oratorical 
perfection. Reagan’s orations over four decades were extremely repetitive.3 He loved 
stump speeches, given over and over but with slight variation. A former actor, Reagan 
knew that the more he practiced his lines the better he would be at delivering them. 
Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said that Reagan memorized his briefings so that he 
could recite them almost verbatim. He knew how to follow scripts.4 He was not averse 
to using someone else’s words. As president he relied on a staff of skillful 
speechwriters. On taking office, President Reagan gave a packet of old speeches to his 
new speechwriters, instructing them to imitate his style and substance.3 Reagan’s style 
was so predictable that speechwriters, however many came and went, could deliver the 
same product.6 To Reagan, careful planning and practice were the keys to gaining the
2 Kurt Ritter and David Henry, Ronald Reagan: The Great Communicator (New York: 
Greenwood, 1992), xiiv-xvi.
3 Ibid, 119.
4 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade 
with Presidents and the Press (New York: Times Books, 1995), 112.
5 Paul D. Erickson, Reagan Speaks: The Making o f an American Myth (New York: 
New York University Press, 1985), 8.
6 William Ker Muir, Jr., The Bully Pulpit: The Presidential Leadership o f Ronald 
Reagan (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press, 1992), 50.
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greatest audience approval. This does not mean that Reagan was vulnerable in 
unrehearsed question-and-answer sessions such as press conferences. He had collected 
more than forty years worth of stories, anecdotes, briefings, and stump speeches that 
he could apply to current situations. Reagan also proved adept at anticipating 
situations where a well-rehearsed line could have a big impact. In his 1980 debate with 
Jimmy Carter, Reagan is remembered for what appeared to be a spur-of-the-moment 
put-down of Carter: “There you go again.”7 The “impromptu” line, however, had been 
carefully rehearsed to be used in situations when Carter attempted to place emphasis 
on potentially dangerous charges against Reagan.8 He would use that same line in a 
1984 debate with Walter Mondale.9 Reagan had trouble remembering people’s names 
and even the previous day’s office schedule; he could, however, remember the scripts 
that he had worked so hard to perfect10
Reagan enjoyed an impressive mastery of the television medium. According to 
Peter Hannaford, Reagan’s chief speechwriter, 1974-80, “Ronald Reagan knew that 
television is the most personal of the media. He knew that when he looked into the 
camera, he was really looking at one person, or one family, seated before a set in the 
living room. What he would have with them was a quiet conversation, just as if he was
7 1980 Presidential Debate, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, 28 October 1980, 
Cleveland, video footage provided by C-SPAN.
8 J. Jeffrey Auer, “Acting Like A President; or, What Has Ronald Reagan Done To 
Political Speaking?,” Reagan and Public Discourse in America, Michael Weiler and 
W. Barnett Pearce, eds. (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1992), 97-98.
91984 Presidential Debate, Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale, 7 October 1984, 
Louisville, video footage provided by C-SPAN.
10 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 120.
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in the living room with them.”11 Reagan himself recalls how he learned how to
communicate with people while working as a sports announcer:
I had a group of friends in Des Moines and we all happened to go to the same 
barber. My friends would sometimes sneak away from their offices or other 
jobs when I was broadcasting a game and they’d get together at the barbershop 
to listen to it; after a while, I began to picture these friends down at the shop 
when I was on the air and, knowing they were there, I’d try to imagine how my 
words sounded to them and how they were reacting, and I’d adjust accordingly 
and spoke as if I was speaking personally to them. There was a specific 
audience out there I could see in my mind, and I sort of aimed my words at 
them. After I did that, something ftmny happened: I started getting mail from 
people all over the Midwest who told me I sounded as if I was talking directly 
and personally to them. Over the years I’ve always remembered that, and when 
I’m speaking to a crowd—or on television—I try to remember that audiences 
are made up of individuals and I try to speak as if I am talking to a group of 
friends... not to millions, but to a handful of people in a living room... or a 
barbershop.12
This ability to make each audience member feel that he was talking directly to them 
served Reagan well during the course of his political career. In the end, Reagan was 
not given the title Great Communicator for his clear speaking or writing. The word 
communication is derived from the Latin comunico, which can mean “to share” and 
“to unite, to join together.” Reagan’s achievement in communication came from his 
view of it as “a unifying process of commitment to the values and beliefs presented by 
the communicator.”13 By that technical definition, Reagan’s mastery of 
communication was unparalleled.
Reagan used all of his polished communication skills during his 1985 
inaugural address. He spoke to the American public “as a benign and genial uncle”14
11 Peter Hannaford, The Reagans: A Political Portrait (New York: Coward-McCann, 
1983), 296.
12 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 246-247.
13 Erickson, Reagan Speaks, 1.
14 Ritter and Henry, Ronald Reagan: The Great Communicator, xiv.
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whose honest advice would reunite America with its God-given role as a chosen land. 
He reached them through the common bond of emotion that transcended the 
differences found in America. Near the end of his speech, he turned to the issue of 
safety and security for the United States. He prefaced his remarks with an affirmation 
of the ancient prayer for peace on Earth. Reminiscent o f his earlier attacks on 
communism, he blamed the Soviet Union for conducting “the greatest military buildup 
in the history of man.” Alluding to ongoing negotiations, he made a statement that 
would never have been found in his first inaugural address. Rejecting the principle of 
mutual assured destruction (MAD), Reagan proclaimed that the United States was 
committed to “the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the 
earth.” He expressed his commitment to creating for the American public a security 
shield that would destroy nuclear missiles before they reached their target and 
promised to work with the Soviets to eliminate the threat of nuclear destruction.13 This 
statement had its origins in a speech given almost exactly one year prior in the East 
Room of the White House on United States-Soviet Relations. In that speech of January 
16,1984, Reagan reversed his foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, marking an 
important turning point in the Cold War.16 Reagan declared his support of a zero 
option for all nuclear arms and declared that his dream was to see the “day when 
nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth.” This would lead to the 
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). He also called for the mutual military 
withdrawal from the third world and promised to establish a better working
15 Public Papers o f the President ofthe United States, Ronald Reagan 1981-1988,55- 
58.
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relationship with the Soviet Union, marked by greater cooperation and understanding
and built on deeds rather than words. Reagan reminded his audience that the Soviet
Union also wanted to avoid war and reduce the level of arms and that, while the two
countries had differences, they could find common ground. He ended with a story:
Well, those differences are differences in governmental structure and 
philosophy. The common interests have to do with the things of everyday life 
for people everywhere. Just suppose with me for a moment that an Ivan and an 
Anya could find themselves, oh, say, in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter 
from the rain or a storm with a Jim and Sally, and there was no language 
barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they then debate the 
differences between their respective governments? Or would they find 
themselves comparing notes about their children and what each other did for a 
living? Before they parted company, they would probably have touched on 
ambitions and hobbies and what they wanted for their children and problems of 
making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, maybe Anya would 
be saying to Ivan, ‘Wasn’t she nice? She also teaches music.’ Or Jim would be 
telling Sally what Ivan did or didn’t like about his boss. They might even have 
decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon. 
Above all, they would have proven that people don’t make wars. People want 
to raise their children in a world without fear and without war. They want to 
have some of the good things over and above the bare subsistence that make 
life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade, or profession that 
gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all 
borders.17
In one of the most remarkable speeches ever given by a U.S. president during the Cold 
War, Reagan demonstrated that, to him, the most potent weapons of all were a well- 
told story and faith in the inherent goodness of mankind. The moral of the story was 
the same as the lessons taught in all of his stories: Good people would do the right 
thing. As Marlin Fitzwater recalls in his memoir, this was the core of Reagan’s 
political principles.18 In this speech, Reagan was telling the world that the President of
16 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society for Historians of 
American Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
17 Public Papers ofthe President o f the United States, Ronald Reagan 1981-88,44.
18 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 117.
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the United States believed that Americans and Soviets alike were, at their core, good 
people. It was a tangible gesture in improving U.S.-Soviet relations.
Many historians credit Mikhail Gorbachev with changing U.S.-Soviet 
relations. Reagan’s speech, however, came fifteen months before Gorbachev took 
office and more than two years before glasnost and perestroika. By 1985, the Reagan 
goal of negotiating from a position of strength had been achieved. The Soviets had 
returned to the negotiating table under an altered arms control debate that shifted the 
focus away from arms limitation talks and toward a new American reliance on 
strategic defense.19 Many critics of Reagan charged him with election-year 
propaganda. The Democrats charged that Reagan had been drawn back to the center in 
an effort to increase his chances for reelection. Reagan had, according to his critics, 
abandoned his ideology in favor of pragmatism. The fact that he made his speech the 
day before a scheduled Democratic primary debate only served to fuel speculation. 
Considering that up to that point the Reagan administration had used a vehement 
anticommunist rhetoric, it is easy to see why his sudden change in positions would be 
questioned. In order to understand this sudden change, one must look at how these 
types of decisions were made in the Reagan administration. Lou Cannon has explained 
that Reagan practiced “a delegative style of decision-making.”20 Reagan was a master 
communicator to the American public; however, he rarely supplied his subordinates 
with clearly defined tasks. This would place increased importance on the fact that both 
Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane
19 William G. Hyland, “East-West Relations,” Gorbachev's Russia and American 
Foreign Policy, Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds. (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1988), 441.
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favored a more conciliatory policy approach to the Soviet Union.21 This suggests that 
Schultz and McFarlane were responsible for the decision to change U.S. policy toward 
the Soviet Union. That explanation, however, does not explain the timing for the 
change. Nor does it take into account that although Reagan did practice a somewhat 
“hands-off” presidency, he had the ability to focus on an issue that especially 
interested him and lead policy making on the issue with little regard to his advisors.22 
The threat of nuclear war was just such an issue. The foundation of the U.S.-Soviet 
policies concerning arms control had been the theory of mutual assured destruction 
(MAD) in which safety was achieved as long as each side possessed enough power to 
destroy the other. Reagan felt that such a doctrine was morally reprehensible because 
o f the unthinkable number of people that would be annihilated in full-scale nuclear 
war. Reagan described the MAD policy as “having two westerners standing in a 
saloon aiming their guns at each other’s head—permanently.”23
Early in his administration, Reagan did not feel that nuclear war was imminent. 
To him, the Cold War was first and foremost a war of words. Reagan’s political career 
had been based on strident rhetoric; he felt the accusations exchanged between the 
Kremlin and the White House were simple political posturing. At some point near the 
end of his first term in office, however, Reagan became obsessed with the idea that a 
nuclear war would soon erupt if a change was not made in U.S.-Soviet policy. The 
cause for Reagan’s change of perspective included an attack by a Soviet jet fighter on
20 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 371.
21 Beth A. Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End o f the Cold War 
(Colombia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 74.
22 A clear example of this is Reagan’s total support for SDI even when the vast 
majority of his advisors and experts warned him that it was impossible.
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a Korean airliner that was flying from Alaska to Seoul with 269 people on board, 
including 61 Americans.24 The plane had accidentally drifted 360 miles off course 
and had twice flown over Soviet airspace. The Soviet Air Defense Command sent a 
Sukhoi-15 fighter to intercept the plane. Claiming that he did not recognize the Boeing 
747 as a commercial jetliner, the Soviet Pilot locked his radar on the plane. After 
receiving the orders to shoot, he fired two missiles at the airliner just as it was exiting 
Soviet airspace and about to reenter international airspace. The missiles struck the tail 
and tore off half of the left wing, forcing the plane to crash into the ocean at a speed of 
several hundred miles an hour. The downing of KAL Flight 007 in the fall of 1983 
occurred thanks to a series of mistakes by the Soviets and a crackdown by Soviet 
leader Yuri Andropov, who had instituted a tough new “Law on the State Border.”
The law was meant to address sloppy military discipline, but had the effect of 
intimidating Soviet military officers who carried out the law’s requirements like 
“unthinking robots.”25 The lack of communication between the Kremlin and the White 
House following the incident worsened the situation. Initially, the Soviets denied that 
they had shot down the plane. When it became obvious that the plane had been shot 
down, the Soviets claimed that the pilot of the airliner had refused a demand to land at 
the nearest airfield. The Soviets finally admitted that they had shot down the airliner; 
however, they claimed that it was on a “deliberate, thoroughly planned intelligence
23 Reagan, An American Life, 547.
24 For a complete explanation of Reagan’s change in thinking see The Reagan 
Reversal by Beth A. Fischer.
25 Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random 
House, 1995), 283-284.
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operation,” directed from the United States and Japan.26 It would not be until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union that the full story would be known. The following year 
the hotline between the two capitols would be upgraded radically through the use of a 
facsimile machine in an effort to avoid the confusion that had surrounded the tragic 
incident. A little over a month after the KAL Flight 007 downing, the president 
attended a private screening of an ABC television movie “The Day After,” which 
showed the horrors of nuclear holocaust. Reagan’s diary entry for that day details his 
reaction:
In the morning at Camp D. I ran the tape of the movie ABC is running Nov. 
20. It’s called “The Day After” in which Lawrence, Kansas, is wiped out in a 
nuclear war with Russia. It is powerfully done, all $7 million worth. It’s very 
effective and left me greatly depressed. So far they haven’t sold any of the 25 
ads scheduled and I can see why... My own reaction: we have to do all we can 
to have a deterrent and to see there is never a nuclear war.27
Reagan had always been affected most by visual images, stories, and emotions. His
foreign policy advisors even abandoned the usual briefing books in favor of short
films. The ABC movie brought home the “realities” of a nuclear war to Reagan in a
way that briefing books could never have done. Less than a month after viewing “The
Day After,” Reagan attended his first Pentagon briefing on nuclear war. Having
refused to attend such meetings during the first two years of his presidency, Reagan
participated in what he would later describe as “a most sobering experience.”28 The
Pentagon report detailed a sequence of events that could lead to complete world
annihilation. The sequence of events described in the report bore striking similarities
to the ABC movie. What concerned Reagan even more was the fact that many people
26 Powell with Persico, My American Journey, 283.
27 Reagan, An American Life, 585.
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in that meeting still described nuclear war as “winnable.” Reagan recalled thinking 
these men were crazy and worried that Soviet generals might also be thinking in terms 
o f winning a nuclear war.29 The final event in that sobering sequence of events 
occurred in early November during a large-scale NATO military exercise named Able 
Archer 83, which sought to test nuclear release mechanisms. The Soviets were 
suspicious of the exercise and worried that the NATO war games were really 
camouflaging preparation for an actual attack on the Soviet Union. The KGB had 
become convinced by the Reagan rhetoric that a nuclear first strike had become a 
serious possibility and instituted a system of Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack alerts in 
1981.30 Now this system sprang into effect in an effort to counter Abel Archer 83. 
Fearing an impending nuclear attack, the Soviets discussed launching a preemptive 
nuclear attack. As perhaps the most dangerous Cold War moment since the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962, Able Archer 83 was viewed by the Reagan administration as a 
nuclear “near-miss.” As Robert McFarlane would later recall, the “war scare” had a 
“big influence” on Reagan’s subsequent approach to the Soviet Union.31
The events of 1983 had convinced Reagan that nuclear war was a real 
possibility. The biblical prophecy of Armageddon permeated Reagan’s thoughts in 
1983-84. In response to this threat, Reagan recalled making a conscious decision to 
“switch to a more hands-on approach” concerning arms reduction. From then on, 
Reagan consulted only with George Bush, George Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, and
28 Ibid., 585.
29 Ibid., 586.
30 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the 
Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 66.
31 Fischer, The Reagan Reversal, 135-136.
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Robert McFarlane to develop a plan for U.S.-Soviet policy.32 Reagan became 
committed to the doctrine of strategic defense and the actual reduction of nuclear 
arsenals. His proposal for a space-based strategic defense shield that would protect the 
United States from a nuclear attack was called SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative). 
Critics quickly labeled it “Star Wars” and charged that it was unrealistic. Reagan, 
however, was determined to bequeath to future generations of Americans a protective 
shield that would allow them to live without fear of nuclear destruction. As Marlin 
Fitzwater recalls, Reagan’s faith in SDI was so great that “Reagan’s staff twice 
intercepted a Reagan written speech insert about the prospect of an alien force 
threatening the earth from space, thereby bringing all the countries of the world 
together in a Steven Spielberg defense of mankind.”33 Reagan had not given much 
thought to the technical specifics of SDI when he introduced it. Unlike Jimmy Carter, 
who was a very intelligent nuclear engineer, Reagan was not prone to deep thinking in 
the field of nuclear strategy.34 Consequently, he tended to see the announcement of his 
SDI proposal as an end in itself.33 Reagan preferred to say, in short: the problem is 
nuclear war, the solution is SDI: “let’s do it.”36 This approach, as one study of SDI 
concludes, “appealed to Reagan’s image of Uncle Sam as an enterprising, self- 
sufficient, fix-it man with more trust in his own common sense than in what the
32 Reagan, An American Life, 594.
33 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 245.
34 Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, Reagan: The Man and His Presidency 
ffioston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 569.
Michael Mandelbaum and Strobe Talbott, Reagan and Gorbachev (New York: 
Vintage, 1987), 129.
36 Reagan, An American Life, 547.
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know-it-alls might say.”37 While critics o f the program relied on the fact that SDI was
probably not feasible and would cost more than most taxpayers would be willing to
pay, Reagan relied on his political instincts. To Reagan, the fact that the idea was easy
to understand was more important than whether or not the physics and engineering
would be feasible. SDI could never be fully tested unless there was nuclear war. Even
then the system would have to be 100 percent effective or tens of millions of
Americans would die.
The Soviets were terrified of SDI because they assumed that a U.S. president
would not place complete faith in a program unless he was certain that it could be
achieved. Indeed, three-fourths of the Soviet propaganda budget in 1984,198S, and
1986 was directed solely against SDI.38 What frustrated Soviet leaders even more was
the fact that Reagan refused to abolish SDI in exchange for Soviet concessions of any
kind. As George Schultz recalls, “Whenever we got together with the Soviets in the
Reagan-Gorbachev meetings, SDI was always on Gorbachev’s mind. He seemed
almost ready to concede anything if he could only manage to deep-six that program.”39
As Marlin Fitzwater recalls, another consideration was the sheer economic strength
that would be needed for a Soviet response to SDI:
In all the summit meetings that I was in with Reagan and Gorbachev, everyone 
o f them ended in the Soviet Union’s plea toward getting us to drop SDI. That 
was the objective, and the reason was because they always thought it was an 
offensive system. President Reagan presented it as a defensive shield, but they 
always thought we were going to get up in space, build some platform, and 
then launch a nuclear attack on Russia. And their problem was that they felt 
they couldn’t afford to match i t  And so, they knew. . .  that’s when they started
37 Mandelbaum and Talbott Reagan and Gorbachev, 130.
38 Peter Hannaford, ed., Recollections o f Reagan: A Portrait o f Ronald Reagan (New 
York: Wiliam Morrow, 1997), 5.
39 Strober and Strober, Reagan: The Man and His Presidency, 336.
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getting serious about arms reduction. Their view was, we don't have the 
money to ever build a space-based system; let's get out of the arms race. So 
they started reducing nuclear weapons.40
This allowed Reagan to have substantial leverage during their arms limitation talks
and allowed him to change the very nature of these talks. In the past, arms control
talks had focused on limiting the growth of nuclear arsenals. The result had been the
SALT I and the SALT II accords. Reagan, however, wanted to do more than limit the
growth of nuclear arsenals. He wanted to reduce those arsenals, the final goal being
the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Gorbachev, however, demanded that
SDI be abandoned before any arms agreement could be reached. Reagan’s refusal to
make concessions on SDI caused him to turn down arms control proposals at the
Reykjavik summit in October 1986 41 Critics, such as Brent Scowcroft, thought
Reagan’s complete dedication to SDI negated it as a leverage tool:
But my sense is that [SDI] tended rather than to use as leverage to get other 
things [the United States] wanted, it tended to stymie the negotiations because 
we would never put SDI on the table. So the Russians tended to drag their feet 
because of that.
But Reagan never altered his complete faith and commitment to SDI.
Early in his administration, Reagan instituted policies that critics claimed had 
“forced the Soviets into a comer from which they might yet lash out in some 
unpredictable way.”43 In 1984, Reagan abandoned his confrontational rhetoric, 
instituting an extreme modification of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. He had 
not revised his assessment of communism, which he still felt was a dangerous system
40 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
41 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society for Historians of 
American Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
42 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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of government. He did soften his image of the Kremlin, what can be interpreted as the 
beginning of the end of the Cold War. By the time he left the White House, Reagan 
had the highest approval rating of any departing president since World War II.44 It 
would be up to his successor to bring a final end to the Cold War. Lacking the 
rhetorical skills of his predecessor, George Bush would have to emerge from the 
shadow of Reagan and rely on his own strengths to finish the job that Reagan had 
begun. As Bush would quickly find out, Reagan would be a tough act to follow.
A New Administration 
On January 20,1989, George Bush gave his bicentennial inaugural address at 
the West Front of the Capitol.45 Bush began his address the same way he had 
conducted his entire vice presidency—by deferring to Reagan: “There is a man here 
who has earned a lasting place in our hearts and in our history. President Reagan, on 
behalf of our nation, I thank you for the wonderful things that you have done for 
America.” With a conviction greater than perhaps any vice president in history, 
George Bush believed that his primary role was to be absolutely loyal to the president. 
Reagan rewarded this loyalty by including Bush in the policy-making process. Reagan 
knew that he could trust Bush completely without fear of leaks to the press or public 
disagreements over policy. As a result, Bush was deeply involved in discussions 
concerning the Soviet Union during the Reagan presidency. He also was used by 
Reagan to meet with new Soviet leaders and provide first impressions. When Soviet
43 Strobe Talbott, The Russians and Reagan (New York: Vintage, 1984), 7.
44 Jane Blankenship and Janette Kenner Muir, “The Transformation of Actor to Scene: 
Some Strategic Grounds of the Reagan Legacy,” Reagan and Public Discourse in 
America, Weiler and Pearce, eds., 135.
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leader Leonid I. Brezhnev died in November of 1982, Reagan sent Bush as head of an 
American delegation to the funeral in Moscow.46 Bush used his meeting with the new 
Soviet leader Yuri Andropov to call for change in U.S.-Soviet relations, to seek “a 
world of greater harmony, not only between the two great superpowers, but for all 
nations.” He stressed that his visit signified “the desire of the United States to continue 
to work for positive relations between our two countries.”47 Improved relations did not 
occur under the leadership of Yuri Andropov. In fact, they steadily declined. Less than 
two years later, Bush again traveled to Moscow to attend the funeral of a Soviet 
leader, this time Andropov’s. White House officials hoped that Bush’s trip could be 
used to signal Reagan’s desire for better relations with the Soviet Union and to 
propose a meeting between Reagan and the new leader. Preparations for the trip were 
made in Washington during meetings led by Bush. Reagan was on vacation at a 
mountaintop ranch, enjoying daily rides on horseback. He was kept abreast of the 
situation by periodic calls from Bush.48 This shows that Reagan was comfortable 
leaving crucial decisions in the hands of his vice president. Following Andropov’s 
funeral, Bush had a 30-minute talk with the new Soviet leader, Konstantin 
Chernenko.49 In an official statement following the meeting, Bush stressed Reagan’s 
“determination to move forward in all areas of our relationship with the Soviets, and
45 George Bush, Public Papers o f the President ofthe United States: George Bush, 
1989-1993,1989, Book I (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 1-4.
46 Murray Marder, “Bush, Schultz to Head Delegation to Funeral,” Washington Post, 
Saturday, 13 November 1982, sec. A-l.
47 Dusko Doder, “Bush and Schultz Tell Moscow Now Is Time to Repair Ties,” 
Washington Post, Monday, 15 November 1982 sec. A-l.
48 Lou Cannon, “Bush to Attend: Reagan Sends Message to Moscow,” Washington 
Post, Saturday, 11 February 1984, sec. A1 and sec. A18.
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our readiness for concrete, productive discussions in every one of them.” Bush insisted 
on “deeds and not just words” from the Soviets.50 In March of 1985, Bush represented 
the president at Chernenko’s funeral, this time carrying an invitation to the new leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev for a summit conference with Reagan. In all, Bush attended the 
funerals of three Soviet leaders during the Reagan presidency. Each time Bush was 
given the responsibility of being the first representative of the United States to meet 
with the new leader, affirming U.S.-policy goals, and reporting his first impressions of 
the new leader back to Reagan. Bush had taken an unusually prominent role for a vice 
president in forging policies toward the Soviet Union and in taking the lead in meeting 
with Soviet leaders. Reagan, however, had complete trust in Bush that was no doubt 
solidified by the unquestioning loyalty demonstrated by the vice president.
The “Wimp” Factor 
In his inaugural address, Bush shared his view of the changes that were 
happening in the world and the opportunities that he would face during his presidency: 
“I come before you and assume the presidency at a moment rich with promise.... For a 
new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn.... There is 
new ground to be broken and new action to be taken.”51 The vast majority of political 
observers would agree with the new president that major changes would occur in the 
world during the Bush administration. Many of those observers, however, argued that 
Bush was not the man for the job. One of the main drawbacks of Bush’s quiet loyalty
49 Dusko Doder, “Chernenko, Bush Talk 30 Minutes,” Washington Post, Wednesday, 
15 February 1984, sec. A l.
50 “Bush: ‘We Too Want Deeds’,” Washington Post, Wednesday, 15 February 1984, 
sec. A26.
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to Reagan was that it did not allow him to establish a strong image that was distinct
and independent of Reagan. Consequently, Bush’s bid for the presidency in 1988 was
hampered by his poor image in the media. According to Marlin Fitzwater:
My press strategy was to introduce the vice president to as many reporters as 
possible during this period so that by 1988 he would know the press corps. 
During the next two years, he gave nearly seventy-five interviews. 
Unfortunately, almost every one of them was bad. The reporters begged him to 
criticize President Reagan or tell them the inside story of the decision-making 
process... but he would never oblige. The stories always came out that Bush 
was loyal to a fault52
The low point came in 1987 just prior to Bush’s announcement as an official
candidate. Newsweek featured a profile of Bush and pictured him on the cover,
piloting his racing boat with the headline “George Bush: Fighting the ‘Wimp Factor’.”
Even many Republicans conceded that the story by Margaret Garrard Warner was an
in-depth discussion of character, which was a legitimate campaign issue. In the article,
Warner explained that Bush suffered from “a potentially crippling handicap—a
perception that he isn’t strong enough or tough enough for the challenges of the Oval
Office. That he is, in a single mean word, a wimp.”53 The article, however, did not
really hurt Bush. The real damage came from the picture of Bush on the cover and the
cover line, which prompted many voters to ask themselves, “Is George Bush a wimp
or isn’t he a wimp?” As Lee Atwater of the Bush campaign explained: “It was not the
story but, guess what, not enough people read Newsweek every week to make any
difference in terms of national consciousness. But guess what else? I went jogging this
51 George Bush, Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: George Bush, 
1989-1993,1989, Book 1,1.
52 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 75.
53 Margaret Garrard Warner, “Bush Battles the ‘Wimp Factor’,” Newsweek, 19 
October 1987,29.
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morning and I saw Newsweek on four newsstands. Guess what I saw? The cover.”54 
The issue quickly entered the public arena as the cover made its rounds on the weekly 
television news talk shows, hosts showing viewers the cover, then debating whether or 
not Bush was a wimp. The rest of the media soon chimed in; George Will claimed that 
Bush was Reagan’s lap dog; cartoonist Gary Trudeau suggested that Bush’s manhood 
was in a blind trust.55 It might seem odd that a former Navy pilot, who received the 
Distinguished Flying Cross during World War II, former director of the CIA, and self- 
made millionaire Texas Oilman, could be seen as a wimp when compared to a former 
actor and radio broadcaster, who never fought in battle.56 The real source of the wimp 
label was Bush’s poor media skills. As Bush’s media consultant Roger Ailes 
commented: “If everyone in America could just sit down with the guy in his living 
room for two minutes, there would be no contest: he would win by a landslide.”57 If 
Reagan could play the part of John Wayne, Ailes was confident that Bush could fill 
the role of Gary Cooper—strong, silent, slow to anger, and tough in a fight.s8 
Unfortunately for Bush, he was being compared to one of the most skillful 
communicators in history and the strong, silent type did not play well with the media. 
The media made the “wimp” issue a concern for voters by the sheer amount of 
attention it received on television and in the press. The public would compare the
54 David R. Runkel, ed., Campaign For President: The Managers Look at '88 (Dover, 
Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1989), 63.
55 Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency 
o f George Bush (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 38.
William A. Degregorio, The Complete Book o f U.S. Presidents (New York: Wings 
Books, 1993), 632-700.
57 Peter Goldman and Tom Mathews, The Quest fo r the Presidency: 1988 (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1989), 191.
58 Ibid.
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would-be president’s strength to Reagan through the joint television appearances that 
they made during the Reagan presidency. Reagan was seen as the bold leader; Bush 
dutifully in the background. Even Bush’s children admitted that it did not produce a 
favorable comparison. Jeb Bush explained that he had “made money betting people 
that my dad is taller than Ronald Reagan.”39 The simple reality was that “television, 
the medium that makes Ronald Reagan larger than life, diminishes George Bush. He 
does not project self-confidence, wit or warmth to television viewers. He comes across 
instead to many of them as stiff or silly.”60 During his term as vice president, Bush 
refused to disagree publicly with President Reagan. Unfortunately for him, it was 
probably the one thing that would have established him as his own man and 
established for him a separate political identity. But Bush had not publicly disagreed 
with Reagan since the two men battled for the Republican presidential nomination in 
1980.
The Nashua Debate
One of Bush’s problems with the media was that he really did not enjoy
campaigning. He viewed it merely as a necessity to get to the more important business
of governing. He did not enjoy having to play to the crowd, and it showed. The fact
that the majority of his public service had been by appointment had allowed Bush to
advance through the ranks without having to learn the painful (at least for modest
types) art of self-promotion. As his friend Brent Scowcroft explains:
He was much more decisive in moving out in private than he appeared in his 
public persona. I think he was deeply affected by his mother who used to tell
59 Warner, “Bush Battles the ‘Wimp Factor’,” Newsweek, 28.
60 Ibid., 30.
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him all the time, ‘George, don’t brag.” And so I think he tended in public to 
underplay things.61
Bush was well thought of by his peers, and that was what mattered most to Bush. The 
vast differences between Reagan and Bush as far as campaigners can be seen in their 
1980 fight for the Republican nomination. Bush and Reagan quickly emerged as the 
two favorites in a crowded Republican field. Reagan had refused to participate in the 
first debate, held in Iowa. Consequently, many of the voters in Iowa became angry 
with Reagan and handed Bush a solid victory in the Iowa caucus, which established 
Bush as the frontrunner in a tight two-man race. Heading into the New Hampshire 
primaries, Reagan was determined not to make the same mistake. He agreed to debate 
the other candidates on February 21,1980, in Manchester, New Hampshire. He 
appeared with Representatives Philip Crane and John Anderson, both of Illinois, Texas 
governor John Connally, Senator Howard Baker, Jr. of Tennessee, Senator Bob Dole 
of Kansas, and George Bush. The debate was more of a forum discussion; partisan 
attacks were not allowed. In other words, it was the kind of political event that only 
the most serious political junky would remember. No candidate made any memorable 
statements—or blunders.62 Bush seemed especially focused on not making any 
statements that might hurt his frontrunner position. Just prior to the debate Bush 
admitted: “I don’t think that it [the debate] is something that can be won. I think it is 
something that can be lost if someone makes a big mistake.”63 This reluctance to take 
chances was typical of Bush’s political background. Reagan, however, was just
61 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
62 New Hampshire Republican Debate, Manchester, 20 February 1980. Video footage 
provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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waiting to get George Bush alone. The Reagan campaign team had desperately wanted 
to have a head-to-head debate with Bush. The Nashua Telegraph, a newspaper in New 
Hampshire, agreed to host the debate; however, the Federal Election Commission had 
ruled that such a sponsorship that excluded all but two of the candidates would be an 
illegal corporate contribution. The newspaper, in turn, asked the two candidates to 
split the $3,500 cost of the debate. The Bush side declined to pay for their share 
because they argued it would push Bush over the legal spending limit for New 
Hampshire. The plans for the debate seemed to be at an end. Soon rumors began to 
spread that Bush preferred not to risk his front runner status. Reagan aides then agreed 
to cover the entire cost of the debate.64 Remembering the damage that Reagan had 
suffered when he refused to debate in Iowa, Bush agreed to the debate. The debate was 
scheduled to take place in the Nashua Senior High School gym on Saturday, February 
22—-just three days before the New Hampshire primary.
Controversy began the afternoon before the debate; Reagan suddenly changed 
his mind and decided that the debate should include all challengers. Since he was 
paying for the debate, he felt that it was his decision to make. He was neglecting the 
fact that he had agreed to pay for the debate in the first place to avoid just such an 
occurrence. The Nashua Telegraph could have legally paid for a debate that was open 
to all candidates. The situation soon became explosive. While 1,500 people waited in 
the gym forty minutes past the scheduled starting time, chanting “We Want Reagan”
63 Martin Schram, “Bush Survives Debate Unscathed,” The Washington Post, 
Thursday, 21 February 1980, A2.
64 Lou Cannon, “Reagan Forces to Pay Costs of Debate With Bush,” The Washington 
Post, Friday, 22 February 1980, A2.
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and “Bush, Bush,” the real action was taking place in the corridors o f the school.65 
Reagan met with four of the excluded candidates, assuring them that he wanted the 
debate broadened to include them.66 Reagan’s national political director, Charles 
Black, was sent to meet with Bush’s campaign manager, James Baker, to request a 
meeting with Bush. Baker rejected the meeting and rejected the idea that the other 
candidates, who would come to be known as the Nashua Four, be allowed to debate. 
Baker replied that he “wanted to stick with the letter of the [arrangements originally 
made] by the Nashua Telegraph. It wasn’t our call—it was the Telegraph's call.”67 In 
fact, Bush handlers had told the Nashua Telegraph that they were willing to open up 
the debate; however, the newspaper declined the suggestion. The debate finally began 
as Bush walked onto the stage smiling. An obviously angry Reagan stormed onto 
stage followed by the four jilted candidates who stood behind the seated Reagan,
Bush, and moderator “like hapless losers in a game of musical chairs.”68 Bush sat 
stiffly in his chair “like a small boy who has been dropped off at the wrong birthday 
party.”69 The moderator, Nashua Telegraph executive editor Jon Breen, announced 
that the debate would proceed as originally scheduled: a two-man debate. When 
Reagan interrupted to explain why he wanted the debate to include the other four 
candidates, Breen ordered: “Will you please turn off Governor Reagan’s microphone.” 
Reagan grabbed his microphone and shouted back, “I’m paying for this microphone,
65 David S. Broder and Lou Cannon, “A Polite Republican Race Takes turn for the 
Bitter,” The Washington Post, Sunday, 24 February 1980, A l.
66 John Conally was campaigning in South Carolina and chose not to return to New 
Hampshire for the debate.
67 Martin Schram and Myra McPherson, “The Night the Grand Old Party Went for Its 
Own Throat,” The Washington Post, Sunday, 24 February 1980, A5.
68 “We Were Sandbagged,” Time, 10 March 1980,15.
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Mr. Green.”70 It did not matter that Reagan had gotten the moderator’s name wrong. 
The crowd went wild with applause. People in the audience began shouting things at 
the moderator such as “You Hitler!” and “Didn’t you ever hear of freedom of the 
press?”71 The exchange between Reagan and the moderator would be the only image 
that most Americans would have concerning the debate. The debate was not televised 
and, other than the few seconds of footage shown on the evening news, no other video 
footage exists. During the uproar, Bush stayed in his seat looking flustered and 
confused. The four excluded candidates walked off stage and the formal proceedings 
began. Reagan debated with an enthusiasm not seen in the previous dates, dominating 
the discussion with one-liners that placed Bush on the defensive.72 During the debate, 
the four excluded candidates were speaking to the press in the school’s band room, 
making it clear that they placed all of the responsibility for their exclusion on the 
shoulders of Bush. Dole summed up the mood of the four men when he stated that 
“George Bush torpedoed us tonight. . .  as far as George Bush is concerned, he had 
better find himself another party.”73 All four men vowed to do everything in their 
power to assure that Bush would not be the nominee.
The Nashua debate proved to be the turning point in the 1980 campaign for the 
Republican nomination. Bush’s frontrunner status disintegrated; Reagan won the New
69 Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1982), 253.
70 Reagan-Bush Debate, Nashua, New Hampshire, 23 February 1980. Audio recording 
provided by President and Mrs. Reagan. From the Personal Collection of Ronald 
Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
71 “We Were Sandbagged,” Time, 10 March 1980,15.
72 Reagan-Bush Debate, Nashua, New Hampshire, 23 February 1980. Audio recording 
provided by President and Mrs. Reagan. From the Personal Collection of President 
Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
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Hampshire primary with 50 percent of the vote; Bush finished second with 23
percent.74 Even Bush’s pollster Robert Teeter admitted that many voters defected from
Bush after the dramatic scene in Nashua and supported Reagan.75 A race that almost
everyone thought would be close turned into a landslide victory during the last few
days when Bush walked right into a political trap set by Reagan. James Baker explains
the importance of the Nashua debate:
I think probably it was one turning point. I think it would have been very 
difficult for an unknown like George Bush, someone who was not known at all 
nationally—even after Iowa—to upset Ronald Reagan who had almost 
knocked off an incumbent president for the nomination in ’76. He came very 
close to knocking off Gerry Ford. And people don’t remember this but 
Governor Reagan started running for president in 1968. So I think that it would 
have been very tough for Bush to win in any event, but conceivable, and the 
Nashua debate was critical.76
As one reporter accurately noted, the debate reinforced "the very image problem Bush
has fought to overcome: that he is just the sort of preppie, Yalie, Skull and Bones
Society fellow his biography says he is. All of Bush’s Republican opponents were
hollering that he was arrogant, and that is the way it looked.”77 James Baker conceded
“I don’t think there’s any doubt that what happened on Saturday night and after that
hurt us severely.”78 Bush stayed in the fight until the convention; however, he had
essentially lost after that night in Nashua. What Bush had not been able to fathom was
that the instant media images created by the confrontation overshadowed the details
73 Martin Schram and Myra McPherson, “The night the Grand Old Party Went for Its 
Own Throat,” The Washington Post, Sunday, 24 February 1980, A5.
74 Lou Cannon, “Bush Is Crushed By Wide Margin,” The Washington Post, 
Wednesday, 27 February 1980, A l.
75 Ibid., A6.
76 James A. Baker IE, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
77 Martin Schram, “A Resurrection and, Possibly, an Interment,” The Washington 
Post, Wednesday, 27 February 1980, A7.
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such as who played fairly or who had the best positions on the issues. Reagan had
swept aside the doubts of his vitality and age by becoming a larger than life presence
on the stage. He fed off the emotion of the crowd and turned it to his advantage. Bush
had solidified his public image as an up-tight eastern elitist fighting against a down-to-
earth Reagan. As Baker recalls, it was pretty much over from that point:
Well it was [over] except that, you know, we won a lot of delegates and the 
reason he was put on the ticket. . .  Reagan didn’t want to put him on the ticket 
because they’d had a fairly contentious primary, and Bush lasted through 
Michigan and Pennsylvania, well into May. He didn’t have to get out of the 
race until sometime in the first or second week in May, and he had a lot of 
delegates at the national convention. And, if you recall, in Detroit, Reagan 
tried to go to Ford and that never worked out He really didn’t want to do Bush 
but then when that collapsed, when the Ford effort collapsed, there wasn’t 
anyplace to go except to Bush because he had delegates.
In actuality, Baker had skillfully placed Bush in the right position to be vice president
in hopes that the Ford nomination would fall apart:
What I’ll admit to, but George never will, is that the Veep thing was always the 
fallback. It was always in my mind. That’s why, at every opportunity, I had 
him cool his rhetoric about Reagan.80
Second place, however, had never been a goal for Bush and his remarkable
determination and competitiveness was apparent during the 1980 fight for the
Republican nomination. But, the weaknesses so obvious at Nashua were still there
when he ran for president in 1988.
Bush vs. Rather
By the start of the 1988 campaign, Bush’s staff knew that they had to do 
something to counter his reserved image of deference to Reagan. Bush knew he was
78 Ibid.
79 James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
80 Michael Kramer, “Playing for the Edge,” Time, 13 February 1989,29.
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an unconventional candidate for a post-Watergate electorate. His privileged
background and impressive resume set him apart from Reagan and Carter, whose
populist aura and outsider status appealed to voters. Bush was without question
identified with the establishment Marlin Fitzwater explains the involvement of the
Reagan administration:
We made a conscious effort to stay in the campaign. One of the reasons was 
that President Bush was not trying to create a separate identity. I mean, he was 
to a small degree, but his challenge was to show that his policies were the same 
as Ronald Reagan’s because they had worked together for a long time; they 
were both conservatives. People wanted to know if he was going to be loyal to 
the Bush, I mean, Reagan’s policies. And the press were always trying to drive 
a wedge between he and President Reagan.81
Perhaps equally as damaging were continued questions of Bush’s role in the Iran-
Contra Affair. Since the scandal became public in 1986, Bush had refused to provide a
full accounting of his role in the clandestine operation. “I’m not a kiss-and-teller”
Bush would repeatedly explain.82 The problem with the Iran-Contra Affair for Bush
was that it attacked his experience in intelligence and diplomacy, his loyal service to
Reagan, and his concern for ethics in government—his greatest assets. The issue came
to a head when Vice President Bush agreed to a live interview with Dan Rather of
CBS Evening News. Bush had insisted that the interview be live so that he would have
a better chance at getting his points across. The interview on January 25, 1988,
represents what media experts label a “defining event” as far as Bush’s image was
concerned.
81 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
82 David Hoffman, “Questions Dog Vice President: Bush Yet to Provide Full Account 
on Iran,” The Washington Post, Thursday, 7 January 1988, A l.
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CBS had explained to Bush’s staff that the interview would be the first in a
series of candidate profiles for the upcoming election. As it drew closer and closer to
time for the interview, it became clear to the Bush staff that the interview would focus
solely on Iran-Contra. After less than three minutes devoted to covering Ronald
Reagan’s State of the Union address and less than a minute on the polls for the 1988
campaign, Dan Rather presented a five-minute report on Bush’s role in the Iran-Contra
Affair.83 The report was very damaging to Bush and clearly demonstrated that Rather
believed that he was far more involved than he had admitted to this point. The report
showed a picture of Bush’s desk in a dark room with a lamp shining on two file
folders marked “Arms Sales” and “Supplying the Contras.” Rather’s voice ticked off
inconsistencies between Bush’s public statements and the official record:
[Bush] insists he was out of the loop, uniformed about the events and the risks 
o f the Iran Initiatives. But the record shows, Mr. Bush attended more than 
fifteen meetings in the Oval Office at which the arms sales were discussed.84
The report continued, comparing what Bush “says” and what “the record shows.”
Bush sat in his Senate office at the Capitol, watching the report on a television monitor
(See figure 1.1). Bush’s anger grew as he watched the report. At one point he barked
at the sound technician, “Iran-Contra Affair? . . .  I didn’t know this was about the Iran-
Contra Affair. Nobody told me. . .  They aren’t going to talk to me about Iran-Contra,
are they? If he talks to me about the Iran-Contra Affair, they’re going to see a
83 Television News Index and Abstracts: A Guide to the Videotape Collection o f the 
Network Evening News Programs in the Vanderbilt Television News Archive 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt Television News Archive, 1988), 155-156.
“Bush vs. Rather,” CBS Evening News, 25 January 1988. Video footage provided 
by the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.
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ission. Figure 1.1. George Bush in his Senate office, watching the report on the television monitor while waiting for his live interview with 
Dan Rather. His ensuing confrontation with Rather would wipe away the “wimp” label in less than fifteen memorable television 
minutes. (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)
seven-minute walkout here.”83 Rather, on the other hand, had spent the entire day
preparing for the interview. The preparation included briefings by associates and
Democratic Party activists, reading through material, and engaging in role playing
activities to anticipate how Bush would respond. It was exactly the type of preparation
that a candidate would engage in before a live debate. By the time the live interview
began, the scene was set for fireworks to explode. Bush quickly accused CBS of
misleading him concerning the subject of the interview:
Bush: You’ve impugned my integrity by suggesting, with one of your little 
boards here, that I didn’t tell the truth... you don’t accuse me o f it, but 
you made that suggestion.... And so, I find this to be a rehash and a 
little bit—if you’ll excuse me—a misrepresentation on the part of CBS, 
who said you’re doing political profiles on all the candidates, and then 
you come up with something that has been exhaustively looked into.86
Rather was quickly put on the defensive; the level of hostility steadily rose as Bush
and Rather interrupted each other:
Bush: May I answer that?
Rather. That wasn’t a question. It was a statement.
Bush: It was a statement and I’ll answer it.
Rather: Let me ask the question, if I may, first.
Later in the interview:
Rather: I don’t want to be argumentative, Mr. Vice President.
Bush: You do, Dan.87
83 Phil McCombs, “In the Studio, Countdown Toward Explosion,” The Washington
Post, Wednesday, 27 January 1988, D2.
86 “Bush vs. Rather,” CBS Evening News, 25 January 1988. Video footage provided
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Bush sent Rather over the edge reminding Dan Rather how he angrily stalked off the 
news set in Miami when the start o f his news program was delayed by network 
officials to accommodate the end of the U.S. Open tennis match. The walkout left the 
network on black for six or seven minutes. It was a major embarrassment to the 
network and showed Rather’s volatility and, some would argue, his immense ego.
Bush: This is not a great night, ’cause I want to talk about why I want to be 
president, why those 41 percent of the people are supporting me. And I 
don’t think it’s fair to judge a whole career, it’s not fair to judge my 
whole career by a rehash on Iran. How would you like it if I judged 
your career by those seven minutes when you walked off the set in New 
York? Would you like that? I have respect for you, but I don’t have 
respect for what you’re doing here tonight88
It did not matter that he named the wrong city. Just as it did not matter in Nashua in
1980 when Reagan called the moderator by the wrong name. Bush had taken control
of the situation. Rather sat frozen, his anger apparent to every viewer. He had lost
control of the interview, and of his emotions. Rather returned to Iran-Contra, with a
below-the-belt punch:
Rather: Mr. Vice President, you’ve made us hypocrites in the face of the
world. How could you, how could you sign on to such a policy? And 
the question is what does this tell us about your record?
Rather asked Bush if he would hold a news conference before the Iowa caucuses to
answer questions about Iran-Contra. Bush declared that he had already held eighty-six
news conferences on that subject since the story broke in 1986, Rather cut the vice
president off:
Rather: I gather the answer is no. Thank you very much for being with us, Mr. 
Vice President90
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
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Bush was furious. He slammed down his earphone exclaiming “The bastard didn’t lay
a glove on me.” He then proceeded with an obscenity-laced tirade that was recorded
by the CBS technicians.91 The “wimp” label was over.
Immediate reaction favored Bush. Thousands of viewers jammed the
network’s lines expressing their opinion that Rather was a bully. His interviewing
“style” was deemed rude and disrespectful to the office of vice president. The next day
crowds were waving signs that read “We’d Rather Be for Bush” and “Dan Rather Is a
Democrat.”92 Political cartoons pictured Bush as a gunslinger shooting a television set,
or dressed as the fictional soldier Rambo and holding a machine gun labeled
RAMBUSH. Fitzwater recalls the importance of the confrontation:
I think it helped him considerably.... The confrontation itself was helpful 
because simply it did kind of have a symbolic manhood effect if you will. Dan 
Rather came out of it looking really bad. He [Rather] was angry and felt he’d 
been humiliated and so forth. So I think on the whole it was very helpful for 
President Bush and the campaign. In the long term, it hurt his relationship with 
CBS, and that was always a difficult relationship from then on through his 
presidency. But the immediate effect was definitely good for President Bush 
and bad for Dan Rather.93
Rather, on the other hand, felt like a victim. He blamed others in the media for 
debating whether Bush had been badgered and treated with disrespect instead of 
following up on questions that he had felt Bush had once again ducked. He claimed 
that Bush had been practicing his explosions of outrage in the days leading up to the 
interview. As Rather recalls in his memoir:
91 Tom Shales, “Rather, Bush and the Nine-Minute War,” The Washington Post, 
Tuesday, 26 January 1988, E l.
92 David Hoffinan, “Bush Revels in Reaction to Face-Off,” The Washington Post, 
Wednesday, 27 January 1988, A12.
93 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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The indignation of Bush was as sincere as that o f Captain Louis Renault, when 
he orders the closing of Rick’s Cafd in Casablanca: “I am shocked, shocked to 
find that gambling is going on here,” the captain protests, as he slips into his 
pockets the winnings handed him by a waiter.94
He was especially upset with Bush’s charge that he had been ambushed. Going into
the interview, Rather had one lone question that he wanted Bush to answer
Why did we send over two thousand of our best missiles to the Ayatollah, after 
241 of our best servicemen had been blown up on his orders?95
Rather had a highly placed secret source that he trusted telling him that Bush had
eagerly played a major role in Iran-Contra. Bush had publicly denied it. Rather hoped
to catch him in a lie. But, Rather had made no secret of his goal. The promos run by
CBS during the week leading up to the interview clearly stated that the interview
would cover questions concerning the Iran-Contra Affair. Rather himself had
introduced the interview as “a live interview with Mr. Bush on arms to Iran and
money to the Contras.”96 In addition to the charges of ambush, Rather was upset
because he felt that the jab on the Miami episode was below the belt. When urged by
the Evening News press representative to apologize, Rather angrily responded, “Wait
a minute, I haven’t done anything to apologize for, and I’m not apologizing.”97 In fact,
the only person in the CBS newsroom that felt Rather had done a great job was Tom
Donilon, the paid CBS News consultant from the Democratic party who tried to
console Rather. Even Rather himself was “acutely aware that it [the interview] had
94 Dan Rather with Mickey Herskowitz, The Camera Never Blinks Twice: The Further 
Adventures o f a Television Journalist (New York: William Morrow, 1994), 112.
95 Ibid., 101.
96 Ibid., 101.
97 Ibid., 114.
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ended abruptly; it was like a door slamming in someone's face.”98 But, that was the 
only mistake Rather was willing to admit. As for an apology, that was out of the 
question. Whether Rather apologized or not, whether the Bush campaign had staged 
Bush’s response or not, the “wimp” label had been wiped away in less than fifteen 
memorable television minutes.
The disintegration of his “wimp” label carried a heavy price as the Iran-Contra 
Affair came back into center stage. After the initial post-interview excitement, articles 
began to appear with titles such as “Bush Is Not A Wimp. Is He Qualified To Be 
President?”99 Questions continued to build throughout the primaries. Lee Atwater, 
Roger Ailes, and George Sununu urged the vice president to go on the offensive in 
order to deflect attention away from his own faults. Normally, the candidate preferred 
to leave the negative campaigning to his advertising and surrogates. The Bush 
campaign, however, was low on funds and would not be able to wage an advertising 
assault until the fall. They needed to create stories for the news media to cover. Also, 
Bush’s handlers wanted to strengthen his image by demonstrating to the public that he 
was a fighter. All of these problems could be resolved by attacking his opponents. 
Bush had fought Dan Rather and won. Now it was time to fight for the presidency. 
Bush had always been uneasy about negative campaigning and was reluctant to give in 
to his advisors. “I don’t like that stuff,” he once told Atwater, “and I don’t want to 
hear any more of i t”100 Eventually though, Bush could no longer ignore the polling 
data and reluctantly agreed. Ironically, he would find help from the left when
98Ibid., 111.
99 David Broder, “Bush Is Not A Wimp. Is He Qualified to Be President?,” The 
Washington Post, Sunday, 31 January 1988, D7.
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Democratic presidential-hopeful A1 Gore attacked Dukakis on Massachusetts’ record 
of permitting “weekend passes” for convicted first-degree murderers who were 
serving life sentences without possibility of parole. Bush’s staff seized on this story 
and used the case o f one of the convicts, Willie Horton, to destroy Dukakis’ double­
digit lead. From that point onward, the Bush campaign became a search-and-destroy 
mission, emphasizing Dukakis’ support of high taxes and increased spending, lack of 
support for defense, support for abortion, attempting to “disarm the state” through gun 
control, and attempting to veto the Pledge of Allegiance. In other words, Dukakis was 
the most liberal and thus the most un-American candidate in America. Rather than 
promoting reasons why voters should cast their ballots for their guy, the Bush 
campaign team was spewing out reasons why the public should vote against the other 
guy. Bush’s staff hoped that they could elevate their candidate by destroying the other 
in a political zero-sum game of epic proportions.
Of course, George Herbert Walker Bush did win the 1988 election and became 
the forty-first president of the United States. His victory seemed impressive at first 
glance. Not since Herbert Hoover had a candidate succeeded a retiring president of his 
own party and not since Martin Van Buren had a vice president been elected to the 
Oval Office. Overcoming a 17-point deficit in July, Bush won an 8-point victory in 
November, capturing 40 states. While the comeback was impressive, his victory did 
not amount to a landslide. Only 57 percent of the voting age population choose to cast 
a ballot, the lowest such turnout since Calvin Coolidge beat John D. Davis in 1924. 
This meant that only roughly 27 percent of the adult population had actually voted for
100 Peter Goldman and Tom Mathews, The Quest fo r the Presidency: 1988,307.
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Bush. Many cynics argued that the 1988 election had been plagued with a growing 
sense of frustration among voters. According to this view, “neither candidate was 
addressing the issues that most concerned them. The message, if either man had one, 
had got drowned out by the mudslingmg.”101 Bush entered into the presidency with no 
clear mandate from the country and with no clear agenda on how to correct the 
domestic policy problems that had been created by the deficit spending of the Reagan 
years. With Democrats achieving net gains in both houses of Congress, governorships, 
and in the state legislatures, Bush would have little chance of pushing forward a 
domestic agenda even if he had one.102 Bush turned to an area where he would have 
greater freedom to form an agenda and an area where he had considerable expertise: 
foreign policy.
101 Ibid., 418.
102 Bush was the first president since William Howard Taft to have been elected while 
his party suffered net losses in each house of Congress, governorships, and state 
legislatures.
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-Chapter 2- 
The Primacy of the National Security Council: 
Beyond Containment in Europe
During the 1988 election, George Bush billed himself as the candidate of continuity. A 
vice president who had faithfully served an enormously popular president pledged to 
continue in his footsteps. While avoiding specifics, Bush promised that he would build 
on the achievements of his predecessor. Such campaign rhetoric, however, did more 
than just win Bush the election. It has shaped how the public, and many political 
observers and historians, have viewed these years. Historical interpretation considers 
this part of American history as the “Reagan-Bush years,” indicating that Bush’s term 
could best be explained as Reagan’s third term. There is some validity to such 
attempts at periodization, especially on domestic issues. But too often scholars gloss 
over the differences between President Reagan’s and President Bush’s approach to 
foreign policy, particularly toward the Soviet Union. This distinction is partly a result 
of a muddled view of the end of the Cold War. A common misconception is that the 
Cold War was basically over by the end of the Reagan administration and that Bush 
merely needed to wrap up the agreements that Reagan had already negotiated. This 
argument completely disregards the ever-changing realities of foreign policy and 
underestimates the potentially explosive situation in Eastern Europe that still existed 
when Reagan left office.
Reagan’s policy of peace through strength had all but guaranteed that the Cold War 
would come to an end. The Soviets simply no longer had the resources to match the 
military build-up of the Americans. From its highpoint in the 1950s, the Soviet Gross
5t
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National Product (GNP) had dropped steadily. CIA estimates placed the annual 
average rates of growth of Soviet GNP at 4.8 percent in 1961-65,3.0 percent in W I ­
TS, and 1.8 percent in 1981-85.1 The Soviet GNP in 1980 simply could not compete 
with the GNP of the United States.2
Table 2.1
Population, GNP per Capita, and GNP in 1980
Population
(millions)
GNP per capita 
(dollars)
GNP (billions of 
dollars)
United States 228 11,360 2,590
USSR 265 4,550 1,205
When Reagan unveiled his plan for his expensive Strategic Defense Initiative, the
Soviets knew that their economy could not maintain the arms race for much longer. As
Marlin Fitzwater recalls:
In all the summit meetings that I was in with Reagan and Gorbachev, every 
one of them ended in the Soviet Union’s plea toward getting us to drop SDI.... 
And their problem was that they felt they couldn’t afford to match it. And so 
they knew; that’s when they started getting serious about arms reduction. Their 
view was, we don’t have the money to ever build a space-based system; let’s 
get out of the arms race. So they started reducing nuclear weapons. President 
Bush kept the pressure on in the same way when he met with Gorbachev and 
then with Yeltsin, after Yeltsin replaced him in ’90, their goal was still the 
same. They still focused every meeting on how to get us to back out of SDI. So 
President Bush wanted to hold that pressure point out there all through his four 
years as well.3
1 Measuring Soviet GNP: Problems and Solutions: A Conference (Washington, D.C.: 
Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 1990), 188.
2 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflictfrom 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 436.
3 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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Brent Scowcroft agrees with the fact that the Soviets simply could not afford to match 
SDI:
I think they were afraid of SDI because. . .  not so much because they thought 
it would work, but that if we went down that path, they would have to follow 
and it was too expensive for them. They didn’t have the resources.4
If SDI had ever become operational, the Soviet defense budget would have the added
pressure of producing even more rockets and warheads. Perhaps even more troubling
for the Soviets was the American advancements in lasers, optics, supercomputers,
guidance systems, and navigation. As one historian has observed:
Russia has always enjoyed its greatest military advantage vis-a-vis the West 
when the pace of weapons technology has slowed down enough to allow a 
standardization of equipment and thus of fighting units and tactics—whether 
that be the eighteenth-century infantry column or the mid-twentieth-century 
armored division.5
With a larger Russian investment needed in advanced technologies, one Russian 
spokesman warned of “a whole new arms race at a much higher technological level.”6 
Taking into consideration the dramatic shift in each country’s GNP, the Soviets simply 
could not maintain the arms race much longer. Critics of Reagan’s approach to arms 
control, most notably Brent Scowcroft, have pointed out that SDI tended to stymie 
negotiations because Reagan refused to use it as a bargaining tool. Reagan viewed SDI 
as too important to use as leverage to get other things the United States wanted from 
the Soviets. Consequently, he never put SDI on the table. By the time Reagan left 
office, the question for U.S. policymakers had changed from how does democracy
4 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
5 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers, 500.
6 Flora Lewis, “Soviet SDI Fears,” New York Times, March 6,1986, A27.
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defeat communism to how does democracy help communism go away in a peaceful 
way.
The Bush administration was able to manage the end of the Cold War so that it 
ended with a whimper and not a bang.7 They were able to accomplish this in part by 
making a fundamental change in the foreign policy approach that had been used by the 
Reagan administration. During arms control negotiations, Reagan had placed the 
emphasis on numbers, reducing numbers by eliminating certain kinds of weapons. 
George Bush’s national security advisor Brent Scowcroft disagreed with that 
approach. He had viewed President Reagan’s rush toward disarmament as “a mighty 
dubious objective for grown-ups in this business.”8 General Scowcroft believed that 
simply getting rid of certain kinds of weapons did not achieve the overall goal of arms 
control, which was to improve stability. Instead, he wanted to reduce the chances that 
in a crisis either side would resort to the use of nuclear weapons for fear of some 
vulnerability in the nuclear arsenal. That was a goal that could not be accomplished 
simply by a shift in numbers. Historically, negotiations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union had centered on arms control. General Scowcroft hoped to shift the 
focus to Eastern Europe. He wanted to take advantage of the ferment that was growing 
in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, to force the Soviet army out of Eastern 
Europe, or at least reduce their presence so that Eastern Europeans could develop in a 
progressive way. This meant putting arms control on the back burner until the 
situation in Eastern Europe unfolded; a move that would require a fundamental change
7 James A. Baker CD, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
8 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
54
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.9 For the president who had promised 
to continue on the course set by his predecessor, this had the potential for drawing 
criticism, especially from the right-wing establishment who had always doubted 
Bush’s credentials as a conservative. Rather than make an abrupt change, President 
Bush conducted a lengthy foreign policy review at the beginning of his term in office. 
The foreign policy review would allow him to make his own imprint on the nation’s 
foreign policy and make sure that there had not been an overly aggressive effort made 
by the Reagan administration to conclude a deal with the Soviets before time ran ou t10
The National Security Council 
The formulation of foreign policy in the Bush administration centered on the 
National Security Council, an inner circle of men that had the complete confidence of 
President Bush.11 Bush’s NSC was markedly different from the one that had existed 
during the Reagan presidency. Reagan’s foreign policy advisors were full of suspicion 
and mutual mistrust, in the words of James Baker, “a witches’ brew of intrigue, 
elbows, egos, and separate agendas.”12 Baker, claims not to “remember any extended 
period of time when someone in the National Security cluster wasn’t at someone else’s 
throat.”13 The fact that Ronald Reagan went through seven national security advisors 
during the eight years that he was in office indicates that something was wrong.
9 Ibid.
10 James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
11 The National Security Council has four statutory members: the president, vice 
president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. The director of Central 
Intelligence, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the national security advisor 
also attend NSC meetings and serve as statutory advisors.
12 James A. Baker in, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy: 
Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 26.
13 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 26.
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Reagan’s seventh national security advisor, Colin Powell, described Reagan’s 
National Security Council as “rudderless, drifting, demoralized.”14 That flaw started in 
Reagan’s first year as president In an effort to end the rivalry that had existed between 
the NSC and the Department of State during the Carter administration, Ronald Reagan 
decided to downgrade the post of national security advisor. To facilitate this objective, 
National Security Advisor Richard Allen’s office was placed under the supervision of 
Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese III. Thus, the national security advisor lost direct 
access to the president for the first time since the NSC had been created in 1947.15 
Reagan drove home the point in subsequent public statements by stressing that his 
secretary of state was his “primary advisor on foreign affairs, and in that capacity, he 
is the chief formulator and spokesman for foreign policy for this administration.”16 
Reagan made clear that the State Department would handle foreign affairs decisions in 
his administration while the National Security Administration would merely be 
responsible for the “integration” of the policies proposed by the State Department. 
Further changes in the NSC were made at a February 25,1981, meeting, which 
established three Senior Interdepartmental Groups (SIGs), chaired by the secretary of 
state, the secretary of defense, and the director of Central Intelligence, respectively. 
Each SIG would deal with specific issues through a series of assistant secretary-level 
Interdepartmental Groups (IGs). That same year Reagan went on to establish the
14 John Barry and Evan Thomas, “Colin Powell: Behind the Myth,” Newsweek, 5 
March 2001,36.
15 The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 
and amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. Later in 1949, as 
part o f the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the 
President
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Special Situation Group (SSG) and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG). It 
seemed that policy would be formulated anywhere but in formal meetings of the NSC; 
and Reagan’s first national security advisor resigned within a year. The situation did 
not improve as the Reagan administration went on to form an additional 22 SIGs and 
55 IGs, which allowed NSC officials such as Colonel Oliver North to establish their 
own sub-domains. The role of the NSA became more prominent during the tenures of 
William Clark and Robert McFarlane; however, too many people played activist roles 
in the management of daily U.S. foreign relations problems. That lack of cooperation 
and organization became evident to the public during the Iran-Contra Affair and the 
subsequent appointment of the Tower Board that made recommendations for the 
reform of the NSC. During that investigation, Congress found that subordinates would 
sometimes ignore the wishes of the president and pursue their own policy schemes. 
Ironically, Bush would appoint to his National Security Council two men, John Tower 
and Brent Scowcroft, who had served on the Tower Commission that investigated 
Reagan’s NSC during the Iran-Contra Affair. The Tower Board would recommend 
that the size of the NSC staff be reduced, a legal counsel be appointed, and that the 
Crisis Pre-Planning Group be replaced with a Policy Review Committee. The NSC 
largely withdrew from its operational roles while the Board’s recommendations were 
implemented, maintaining a low profile for the rest of Reagan’s administration. 
National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci and his successor Colin Powell would use 
the time to implement many of the changes suggested by the Tower Commission. As 
Colin Powell recalls:
16 “History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997,” official National Security
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My own view is that, and this is a very self-serving view as you can imagine, 
that when Mr. Carlucci took over and I was his deputy we restored a since of 
process and discipline to the National Security Council and its functioning. 
Then there were some additional changes in personality when Mr. Carlucci 
went to the Pentagon and Mr. Weinberger left And a more cooperative 
relationship emerged between the Department of Defense and the NSC. And I 
would say that it continued into and through the Bush administration.17
By the start of the Bush administration, the changes in the NSC would once again
allow it to play a constructive role in policymaking without fear of the improprieties
experienced during the Iran-Contra Affair. Ironically, it would be one of the lead
members of the Tower Commission that Bush would entrust to complete the changes
in the NSC.
At the center of Bush’s foreign policymaking team was his national security 
advisor Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force lieutenant general. Scowcroft had spent 
much of his time in the Air Force both studying and teaching international relations. 
His credentials included a Ph.D. from Columbia University, as well as teaching stints 
at West Point, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the Naval War College. He had 
worked for the Department of Defense, served as deputy national security advisor 
under Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration, and succeeded Kissinger as 
President Ford’s national security advisor. After 1976, Scowcroft worked for 
Kissinger Associates as an international consultant During the Reagan administration, 
Scowcroft served on various committees, including the Tower Commission that was 
formed in 1986 to investigate the Iran-Contra Affair. Although he had many close 
Mends in the Reagan administration, including the vice president Scowcroft had 
privately been one of the fiercest critics of Reagan’s foreign and military policy. He
Council website, www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/htmI/NSChistoryJitml.
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felt that Reagan’s initial hard-line approach was foolish and that his subsequent blind
embrace o f Gorbachev was naive. Scowcroft especially objected to Reagan’s policy
on nuclear deterrence, terming Reagan’s 1986 Reykjavik proposal to eliminate all
ballistic missiles as “insane.”18 Bush’s selection of Scowcroft sent a clear message to
Washington insiders that he intended to change the direction of defense and foreign
policy. Scowcroft’s style also suited Bush’s preference for staying out of the limelight
and working quietly behind the scenes. Scowcroft’s low-profile, self-effacing
approach won Bush’s complete trust. Bush recalled that Scowcroft “worked the
longest hours of anyone in the White House.”19 That was the type of loyal dedication
that Bush prized above all other traits and was indicative of the close relationship the
two men developed, going back to 1972. Scowcroft was one of the first people that
Bush asked to join his administration.20 He had considered Scowcroft to serve as the
secretary of defense or possibly director of the CIA; however, Bush felt that
Scowcroft’s knowledge of foreign policy matters could best be utilized as national
security advisor. Bush also had another motive for selecting Scowcroft:
In selecting him, I would also send a signal to my cabinet and to outside 
observers that the NSC’s function was to be critical in the decision-making 
process.21
It was clear that Bush intended to rely on the NSC, and Scowcroft, more than anyone 
else, would prove to be the chief architect of the foreign policy approach of the Bush 
administration. He answered directly to the president and always made sure that a
17 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
18 Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 51.
19 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 
1998), 33.
20 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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third person was present to make a record of everything that was discussed and agreed 
upon, something that was not always the case with the Reagan administration. Even 
critics of the administration conceded that the NSC ran more smoothly under 
Scowcroft.
Scowcroft was joined on the National Security Council by Bush’s campaign 
manager James Baker, who had been offered the position of secretary of state just two 
days prior to the 1988 election (See figure 2.1). Baker was one of Bush’s oldest 
friends, going back to his pre-political days in Texas, where the two met in 1959 at a 
cookout when a mutual friend suggested that they become tennis partners at the 
Houston Country Club. The two men went on to win two club championships and 
form a lifelong friendship. After Baker’s first wife died of cancer in 1970, it was Bush 
who was responsible for getting Baker interested in politics by involving him in his 
1970 Senate campaign. In 1975, Bush helped get Baker his first public job when he 
persuaded President Ford to appoint Baker as under secretary of commerce. Baker had 
a large ego and could be abrasive if he felt that his time was being wasted. As Baker 
has admitted, he and his staff “did not suffer fools gladly.”22 Baker’s critics have 
characterized him as a consummate pragmatist and tough politician. His years as a 
successful lawyer, however, allowed him to operate in a conciliatory manner when he 
wanted to gain an edge over someone. When he adopted this nonconfrontational 
technique, he could cleverly guide, or persuade, people to “chose” the option that he 
had intended all along. This type of strategy earned him the nickname “the Velvet
21 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 19.
22 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 32.
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ission. Figure 2.1. Bush, Scowcroft, and Baker would prove to be the chief architects of Bush’s foreign policy. (Courtesy of the George 
Bush Presidential Library.)
Hammer" and allowed him to refrain from making too many enemies. It was a 
technique that he used while running Bush’s campaigns and one that would serve him 
well when dealing with foreign leaders. All in all, Baker was tough, very competitive, 
a strong negotiator, and someone Bush could count on to state how he felt directly and 
forcefully, even when it was not the advice that Bush wanted to hear. Baker recalls 
that he often was the recipient of one of Bush’s favorite jabs: “If you’re so smart, why 
am I vice president [or president] and you’re not?”23 This usually indicated to Baker 
that Bush was cutting short their discussion because he did not like the advice he was 
offered. There were many times when the two men disagreed and became angry with 
one another, but neither man would voice his displeasure publicly. In the Bush 
administration, friendship and loyalty went hand in hand. That loyalty went with 
Baker as he assumed his new position at the State Department. In an interview with 
Time magazine following his appointment, Baker stressed that he intended to be “the 
president’s man at the State Department, not the State Department’s man at the White 
House.”24 Baker was determined to make it clear that President Bush made foreign 
policy, not the Foreign Service.
Dick Cheney became secretary of defense after John Tower’s nomination 
failed because of allegations of alcohol abuse. Cheney was a close friend of Scowcroft 
and shared his pragmatic, no-nonsense work ethic and lack of ego. His graduate 
degree in political science, stint as President Ford’s White House Chief of Staff, and 
six terms in Congress were valuable assets. While chief of staff, Cheney routinely
23 Ibid., 20.
24 Michael Kramer and Christopher Ogden, “I Want to Be the President’s Man,” Time, 
February 13, 1989,31.
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attended National Security Council meetings. At the time of his appointment, Cheney 
was serving as the senior Republican on the Budget Subcommittee of the Intelligence 
Committee, which authorized the activities of all intelligence programs. He had, 
therefore, a depth of understanding in very specific areas that come within the general 
jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and national security in general.25 His 
greatest asset, however, was his friendship with key members of the Bush 
administration. The close working relationship that Bush, Scowcroft, Baker, and 
Cheney had cultivated during the Ford administration ensured that the national 
security apparatus would function smoothly. Friction was handled privately. Baker 
was preparing for his first visit to Moscow in May 1989. Just prior to this trip, on 
April 29, Dick Cheney agreed to a CNN interview, during which he surmised that 
Gorbachev’s push for perestroika would “ultimately fail.” For the secretary of defense 
to be predicting Gorbachev’s failure publicly would certainly have cast a shadow over 
Baker’s trip to Moscow. Cheney called Baker and agreed with him that he had said 
something that was better left unsaid. Baker claims that it was the only major 
disagreement with Cheney involving turf during the entire administration.26
The role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone through serious 
changes during the Reagan administration. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 
gave the chairman of the JCS real power.27 Since its creation in 1949, the power of the 
chairman was limited to presenting the secretary of defense and the president with the
25 The President’s News Conference: March 10, 1989, 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89031006.html
26 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 70.
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watered-down consensus recommendations of the chiefs. As head of his own service, 
each chief had a separate agenda and a unique perspective of events. Decision papers 
from the JCS tended to be guided by the least-common-denominator that “every chief 
would accept but few secretaries of defense or presidents found useful.”28 The 1986 
act designated the chairman of the JCS as the “principal military advisor” who could 
give his own advice directly to the secretary of defense and the president. Admiral 
William J. Crowe, Jr. was chairman when the 1986 reorganization went into effect. 
Bush allowed Admiral Crowe to finish out his term until he retired at the end of 
September 1989. When it came time to decide on a replacement, Cheney advised Bush 
to consider Colin Powell, who had served as Reagan’s national security advisor during 
the last year of his administration. Powell was one of the few people from the Reagan 
administration whom Bush had considered for the new team, offering him the job of 
deputy secretary of state or director o f the CIA.29 Powell had declined both offers, 
deciding to return to the Army as commander in chief of Forces Command, a position 
responsible for all Army field forces based in the United States and carrying a 
promotion to four star general, the Army’s highest rank. Later in the year when Bush 
made him the offer to vault to the highest uniformed military post in the land as 
chairman of the JSC, it was too good to pass up. Both men were concerned with the 
fact that Powell was the most junior of the IS four-star generals who were legally 
eligible for the chairmanship. Despite Bush’s and Powell’s reservations, Cheney was
27 The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is commonly referred to as the Goldwater- 
Nichols Act because it had been sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and 
Congressman Bill Nichols.
28 Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random 
House, 1995), 411.
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
convinced that Powell’s tenure as National Security Administration as well as his
military command credits had uniquely prepared him to operate between the Pentagon
and the White House with ease. Assuming the position of chairman on October 1,
1989, Powell became the first chairman to begin his tenure with the added benefit of
Goldwater-Nichols authority. Powell explains the importance of Goldwater-Nichols:
[It helped] to the extent that Goldwater-Nichols did not require me to speak 
with the corporate voice. In other words, I can speak in my own right as 
principle military advisor. All the other chiefs are military advisors to the 
president as well. But, because the chairman is the principle military advisor, I 
did not need the chiefs vote on what my advice should be for the corporate 
body. That was of enormous help.30
But, as Powell recalls, just as important was the confidence that Bush and Cheney had
in his ideas:
The great influence that I was able to use was the influence given to me by my 
superiors. The fact that Mr. Cheney found the ideas that we came up with 
useful and that the president found them useful and relevant to the challenges 
they had is really what made it work more so than bureaucratic imprimatur of 
Goldwater-Nichols.31
The relationship between Powell and Cheney in particular would become quite strong 
and add to the cohesion of the National Security Council.
One o f the few hold-overs from the Reagan Administration was William 
Webster, who was asked to continue his role as the director of Central Intelligence. 
Despite having no background in intelligence or foreign policy, Webster had been 
offered the job as DCI upon the death of William Casey and in the aftermath of the 
Iran-Contra Affair. Labeled by Newsweek as “Washington’s most successful Mr. 
Fixit,” the Missouri lawyer and former federal judge had served as director of the
29 Powell with Persico, My American Journey, 388.
30 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1978 to 1987, helping to reverse the agency’s 
image that had been blighted by the legacy of J. Edgar Hoover. As the new DCI, 
Webster ended the off-the-books covert operations that had been routinely organized 
by Casey. Prior to Webster’s new guidelines, as then deputy director Robert Gates 
recalls, covert operations “was a very informal kind of process, [but] now they 
actually sit down and debate the issue. They talk about it; they go through a long 
checklist of questions.”32 He also dramatically improved the CIA’s relationship with 
Congress, something that had been virtually ignored by Casey. But, Webster’s main 
priority was to make a firm distinction between intelligence and policymaking. As the 
first director of Central Intelligence to be named a member of the Cabinet, Casey had 
all but obliterated that line. Refusing to be appointed to that rank, Judge Webster 
defined his role as informing and implementing policy, not making it. He even went so 
far as to say that it was none of his business what policymakers did with his 
intelligence estimates. In fact, Webster wanted to make the relationship between the 
director and president “professional and not a political relationship.”33 This matched 
President Bush’s concept of the role of the DCI. Having served as DCI himself, Bush 
had a very set idea about the role that the director of the CIA should play in an 
administration. It was clear that the DCI would provide the president with intelligence 
information but otherwise have no role in policymaking decisions.
As vice president, Dan Quayle also served on the NSC. His interest in arms 
control involved him in many of the discussions of the NSC; however, his input was
31 Ibid.
32 Russell Watson with Richard Sandza, “Cleaning Up the Mess,” Newsweek, October 
12,1987, p. 9.
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usually only considered when it, at least loosely, fell in line with the direction in which 
Bush was already leaning. In an administration dominated by people with far more 
experience in foreign affairs, Quayle was primarily involved in domestic policy and 
congressional maneuvering. Even he admits that his contribution to foreign policy­
making during the Bush administration was marginal.34 He was, however, a faithful 
observer to the decision-making process. Each morning he attended the president’s 
daily national security briefing with Scowcroft and CIA briefers. He would then stay 
for Bush’s meeting with the chief of staff to set the agenda for the rest of the day. 
Quayle continued to favor programs from the Reagan era such as SDI and he 
continued the strong anti-Soviet rhetoric that was prevalent dining Reagan’s first term. 
While this endeared Quayle to the right wing of the Republican party, it made Bush’s 
more moderate advisors wary of Quayle’s input Quayle, therefore, was not a 
significant contributor to foreign policymaking during the Bush administration. His 
many hard-line speeches, however, did help mollify the right wing of the Republican 
party, who never really trusted Bush, and gave Bush some political cover to institute 
his own, more moderate, foreign policy decisions. Qualye’s speeches also allowed the 
Bush administration to be critical of the Soviet Union and congressional Democrats 
without the criticism coming directly from the president Bush could then distance 
himself from the comments using an often-repeated line: “I haven’t seen what he said,
33 Quoted in an interview with Newsweek editors, October 12,1987, p. 29-35.
34 David S. Broder and Bob Woodward, The Man Who Would Be President: Dan 
Quayle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 96.
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so I can’t  tell you whether he speaks for me. I speak for myself. He speaks for 
himself.”35
One final person that should be mentioned is Marlin Fitzwater. Although not 
officially a part of the NSC, Fitzwater attended the NSC meetings, sitting quietly to 
one side. He had decided early in his job as press secretary that he needed to attend 
National Security Council meetings and other foreign policy discussions in order to 
absorb the nuances of foreign policy and the rationale for policy changes. Reagan had 
allowed him this unusual level of access and Bush, somewhat reluctantly, agreed to 
the continuation of this practice. During his six years with Reagan and Bush, he was 
never asked to leave a meeting, and his presence paid off with his improved ability to 
explain to the public the actions taken by the NSC.36
Together, these men represented a very capable NSC that Bush would rely on 
during the dramatic events leading to the end of the Cold War. That does not mean, 
however, that the NSC collectively made the decisions concerning foreign policy. As 
Brent Scowcroft recalls, President Bush always made the final decision. Perhaps 
because of his extensive background in foreign affairs, Bush enjoyed debating issues 
with his advisors (See figure 2.2). He asked question after question, provoking people 
to defend their views. This helped him clarify the issues in his own mind and allowed 
him to make prudent, well-reasoned decisions. According to Scowcroft, “Rarely did
35 An example of this occurred when the Tower nomination failed in the Senate. 
Quayle made a blistering speech in Indianapolis that accused Senate Democrats of 
using “McCarthy-like tactics” to defeat John Tower. Although Bush privately agreed 
with that statement, he could not publicly condemn the actions of Senate Democrats 
because he still had several nominations that needed to be confirmed in the Senate.
36 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade 
With Presidents and the Press (New York: Times Books, 1995), 144.
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Figure 2.2. Bush enjoyed debating issues with his advisors, a process markedly different than under President Reagan. 
Clockwise around the room: Bush, Scowcroft, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates, Sununu, Cheney, and Baker. 
(Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)
[Bush] make major decisions without a lot of back and forth with his advisors in order
to set things in his own mind.”37 This was a markedly different process than that
which occurred during the Reagan administration. As Colin Powell, who served on
both President Reagan’s and President Bush’s NSC, recalls:
President Reagan relied more on his advisors to shape issues for him, and 
President Bush got a little more deeply involved in the shaping of the issues 
but didn’t constrain his staff. And he wanted to hear more of the in and out, up 
and down and dialogues over the various issues than President Reagan.
In the final analysis the NSC during the Bush administration was better qualified, was 
more stable, had more clearly defined roles, and played a greater part in the decision­
making process than it had under President Reagan.
The National Security Review of the Soviet Union (NSR-3)
With its foreign policymaking team in place, the new administration was ready 
to assess the improvements in the U.S.-Soviet relationship that occurred during 
Reagan’s second term. Unlike Reagan, who was often seen as detached from the 
process, Bush’s knowledge and interest in foreign affairs placed him at the center of 
policy-making discussions. Out of this close-knit group emerged a consensus 
characterized by both skepticism of Gorbachev and criticism of Reagan’s anti-nuclear 
weapons enthusiasm. A foreign policy review finally got underway weeks after the 
inauguration. It quickly became clear to those conducting the review that it was a 
waste of time and manpower. Many of the senior bureaucrats throughout the 
government were holdovers from the Reagan administration, and as one frustrated 
official exclaimed, “If  we had any better ideas than the ones we had, we would have
37 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
38 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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used them.”39 The process drifted on for over three months. Privately, Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze begin to refer to the policy review as the pauza—the pause. Even Bush
officials, such as Robert Gates, began to refer to it as “the pause.”40 Many observers
outside of the administration criticized Bush for not seizing what they felt was a clear
course of action inherited from Reagan. Jack Matlock, the U.S. ambassador to the
Soviet Union, angrily explained to colleagues at the State Department, “Our marching
orders are clear: ‘Don’t just do something, stand there!'”41 Matlock argues that the
Bush administration was slow in recognizing that Gorbachev understood that the Cold
War was coming to an end and was ready to make concessions. According to this
view, the Bush administration was slow in testing Gorbachev’s words. Matlock also
sees practical considerations for the pause. He believes it was intended by the Bush
administration to reassure the right wing of the Republican party and to allow time for
a complete overhaul of the government in terms of personnel:
[Bush] purged almost everybody from the top ranks of the government. At one 
point, I know Baker had told me in a private meeting, when he asked me to 
stay on in Moscow, that, well, you know, they had run three political 
campaigns and he’s got a lot o f people that he has to take care of. Now clearly 
he didn’t consider the people who had worked for Reagan their people. So I 
think they did look at their own backers as distinct from the Reagan backers. 
And their political task was not having the Reagan backers defect Since many 
of the right-wing Republicans had thought Reagan had gone soft his last year 
or so, you know Bush had to sort of stand up and, I think, show that he was 
tougher.42
39 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the 
Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 333.
40 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, M  the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f 
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 28.
41 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 34.
42 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
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Matlock, therefore, criticizes the foreign policy review as taking place largely for
political reasons rather than necessitated by foreign policy concerns, which he felt
warranted decisive action. James Baker argued that these critics were missing the main
goal behind the lengthy foreign policy review:
Any new administration, even if it’s one of the same party, has got to put its 
imprint on foreign policy, and you needed to have a Bush imprint on the 
nation’s foreign policy. Also, you needed to make sure there had not been an 
overly aggressive effort to conclude a deal just, you know, just before time ran 
out with the Soviets. Nothing had been concluded. Also, you had to, you know 
. . .  Vice President Bush had not really been in those meetings with Gorbachev. 
He had to satisfy himself that Gorbachev was for real. The Cold War still was 
on. You have to remember that. They were still supplying weapons through 
Cuba to Nicaragua. There was still the Angola problem. We had major arms 
control negotiations going on, and many of them were stuck. Chemical 
weapons was stuck. Sea launch cruise missiles and the linkage with START 
was a sticking point. We had a lot, there’s still a lot of problems.43
Those problems could not be addressed adequately by simply continuing Reagan’s
emphasis on reducing numbers of weapons. Bush needed to know if Gorbachev was
actually prepared to fulfill his promises for fundamental change. Baker felt that
Gorbachev’s strategy depended on his ability to split the alliance in Western Europe
by appealing to Western publics rather than Western governments. This strategy
would also elevate his own authority and stature within the Soviet Union. The only
way to keep Gorbachev from gaining the advantage over the United States, according
to Baker, was to “attack his strategy head-on and to craft initiatives that he would feel
obliged to embrace.”44 After making such bold promises, Gorbachev could not easily
say no to any positive initiatives from the West
43 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
44 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 70.
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When the formal report from the strategic review on the Soviet Union (NSR-3) 
was presented to Bush on March 14,1989, it was a big disappointment As Brent 
Scowcroft recalls:
The chief problem with the policy reviews is that they didn’t produce anything. 
They were sort of bureaucratic exercises, and it’s not surprising that the 
bureaucracy thought everything was going well because they had designed the 
policy. So mostly we got back studies that said do more of the same. That was 
the principal problem, and as a result, we just fashioned policies ourselves 
within the NSC and then debated them in the NSC.45
The “big picture” document did not provide the kind of specific initiatives that were
needed, and Bush simply was not satisfied with the approach suggested by the review
that was quickly labeled “status quo plus.” He and his team wanted policies that could
cope with the radical change that was taking place in Eastern Europe. The Bush
administration wanted “to signal the bureaucracy, the Congress, the media, and the
public at large that it was time for a reassessment of old assumptions.”46 The review
did not further that goal. As Baker explains:
Unfortunately, we made two mistakes in the way we set up the review.
First.. .the review was run by Reagan administration holdovers. Since they 
were responsible for the development and articulation of the previous policy, 
these officials naturally had a personal and psychological investment in the 
status quo. It was pretty much like asking an architect to review his own work; 
he might change a door here or a window there, but it would be unlikely for 
him to question the basic foundations on which the structure stood. Needless to 
say, these officials found themselves incapable of truly thinking things anew. 
Second, instead of asking for ideas and suggestions from sources without a 
vested interest in established policy, we asked the bureaucracy itself to produce 
the papers. This resulted in Ieast-common-denominator thinking, with every 
potentially controversial—that is, interesting—idea left out in the name of 
bureaucratic consensus. In the end, what we received was mush 47
45 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
46 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 68.
47 Ibid.
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Another disappointing aspect concerning the review was that it was ambivalent about 
whether or not Gorbachev could succeed in bis efforts at reform. The report on the 
Soviet Union had suggested that Gorbachev had about a 50-50 chance at overcoming 
his domestic problems and succeeding with his reforms and that because of the 
uncertainty surrounding Gorbachev’s ability to maintain power, U.S. policy should not 
be designed to either help or hurt Gorbachev. This was unacceptable to Bush. He 
needed to know that Gorbachev was a true reformer and that he could trust that 
Gorbachev would be successful. Bush needed to determine if perestroika was a 
breathing space (peredyshka) designed to overcome the stagnation and technological 
backwardness of the Brezhnev era and to revive the Soviet economy for further 
competition with democracy and capitalism into the twenty-first century, or if it was a 
fundamental shift (perekhod) in Soviet policy ushering in a new era of socialism.48 
The review offered no clear answers to these questions.
The End of “the Pause”
Scowcroft explained how the NSC shifted its focus: “we worked instead with a 
‘think piece’ on Gorbachev’s policies and intentions, drafted by an NSC team headed 
by Condoleezza Rice.”49 Rice’s memo laid out a four-part approach that Scowcroft 
used as a blueprint to guide the development of an overall strategy.50 First, the 
administration needed to work on the domestic side to strengthen the image of 
America’s foreign policy as driven by clear objectives. Second, it needed to send a 
clear signal that relations with its allies was the top priority. A unified NATO was key
48 Ibid., 69.
49 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 40.
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to arms reduction talks. Third, the United States should undertake initiatives,
particularly economic assistance, with Eastern Europe, a potential weak link in the
solidarity of the Soviet bloc. Fourth, the United States should promote regional
stability around the world.51 Rice’s memo eventually led to the end of the pause. Until
then, however, the Bush administration continued to be criticized for its foreign policy
review. Marlin Fitzwater recalls the problems created by the lengthy foreign policy
review at the beginning of Bush’s term in office:
The press is always an impatient group. I mean, a day is forever in the news 
business. And you promise a policy review and they expect to have it 
tomorrow or the next day. And if it drags on for six or eight months, something 
like that, that seems like a long time and you’ve got to expect you’re going to 
start getting editorials and others saying, “Where’s that policy review?” So, 
you always have to deal with media impatience.52
The Bush administration started to see attacks from the press. One article in the
Washington Post even reported that Ronald Reagan was telling close friends that he
had an “uneasy” feeling about Bush’s “foreign-policy indecisiveness” and felt that
Bush’s hesitancy was allowing Gorbachev to regain the momentum in public opinion:
The Reagan view when he left office was that Bush had a clear advantage in 
dealing with the Soviets because he had inherited policies he had helped shape. 
Instead of plunging ahead with negotiations, however, Bush opted for the 
delaying tactic of a policy review, behaving the way new presidents do when 
replacing someone from the opposing party with different views.53
Reagan had been trying to avoid public criticism of Bush because he did not want to
undermine him; however, it was clear that Reagan was starting to lose his patience
50 Rice’s memo would eventually evolve into National Security Directive 23, which 
was finally signed by Bush on September 22,1989.
51 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 40.
52 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
53 Lou Cannon, “Reagan Is Concerned about Bush’s Indecision,” The Washington 
Post, Saturday, May 6,1989, A21.
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with his successor. George Kennan, creator of the policy of containment, also 
criticized Bush. While testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Kennan blamed Bush for failing to respond to Soviet initiatives. Margaret Thatcher 
sent Bush a message complaining that the policy review was taking too long.54 When 
Gorbachev announced on April 7, 1989, that he was halting production of weapons- 
grade uranium and closing two plutonium plants, reporters pressed Bush for a 
response. Bush snapped back at reporters: “We’U be ready to react when we feel like 
reacting.”55 Bush knew that he had to announce his new policy goals soon. The Bush 
administration also knew that the press, as well as the public at large, were expecting 
some kind of climax to the policy review. After eight years of Reagan, people had 
come to expect grand speeches and dramatic press conferences. Certainly something 
as important as a fundamental shift in policy toward the Soviet Union would have 
required a prime time televised report to the nation in the Reagan era. Typical of 
Bush’s press style, his staff put together a series of four speeches that read more like 
position papers, and that would constitute the conclusion of the review: one speech 
each on Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and defense and arms 
control. None were televised nationally.
Commencement Season 
Originally, all four of the speeches were to be given at university 
commencement ceremonies. A historic agreement forced the speech on Eastern 
European policy to be moved up to April, well before the commencement season 
began. The opportunity to launch the new policy of encouraging reform in the
54 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 49.
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governments of Eastern and Central Europe suddenly developed with the successful 
completion of ongoing talks between the Polish government and Solidarity, the first 
independent trade union behind the Iron Curtain. That agreement, signed on April 5, 
1989, legalized Solidarity, created a new and powerful office of president along with a 
new 100>seat senate, and allowed for the opposition to compete for seats in the senate 
as well as for 161 of the 460 existing seats in the Sejm, or parliament.56 The event 
required an American response. The Polish Communist Party had maintained a forty- 
five-year monopoly of power. Now Poland was apparently moving outside of 
communist control and would be allowed autonomous political development. It was 
exactly the sort of reform that the Bush administration intended to promote all over 
Eastern Europe and provided an ideal opening for Bush’s speech. White House 
planners chose Hamtramck, Michigan, as a good place to hold a speech on Eastern 
Europe. The Detroit enclave had an unusually high concentration of blue-collar 
families with ties to Poland, as well as the rest of Eastern Europe. Only two problems 
existed: the new policy still had not been clarified and the speech itself still needed to 
be written. Even after the long policy review, it had not been decided what kind of 
assistance the United States could afford to offer Eastern Europe. In the post-Reagan 
era, the huge federal deficit forced budgets to be extremely tight Bush had committed 
that new programs would not be approved unless funds could be diverted from other 
parts of the budget. Bush, however, knew that his plan required economic aid if it had 
any chance of working and instructed his planners to find the money somewhere. 
Perhaps the more difficult problem was deciding who would write the speech. The
55 Ibid., 50.
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controversy, one of the few reoccurring disputes within the foreign policy apparatus of
the administration, was between the NSC, who felt that they should be responsible for
national security policy speeches, and the president’s speechwriters, who felt that they
should write all of the president’s speeches. In the end, the two sides reached an
uneasy compromise; however, as Brent Scowcroft recalls, “It remained a major
irritant, with a negative impact on the quality of many of the President’s foreign policy
speeches throughout the Administration.”57 The speech was finally given by President
Bush on April 17 at Hamtramck City Hall:
My friends, liberty is an idea whose time has come in Eastern Europe.... The 
West can now be bold in proposing a vision of the European future: We dream 
of the day when there will be no barriers to the free movement of the peoples, 
goods and ideas. We dream of the day when Eastern European peoples will be 
free to choose their system of government and to vote for the party of their 
choice in regular, free, contested elections. And we dream of the day when 
Eastern European countries will be free to choose their own peaceful course in 
the world, including closer ties with Western Europe. And we envision an 
Eastern Europe in which the Soviet Union has renounced military intervention 
as an instrument of its policy—on any pretext We share an unwavering 
conviction that one day, all the peoples of Europe will live in freedom.... Let 
us recall the words of the Poles who struggled for independence: “For your 
freedom and ours.” Let us support the peaceful evolution of democracy in 
Poland. The cause of liberty knows no limits; the friends of freedom, no 
borders.58
In that speech, Bush promised new American trade and credits to countries 
experiencing economic and political reforms. This established a link between help 
from the West and significant political and economic liberalization. The Bush team 
hoped that by offering economic rewards, they could keep reform going in Eastern
56 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 47.
57 Ibid., 51.
58 Remarks by the President to Citizens o f Hamtramck, April 17,1989, George Bush 
Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 4/89 -  2/90, Box #13. 
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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Europe. They also hoped to eventually extend the link between aid and reform to the
Soviet Union itself. Unfortunately, the speech at Hamtramck also showed that the
United States did not have the resources to provide the level of rewards that could
genuinely stimulate the troubled economies of Eastern Europe. The administration,
however, had finally taken a position on Eastern Europe. As Brent Scowcroft recalls:
It was only a beginning, but it was a crucial move to try to capitalize on the 
signs of thaw in the communist states of Europe and to steer events in 
productive directions, but at a speed Moscow could accept. It was a serious 
effort to address the central questions of the Cold War.59
The speech was covered in full detail by the press in Europe and the Soviet Union, but
at home Bush’s first foreign policy address received very little attention.
Administration officials would later admit that part of the problem was of their own
making. The White House did very little advance work with the press, and many of the
Washington reporters simply refused to believe that Bush would make any important
announcements at Hamtramck. Marlin Fitzwater explains the problems behind using
the series of speeches to unveil the new policies:
No, they weren’t nationally televised. Well, the problem was, first of all, we 
had to have some way to put it out. And secondly, the review that took place 
was a more informal one between the president, the national security advisor, 
Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and 
so it was, ya know, it didn’t lend itself to kind of being published in a book. 
This review really was, amounted to a lot of private discussion, a lot of 
meetings they had had and so forth. So they needed some way to kind of say to 
the American people, “Here’s what my policies are going to be.” And the 
speeches simply were a, seemed to be, the most effective tool for producing 
three or four documents on three or four different areas o f foreign policy that 
outlined where he intended to go from here.60
59 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 52.
60 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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The first speech, which should have been a dramatic beginning to Bush’s plan for
foreign policy, was an easily forgettable event Bush’s preference for
compartmentalization and behind-the-scenes discussions kept the American public
uninformed during the first months of his presidency. Now, his failure to learn the
nuances of image management, something his predecessor had mastered, left much of
America still unsure about the direction he wanted to pursue. The second speech
would be equally as undramatic.
The president’s commencement speech at Texas A&M University in College
Station on May 12, 1989, announced his strategy for future policy toward the Soviet
Union (See figure 2.3). Drawn primarily from a decision memorandum written by the
NSC staff and based on an earlier memo written by Condoleezza Rice, the speech
called for a fundamental transformation of the U.S-Soviet relationship. It recognized
that the Soviet Union was in the midst of change; however, it challenged the Soviet
Union to action to demonstrate their commitment to Gorbachev’s principles. Bush’s
policy, called “beyond containment,” was explained in National Security Directive 23:
The character of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union leads to the 
possibility that a new era may now be upon us. We may be able to move 
beyond containment to a U.S. policy that actively promotes the integration of 
the Soviet Union into the existing international system.... But a new 
relationship with the international system can not simply be declared by 
Moscow. Nor can it be granted by others. It must be earned through the 
demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy and reinforced by behavior.... We are 
in a period of transition and uncertainty. We will not react to reforms and 
changes in the Soviet Union that have not yet taken place, nor will we respond 
to every Soviet initiative. We will be vigilant, recognizing that the Soviet 
Union is still governed by authoritarian methods and that its powerful armed 
forces remain a threat to our security and that o f our allies. But the United 
States will challenge the Soviet Union step by step, issue by issue and 
institution by institution to behave in accordance with the higher standards that 
the Soviet leadership itself has enunciated.... The goal o f restructuring the
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ission. Figure 2.3. Bush’s commencement speech at Texas A&M University on May 12, 1989, called for a fundamental transformation of 
the U.S.-Soviet relationship that would move “beyond containment.” (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)
relationship o f the Soviet Union to the international system is an ambitious 
task. The responsibility for creating the conditions to move beyond 
containment to integrate the Soviet Union into the family of nations lies first 
and foremost with Moscow. But the United States will do its part, together 
with our allies, to challenge and test Soviet intentions and, while maintaining 
our strength, to work to place Soviet relations with the West on a firmer, more 
cooperative course than has heretofore been possible.61
The speech given by President Bush mirrored the language of the NSC memorandum:
The Soviet Union says that it seeks to make peace with the world, and 
criticizes its own postwar policies. These are words that we can only applaud. 
But a new relationship cannot simply be declared by Moscow, or bestowed by 
others. It must be earned. It must be earned because promises are never 
enough.62
Bush challenged the Soviets to reduce their conventional forces, abandon the 
Brezhnev Doctrine, and allow self-determination for all o f Eastern and Central 
Europe, in the process removing the Iron Curtain. He urged diplomatic solutions to 
regional conflicts, respect for human rights, and for the Soviet Union to work with the 
United States to solve drug-trafficking and environmental dangers. Bush resurrected 
Open Skies, a plan first introduced during the Eisenhower administration that allowed 
unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to fly over the territory 
of the other country opening military activities to regular scrutiny. Many considered 
Open Skies as proof that the Bush administration could not come up with anything 
new. After months of delay, the Bush administration simply dusted off a plan thirty 
years old. Unlike Eisenhower in the 1950s, Bush could rely on satellites to do the type 
of surveillance work that could be done by unrestricted flights over the Soviet Union.
61 National Security Directive 23: United States Relations with the Soviet Union, 
George Bush Presidential Library.
62 Remarks by the President at Texas A&M University, May 12,1989, George Bush 
Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 4/89 -  2/90, Box #13. 
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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Certainly, the Open Skies proposal was outdated. Even a protective Brent Scowcroft
admitted that the proposal “smacked of gimmickry.”63 Bush thought that the Open
Skies proposal would show that his administration was acting boldly. He was wrong.
The speech on Western Europe was delivered at Boston University on May 21,
1989. Bush had just spent a weekend at his home in Kennebunkport, Maine, with
French president Francis Mitterrand. Reagan and Mitterrand had never been close.
Reagan had been greatly troubled by Mitterrand’s promise in 1981 to place
communists in his government. Mitterrand felt that Reagan was too obsessed with
communism and that he wrongly categorized all communists as aggressive Stalinists.
Bush hoped that the relaxed setting in Maine would allow him to get to know
Mitterrand on a personal basis. The salt air and waves pounding against the rocks
provided a setting that was very different from the protocol and formalities of the
Reagan years. It was Bush’s style of personal diplomacy at its very best, and it helped
establish a deep level of trust and personal rapport between the two presidents. So it
was that Mitterrand accompanied Bush to Boston and followed Bush’s speech with
one of his own. Afterwards, the two leaders gave a joint press conference. In his
address, Bush delivered a warning to those who would rush blindly into Gorbachev’s
proposals for Europe:
We must never forget that twice in this century, American blood has been shed 
over conflicts that began in Europe. And we share the fervent desire of 
Europeans to relegate war forever to the province of distant memory. But that 
is why the Atlantic Alliance is so central to our foreign policy. And that’s why 
America remains committed to the Alliance and the strategy which has 
preserved freedom in Europe. We must never forget that to keep the peace in 
Europe is to keep the peace for America. NATO’s policy of flexible response 
keeps the United States linked to Europe and lets any would-be aggressors
63 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 54.
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know that they will be met with any level o f force needed to repel their attack 
and frustrate their designs. And our short-range deterrent forces based in 
Europe, and kept up-to-date, demonstrate that America’s vital interests are 
bound inextricably to Western Europe, and that is an attacker can never gamble 
on a test of strength with just our conventional forces. Though hope is now 
running high for a more peaceful continent, the history of this century teaches 
Americans and Europeans to remain prepared. As we search for a peace that is 
enduring, I’m gratefhl for the steps that Mr. Gorbachev is taking. If the Soviets 
advance solid and constructive plans for peace, then we should give credit 
where credit is due. And we’re seeing sweeping changes in the Soviet Union 
that show promise of enduring, of becoming ingrained. At the same time, in an 
era of extraordinary change, we have an obligation to temper optimism—and I 
am optimistic—with prudence.... it is clear that Soviet “new thinking” has not 
yet totally overcome the old.64
Stressing that the Soviet Union still kept a formidable military machine in Europe,
Bush pledged his determination to negotiate a less militarized Europe:
I believe in a deliberate, step-by-step approach to East-West relations because 
recurring signs show that while change in the Soviet Union is dramatic, it’s not 
yet complete. The Warsaw pact retains a nearly 12-to-one advantage over the 
Atlantic Alliance in short-range missile and rocket launchers capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons; and more than a two-to-one advantage in battle 
tanks. And for that reason, we will also maintain, in cooperation with our 
allies, ground and air forces in Europe as long as they are wanted and needed 
to preserve the peace in Europe. At the same time, my administration will 
place a high and continuing priority on negotiating a less militarized Europe, 
one with a secure conventional force balance at lower levels of forces. Our 
aspiration is a real peace—a peace of shared optimism, not a peace of armed 
camps.65
Bush made clear in his speech that a strong NATO became more important, not less, 
with the changes occurring within the Soviet Union. It certainly was not the time for 
the West to be overcome by complacency or division.
64 Remarks by the President at Boston University Commencement Ceremony, May 21, 
1989, George Bush Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 
4/89—2/90, Box #13. Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential 
Library.
65 Ibid.
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The fourth and final speech was delivered at the Coast Guard Academy 
commencement, May 24,1989, focusing on defense strategy and arms control. Bush 
emphasized his commitment to maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent but 
promised to seek arms reductions that would allow stability with the lowest number of 
weapons that the administration felt was prudent Any advance in arms control, 
however, would have to be prefaced by a Soviet move away from an offensive 
military strategy:
The USSR has said that it is willing to abandon its age-old reliance on 
offensive strategy. It’s time to begin. This should mean a smaller force—one 
less reliant on tanks and artillery and personnel carriers that provide the 
Soviet’s offensive striking power. A restructured Warsaw Pact—one that 
mirrors the defensive posture of NATO—would make Europe and the world 
more secure.66
Thus, the series of speeches that had been designed to announce the conclusion of the
administration’s long foreign policy review came to a conclusion and the “pause” was
now officially over. Brent Scowcroft summed up the new strategy that was unveiled
with the four speeches:
It was cautious and prudent, an appropriate policy in a period of turbulence and 
rapid change, but it proved surprisingly durable and established a valuable 
framework for the conduct of policy. We were shifting policy from the old and 
narrow focus on strategic arms control to a wider dialogue designed to reduce 
the threat of war and bring real peace—including progress in Eastern Europe, 
CFE (conventional forces in Europe), and regional issues. All this was aimed 
at encouraging a “reformed” Soviet Union, ready to play a trustworthy role in 
the community of nations—one far less threatening to the United States and its 
allies.67
66 Remarks by the President at the Coast Guard Academy Graduation Ceremony, May 
24,1989, George Bush Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 
4/89—2/90, Box #13. Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential 
Library.
67 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 55-56.
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The new strategy was a major departure. After serving as a loyal vice president 
for eight years, Bush was determined to make his own mark on foreign policy distinct 
from his predecessor. Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had 
claimed that the NSC had entered its “mid-life crisis” during the Reagan years.68 
Restoring the NSC to its former importance would be Bush’s first order of business.
To facilitate this goal, he issued the first National Security Directive of his presidency, 
NSD I, which reorganized the National Security Council. Along with making 
fundamental changes in the NSC machinery, Bush appointed a trusted friend in Brent 
Scowcroft to be his national security advisor, thereby elevating the authority of the 
position. Bush, Scowcroft, Baker, and Cheney would make all of the important foreign 
policy decisions. Bush’s years of experience in foreign affairs necessitated a more 
hands-on approach that was markedly different than the complex system of SIGs and 
IGs that had been used by Reagan to delegate authority. The long policy review and 
the anti-climactic speeches that laid out the new policy helped provide a period of 
gradual transition that protected Bush from charges from the Right that Bush was not 
loyally following in Reagan’s footsteps. By the summer of 1989, however, it was clear 
that the White House rather than the State Department would be in charge of foreign 
policy and that Bush, along with his close advisors, would bear the responsibility for 
reacting to the incredible change that was happening in Central and Eastern Europe 
and within the Soviet Union itself. It would be up to this small group of men to 
manage the end of the Cold War and make sure that it ended with a whimper and not a 
bang.
68 “The History of the National Security Council, 1947-1997,” official NSC website.
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-Chapter 3- 
Bush and Gorbachev: The Road to Malta
December 7,1988: it was sunny as Mikhail Gorbachev rode the ferry to Governors 
Island in New York’s harbor. He had just come from delivering an important speech at 
the United Nations announcing massive unilateral military cuts. He was the first 
Soviet leader to speak at the United Nations since Nikita Khrushchev in 1960. Now he 
was on his way to his fifth and final meeting with Ronald Reagan and his first meeting 
with George Bush since the president-elect’s victory in November. As Colin Powell 
recalls:
The meeting was really as a result of a request from President Gorbachev. I 
was national security advisor and we were not expecting to have any more 
summits or meetings. Really, it was not a summit. In fact, we carefully did not 
call it a summit But we were not planning to have any more meetings with 
Gorbachev, and suddenly he said, “Well I’m going to be in the United 
Nations.... and would like to meet and have one final go at i t  to talk.” And so 
it was hard to say no at that point.... he initiated it and, o f course, we accepted 
i t  No reason not to accept it. We made clear to the Soviets, however, that we 
were not looking for a substantive exchange. It was a good way to say goodbye 
Reagan-Gorbachev and also say hello to President Bush.1
The White House team selected the U.S. Coast Guard station on Governors Island for
the sight of the luncheon. Security would be relatively simple to maintain; the Statue
of Liberty served as the dramatic backdrop for what was sure to be a historic
opportunity for photographs. One last meeting between old friends, however, masked
underlying motives behind the meeting. Gorbachev wanted to size up the new
president and receive assurances that there would be continuity in the relationship
between the two countries after Inauguration day on January 20,1989. Even though
1 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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the two men had met at the Chernenko funeral and the Washington summit, 
Gorbachev wanted to see for himself if President Bush, now free to make his own 
decisions, would be different than Vice President Bush, who always supported 
Reagan’s policies. As Colin Powell recalls, the proposed meeting was a difficult 
situation for Bush:
There was nervousness on the part of President Bush and his associates that 
perhaps the Soviets might try to throw some proposal at us that they would 
have to deal with before they had even come into office.2
It was a difficult position for Bush. He was officially there as Ronald Reagan’s vice
president. Bush decided to finish out his job as vice president. He refused to bring
James Baker, his nominee for secretary of state, lest it give the wrong signal to
Gorbachev. When Reagan walked out to meet Gorbachev as his car pulled up, Bush
dutifully stayed inside until the two men had exchanged greetings and only then
nonchalantly walked outside (See figure 3.1). Just prior to the luncheon, Reagan was
asked by a reporter to respond to Gorbachev’s announcement to reduce troops. His
response: “I heartily approve.” The reporter then turned to Bush who awkwardly
replied, “I support what the President said.” It was clear that Bush was not ready to
announce what his policy would be as president Later, Bush quietly told Gorbachev
that he looked forward to working with him “at the appropriate time.”3 The
appropriate time, however, would be a while in coming. Bush and his foreign policy
team had not yet decided how they were going to proceed. At least, they were not
ready to announce their plan to the world because it would be markedly different from
2 Ibid.
3 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United State and the Soviet 
Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 321-322.
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that o f Ronald Reagan. Bush’s loyalty to Reagan made his transition from vice 
president to president a slow and difficult process.
Bush’s change in foreign policy was orchestrated by his closest advisor, one of 
the Reagan administration’s critics, Brent Scowcroft Scowcroft was convinced that 
the Cold War could only be brought to a conclusion if it ended where it had begun: in 
Central and Eastern Europe. More specifically, the Cold War had begun in Germany 
after World War EL The United States and the Soviet Union split Germany in two, 
creating spheres of influence that would pit the two sides against each other. In order 
for the confrontation to end, the German question would have to be tackled. As 
Scowcroft recalls:
I wanted... to focus on Eastern Europe. There was ferment in Eastern Europe, 
especially in Poland. And I wanted to take advantage of that ferment to try and 
get the Soviet army out of Eastern Europe, or at least reduce their presence to 
allow the Eastern Europeans to develop in a progressive way.4
This might seem like an obvious decision; however, Reagan strongly disagreed.
Reagan was obsessed with reducing nuclear weapons and more concerned with arms
control discussions with Gorbachev than substantive proposals to reshape Central and
Eastern Europe. As for the German question, Reagan’s assistant secretary of state
Rozanne Ridgway summed up the administration’s position by arguing that the
existing situation was stable and a source of peace and that renewed debate over the
reunification of Germany would be premature and unwise/ Despite the
recommendations of the outgoing Reagan officials, many of whom worked on the
Bush foreign policy review before leaving office, Scowcroft was committed to shifting
4 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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American policy. He recommended that “the goal of U.S. policy should be to
overcome the division of the continent through the acceptance of common democratic
values.”6 The Bush administration, however, was careful not to make the same
mistakes that had started the Cold War in the first place. Scowcroft, and particularly
Baker, wanted to make sure that their initiatives would not give the impression that the
United States and the Soviet Union were getting together to carve up Eastern Europe.
They also did not want to bring about reckless change at a pace that might end in
violence. As Scowcroft recalls:
We did not stimulate ferment in Eastern Europe. We had done that earlier in 
the '70s and indeed in the ’50s when we helped stimulate the Hungarian revolt 
and so on. That turned out to be counter productive because when we turned 
people out in the streets, we weren’t prepared to support them. So what we 
tried to do was encourage reform at a level that we thought would be below 
that that the Soviet Union would think they would have to crush it. So we 
wanted to keep it going but we didn’t want it smashed, as was usually the case 
with revolt in Eastern Europe with all the leaders killed or put in prison. And 
that’s what we tried to do and it turned out, you know, because of our skill or 
because of luck it turned out that that was very effective in this case.7
To facilitate this type of change, the administration hoped to provoke change but never
direct intervention. Bush made two European trips to further this goal. The first, in the
spring of 1989, was to Western Europe and coincided with the NATO summit that was
scheduled to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of the alliance. The second was in the
summer of 1989 and focused on Eastern Europe and ended with the G-7 economic
summit in Paris. These two presidential trips, along with the speeches scheduled for
the commencement season, gave the administration the opportunity to lay out its new
5 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A 
Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 26.
6 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 28.
7 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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policy initiatives and put pressure on other governments to respond. This was, in 
reality, a diplomatic offensive that finally allowed the new administration to break free 
from the Reagan-era policies and forge a new course, which even though still 
somewhat fragmented, was more in line with Scowcroft’s goal to capitalize on the 
ferment in Eastern Europe.
The NATO Summit
The NATO summit presented the Bush administration with some interesting 
challenges. Gorbachev had undertaken an intense public relations campaign. His 
speeches about peace and democracy in Eastern Europe were well publicized, placing 
pressure on the West to respond. His message resonated with many European political 
leaders who questioned the need for defense spending at current NATO levels. At a 
time when Gorbachev seemed to be moving beyond the Cold War, the United States 
was still “dourly debating tanks and missiles.”8 This, coupled with Gorbachev’s 
dramatic arms control announcements in his speech to the United Nations in 
December, had placed the West on the political defensive. Both Baker and Scowcroft 
were determined to use the NATO summit to establish Bush as the sole leader of the 
alliance and gain the initiative. The two topics that needed to be addressed at the 
summit were the reduction of conventional (non-nuclear) forces in Europe (CFE), and 
the modernization and possible reduction of short-range nuclear forces (SNF). The 
general public tended to perceive these issues as boring; however, Scowcroft knew 
that the Cold War would continue as long as the U.S. and Soviets maintained opposing 
armed camps in Europe. The Bush administration needed to find a way to reduce the
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hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops, which they pinpointed as the true source of 
Europe’s insecurity. This type of fundamental change had not been included in 
Gorbachev’s flashier, yet less meaningful, arms control proposals. The way for the 
United States to affect change was to have an alliance in full agreement on the 
solutions and united behind President Bush. To reach this goal, the Bush 
administration began working on proposals to present at the NATO summit.
The SNF problem was made difficult because of West Germany. NATO 
needed modem nuclear forces to offset the conventional superiority of the Warsaw 
Pact In West Germany, however, Chancellor Helmut Kohl faced increasing public 
resistance because short-range missiles, with a range of 300 miles, would in all 
likelihood be directed at targets within Germany or Poland. The Germans even had a 
sardonic maxim: “The shorter the missile, the deader the German.”9 Understandably, a 
strong anti-nuclear movement in the Federal Republic began to call for the elimination 
of the current 88 SNF launchers (as opposed to around 1,400 for the Soviets!).10 In 
1987, NATO had agreed to delay the decision on modernization until a comprehensive 
plan could be formulated, scheduled to be finished by the 1989 summit. The United 
States, supported by most of the alliance, felt that the Warsaw Pact’s superiority in 
conventional forces had to be addressed before major changes in NATO’s nuclear 
weapons could be discussed. The Bush administration faced increasing pressure to
8 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), 
57.
9 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy: 
Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992,85.
10 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 58.
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create both a CFE proposal and a SNF proposal before the NATO summit As 
Scowcroft recalls:
From our perspective, resolving the differences in time for the summit, and
doing so in a way that would strengthen NATO unity and put us out in front of
Gorbachev, presented the first test of President Bush’s alliance leadership.11
In March 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had agreed to a proposal presented by 
Baker of unequal CFE reductions to create and equal level of forces at about 5-10 
percent below the current NATO levels. The proposal was criticized as insufficient; 
Bush pushed for larger cuts. Less than two weeks before the summit, Bush sat down 
with his most trusted advisors to discuss a CFE initiative. Scowcroft and Baker pushed 
for bold cuts; Crowe and Cheney voiced objections. President Bush had the deciding 
vote: “I want this [more radical proposal] done. Don’t keep telling me why it can’t be 
done. Tell me how it can be done.”12 The result was President Bush’s Conventional 
Parity Initiative, which proposed a 20% cut in U.S. and Soviet troops in Europe and 
establish a ceiling of approximately 275,000 each. This would force the U.S. to 
withdraw and demobilize 30,000 troops and would require the Soviets to reduce their 
600,000-strong Red Army in Eastern Europe by 325,000. In addition, President Bush 
proposed a reduction to parity of all tanks, armored troop carriers, artillery, and land- 
based combat aircraft and helicopters to a ceiling of 15% below the current NATO 
totals; weapons removed were to be destroyed. The president proposed that this 
reduction to parity be negotiated within 6 months to a year and that it be implemented
11 Ibid., 60.
12 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 94.
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by 1993 at the latest13 Bush knew that he would need the support of the major NATO
leaders for his idea to work and sent Deputy Secretary o f State Lawrence Eagleburger
and Deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates to Europe to win the support of
Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Kohl.
The NATO summit took place on May 29-30,1989, in Brussels (See figure
3.2). Bush knew that his public image in regards to foreign policy rested on the
outcome of the summit. President Bush presented his CFE proposal in the formal
session. Margaret Thatcher praised Bush’s initiative, claiming it would promote unity
within the alliance. Mitterrand then asked to speak. He offered his full support:
...good for the alliance because we can’t give the impression of merely 
standing in place.... We need innovation. The president of the United States 
has displayed imagination—indeed, intellectual audacity of the rarest kind.... 
Those advising me said ‘no’ to aircraft.... But I told them they were wrong. I 
told them we must be bold, as the American president wants us to be. President 
Bush, I again congratulate you.14
Bush had scored the public victory that he had sorely needed. The alliance agreed that
SNF negotiations leading to a partial reduction would begin, once implementation of
conventional force reductions was underway. One London newspaper said that Bush
had ridden “to the rescue like the proverbial U.S. cavalry, at the last possible
moment”15 Reporters in the United States would now have trouble accusing the Bush
administration of lacking vision.
13 A full description of the Conventional Parity Initiative can be found in President 
Bush’s “Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe,” Current Policy No. 1179, 
published by the United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Washington, D.C.
14 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f 
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 79.
15 The London Guardian, 31 May 1989.
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Bush traveled to Germany to make one of the most important speeches of his
presidency. In his address in the Rheingoldhalle in Mainz, Chancellor Kohl’s home
turf, Bush linked the end of the Cold War to an end of the division of Europe:
For 40 years, the seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe lay dormant, buried 
under the frozen tundra of the Cold War. And for 40 years, the world has 
waited for the Cold War to end. And decade after decade, time after time, the 
flowering human spirit withered from the chill of conflict and oppression. And 
again, the world waited. But the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever. 
The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and 
free.16
He went on to issue an ultimatum:
The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe 
is whole. Today, it is this very concept of a divided Europe that is under siege. 
And that’s why our hopes run especially high, because the division of Europe 
is under siege not by armies, but by the spread of ideas.... It comes from a 
single powerful idea—democracy.... As President, I will continue to do all I 
can to help open the closed societies of the East. We seek self-determination 
for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe. And we will not relax and we 
must not waver.... But democracy’s journey East is not easy.... Barriers and 
barbed wire still fence in nations.... There cannot be a common European 
home until all within it are free to move from room to room.... The path of 
freedom leads to a larger home—a home where West meets East, a democratic 
home—the commonwealth of free nations.17
Bush made clear that the Cold War would not end until the division of Europe ended.
His reference to the “commonwealth of free nations” was a deliberate response to
Gorbachev’s call for a “common European home.” In essence it was a direct challenge
to the proposals made by Gorbachev. He argued that even though glasnost was a
Russian word, openness was a Western concept. To that end, Bush called for free
elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe, cooperation in addressing
16 Remarks by the President at Rheingoldhalle, May 31, 1989, George Bush 
Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy Speeches, 4/89—2/90, Box #13. 
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
17 Ibid.
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environmental problems in the East, and a less militarized Europe. Perhaps his most 
dramatic proposal, especially considering the venue for the speech, came when he 
noted that Hungary was tearing down its barbed wire fence along its border with 
Austria:
Just as the barriers are coming down in Hungary, so must they fall throughout 
all o f Eastern Europe. Let Berlin be next! Let Berlin be next! Nowhere is the 
division between East and West seen more clearly than in Berlin. And there 
this brutal wall cuts neighbor from neighbor, brother from brother. And that 
wall stands as a monument to the failure of communism. It must come down.18
Bush’s statement lacked the drama and showmanship of Reagan’s 1986 speech in
Berlin. But the message was clear: the division of Berlin and Europe must end.
Tiananmen Square Massacre 
Immediately following his return from Europe, Bush had to deal with a crisis 
in China that swept away many of the gains in Bush’s public image. On June 3-4, 
1989, armed units of the People’s Liberation Army poured into Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing, brutally dispersing thousands of student demonstrators with bullets and tanks. 
The demonstrators had been gathering in the square since April IS to mourn the death 
o f Hu Yaobang, former general secretary of the Communist Party. Hu, who was 
removed from office in 1987 for excessive liberalism, was considered by many to be a 
sincere reformer. Hard-liners within the government reacted harshly to the 
demonstrators and sent police to breakup the demonstrations, beating students in the 
process. Soon, the mourning of Hu transformed to protests against the government, 
with calls for increased democratic freedoms, improvements in university living 
conditions, a crackdown on corruption, and other political reforms. Adding to the
18 Ibid.
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tensions was the scheduled visit of Mikhail Gorbachev on May 15,1989. Western
television crews had already arrived in Beijing to set up their cameras for the event
and were able to cover the protestors. The international attention only fueled the
students’ protest and placed more pressure on the Chinese government. Many of the
events planned for Gorbachev’s visit had to be cancelled, as the ranks of the
demonstrators swelled to almost a million. The government declared martial law and
sent in the troops. The ensuing massacre was broadcast live to audiences around the
world and created a problem that, as the following account by James Baker proves, the
Bush administration had not anticipated:
The morning of Saturday, June 3, 1989, dawned clear and sunny in 
Washington. It was perfect golf weather.... On the spur of the moment, I called 
the Chevy Chase Country Club, then telephoned my eldest son, Jamie, at his 
home in suburban Alexandria, Virginia. It was about 9:30 A.M.
“I’ve got a great deal for you,” I told him. “I’ve got a tee time at Chevy 
Chase in forty-five minutes. Grab your sticks and come on over right now and 
we’II play some golf.”
“I don’t think you’re going to be playing any golf today,” Jamie
replied.
“What do you mean?”
“Well, I’m sitting here watching tanks rolling through Tiananmen 
Square on CNN.”
“You’re kidding me.”
“No.”
After a few startled seconds of silence, I understood he wasn’t. “Okay,” 
I said. “I’ve got to go.”
As I hung up, my other phone line rang. It was a duty officer at the 
State Department Operations Center, informing me that heavily armed unites 
of the People’s Liberation Army had indeed begun firing on demonstrators in 
the heart of Beijing. Casualties were expected to be heavy, I was told.19
Thanks to CNN, the American public knew about the crisis before the secretary of
state. Public outrage in the United States was intense. Bush, however, was reluctant to
upset the process of normalization that had been initiated by Nixon in 1972. President
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Bush had a personal understanding of one of America’s greatest Cold War strategic
successes, having turned down ambassadorships in Paris and London to accept the job
as chief of the United States Liaison Office in Beijing in 1974:
I wanted a measured response, one aimed at those who had pushed for and 
implemented the use of force: the hard-liners and the Army. I didn’t want to 
punish the Chinese people for the acts of their government I believed that the 
commercial contacts between our countries had helped lead to the quest for 
more freedom. If people had commercial incentives, whether it’s in China or in 
other totalitarian systems, the move to democracy becomes inexorable. For this 
reason I wanted to avoid cutting off the sales and contacts. It was important 
that the Chinese leaders know we could not continue business as usual and that 
the People’s Liberation Army realize that we wanted to see restraint. What I 
certainly did not want to do was completely break the relationship we had 
worked so hard to build since 1972.... While angry rhetoric might be 
temporarily satisfying to some, I believed it would hurt our efforts in the long 
term.20
Angry rhetoric was exactly what the American public wanted. Although it might have 
been a solid diplomatic decision to show restraint, and although the United States was 
the first major government to impose sanctions on China after Tiananmen, what the 
public really wanted was to see a little righteous indignation from their president. 
Having failed to accommodate the public mood, Bush was heavily criticized by the 
press and Congress. It was on this note that President Bush embarked on his trip to 
Eastern Europe. It should have been a victorious follow-up to his successful NATO 
summit; however, Tiananmen and the criticism of Bush’s restraint cast a shadow over 
his trip to Poland.
Bush's Trip to Eastern Europe
Ironically, the first round of parliamentary elections in Poland occurred the 
same day as the Tiananmen massacre. Solidarity’s Civic Committee won 92 of 100
19 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 97-98.
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seats in the first round of Senate elections and 160 of the 161 Diet seats that were open
for competition. In stark contrast, the governing coalition was only able to fill 5 of the
299 seats reserved for them. Only five of the Communist's candidates were elected. It
was totally humiliating for the government because it was so completely unexpected.
The result was the legitimization of Solidarity.21 Coupled with the surprising election
results was Gorbachev’s public rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine:
The political and social order in one country or another has changed in the past 
and can also change in the future. Still, it is exclusively up to the peoples 
themselves. It is their choice. All interference, whatever its nature, in the 
internal affairs of a state to limit its sovereignty of a state, even from a friend 
or all, is inadmissible.22
The elections in Poland and Gorbachev’s rhetoric accentuated the polarization within
the Warsaw Pact that pitted the USSR, Poland, and Hungary against Romania, the
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The closed-door meetings of the Warsaw Pact
heads of state and Party leaders in Bucharest, July 7-8, 1989, were filled with tension.
Leaders such as Nicolae Ceausescu and Milos Jakes criticized Gorbachev’s
perestroika and called for action to put an end to the “counterrevolutionary” process
that was occurring in Poland. It was becoming increasingly clear that the destruction
of socialism’s conquests through the policies of Gorbachev had the potential of
turning violent That made Bush’s trip to Eastern Europe even more imperative. The
situation in Poland became more complicated. The gains by the Solidarity had placed
in jeopardy the election of General Jaruzelski, whose election was one of the central
20 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 89.
21 Jacques Ldvesque, The Enigma o f1989: The USSR and the Liberation o f Eastern 
Europe, translated by Keith Martin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 
117.
22 Ibid., 118n. (Translated from Pravda, 7 July 1989).
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elements o f the Roundtable agreements. Also, Poland was informally asking the
United States for $10 billion in assistance over the next three years. It was under these
conditions that Bush arrived in Warsaw on July 10,1989. It was important for
President Bush to show that he was backing the political and economic reform efforts
in Eastern Europe. Due to its own huge deficit, however, the United States could not
deliver substantial aid. A fact acknowledged by NSA Scowcroft:
The days were over when the United States could pick up the check for 
everything: a new Marshall Plan was not possible.
The United States sought to share the economic burden with Western Europe. The
proposal by Bush called for the rescheduling of Poland's $39 billion foreign debt, a
request for $325 million in new loans from the World Bank, and $100 million from
the United States. The package was inadequate for the needs of Poland. At a joint
session of the newly elected Polish parliament, President Bush voiced his support of
the momentous changes in Poland’s political system:
The elections which brought us—all of us—together here today mean that the 
path the Polish people have chosen is that of political pluralism and economic 
rebirth. The road ahead is a long one, but it is the only road which leads to 
prosperity and social peace. Poland’s progress along this road will show the 
way toward a new era throughout Europe, an era based on common values and 
not just geographic proximity. The Western democracies will stand with the 
Polish people, and other peoples of this region.24
Bush wanted a gradual process that encouraged change while maintaining order. His
preference for a controlled process led him to support Jaruzelski over the Solidarity
candidates. Jaruzelski, who was considering not even running for president because of
23 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 113.
24 Remarks by the President at Joint Session o f Parliament, the Sejm, Warsaw,
Poland, July 10,1989, George Bush Presidential Library, Subject File: Foreign Policy 
Speeches, 4/89—2/90, Box #13.
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Solidarity’s victory in the parliament election, asked for Bush’s advice during a
private conversation. Bush urged him to run for election:
It was ironic: Here was an American president trying to persuade a senior 
Communist leader to run for office. But I felt that Jaruzelski’s experience was 
the best hope for a smooth transition.23
Later, General Jaruzelski would write in his memoirs that President Bush’s support
played a crucial role in his election to the presidency.26
From Poland, Bush traveled to Hungary, the first American president to do so.
Bush stepped to the podium, waved off an umbrella, and dramatically ripped up his
speech. The crowds cheered him on as he spoke briefly of his support of the reform
efforts being undertaken in Hungary. Near the end of his speech he noticed an elderly
women who was standing near the podium, soaked from the rain. He quickly took off
his raincoat and wrapped it around her shoulders. The crowd erupted and Bush walked
into the crowd, shaking hands and wishing them well. It was a dramatic moment and
one that showed the people of Hungary that the United States was committed to
establishing a partnership with Hungary to promote lasting change. Bush then flew to
Paris for the G-7 summit in hopes of convincing them to share the burden of helping
Eastern Europe’s economic distress. He did just that, achieving the aims that he had
promised to both Poland and Hungary and making the trip to Eastern Europe a very
successful one. Energized and growing more confident, Bush decided that it was time
to consider a meeting with Gorbachev.
25 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 117.
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Collision Course
At the same time as Bush’s trip to Poland and Hungary, Gorbachev was
making a highly publicized trip to West Germany, calling for immediate cuts in short-
range nuclear missiles in NATO. The proposals had gained Gorbachev attention in
Germany; however, the proposals were designed to disrupt the gains that Bush had
made at the NATO summit and create rifts within the alliance. Tactics such as this
confirmed Bush’s decision to move cautiously in regard to Gorbachev. Bush and
Gorbachev traveled Europe with competing messages: whether or not the West needed
to wait for concrete actions by the Soviet Union. The ferment that was growing in
Eastern Europe, however, was not going to wait for the West to decide between the
competing views. The Bush administration knew that, as the changes in Eastern
Europe accelerated, Gorbachev would face increasing pressure from hard-liners to
intervene. After all, Eastern Europe was a buffer zone that separated the Soviet Union
from the W est If its once-reliable allies began to slip away, the Soviet Union would
lose much of the security that it had depended upon. It became increasingly unclear
whether or not the Cold War would end with violence. The Bush administration knew
that “dying empires rarely go out peacefully.”27 Bush became even more determined
that the cataclysmic changes in world structure that were about to occur would take
place without a shot being fired:
The dangers were ahead, and I would have to respond with even greater care as 
the Eastern Europeans pushed their own way to the future. We could not let the 
people down—there could still be more Tiananmens.28
26 Ldvesque, The Enigma o f1989,123.
27 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
28 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 131.
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Realizing the growing need for a face-to-face meeting between the two men, Bush
started the first draft of a letter on the flight home from the G-7 meeting in Paris that
suggested just such a meeting:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am writing this letter to you on my way back from Europe to the 
United States. My mind is frill of the fascinating conversations that I had with 
people in Hungary and Poland and with the many world leaders gathered in 
Paris for France’s bicentennial. Let me get quickly to the point of this letter. I 
would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to 
the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our 
shoulders, without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about “who’s 
winning,” “what agreements have been reached,” or “has our meeting 
succeeded or failed.” Up until now I have felt that a meeting would have to 
produce major agreements so as not to disappoint the watching world. Now my 
thinking is changing. Perhaps it was my visit to Poland and Hungary or 
perhaps it is what I heard about your recent visits to France and 
Germany—whatever the cause—I just want to reduce the chances there could 
be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more 
personal basis....29
Bush felt that the negotiations for a proposed meeting between the men should be 
done secretly as to avoid any outside pressures or competing public agendas. 
Consequently, he decided to bypass the normal channels of communication. Only 
Scowcroft, Baker, and Chief of Staff John Sununu knew of the letter. The final draft 
was presented to Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Gorbachev’s principal military advisor, 
at the end of July when he was visiting Washington, D.C. to discuss arms control. 
Akhromeyev could be trusted to deliver the letter in absolute secrecy. Gorbachev 
responded within days of receiving Bush’s letter. His messenger delivered 
Gorbachev’s approval of the proposal, suggesting that the two leaders could meet as 
early as September. The only problem was finding a location. The two sides wrangled
29 George Bush, A ll the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings 
(New York: Scribner, 1999), 433.
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over location for weeks before President Bush’s brother, William “Bucky” Bush 
suggested the island of Malta. Malta would have two benefits. Gorbachev had already 
planned a state visit to Italy at the end of November and could easily adjust his 
schedule to include a trip to the island. Also, Bush, as an old Navy man, liked the idea 
of holding the conference at sea, recalling the Roosevelt-Churchill shipboard meeting 
in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland in 1941. A meeting aboard a ship limited the number 
of press and staff that could attend. Bush’s national security advisor Brent Scowcroft 
recalls:
It was primarily more of a trust-building meeting. He [Bush] had wanted from 
the onset of his administration to talk with Gorbachev and I and I think Dick 
Cheney had held him back because historically the Soviet Union always 
profited by summits because there was an atmosphere that, you know the Cold 
War was over; we didn’t have to worry. And that always made it harder for us 
to get appropriations through Congress and so on. So we didn’t want—I didn’t 
want, and Cheney didn’t want—a summit until we had something specific to 
get from it, that is an arms control agreement or something else. And early in 
the administration we didn’t have anything yet. So the president acquiesced in 
holding off a summit Then in the summer of ’89, as a result of his trip through 
Eastern Europe and what he saw there and his meeting with his European allies 
at the G-7 summit he decided that he had to talk with Gorbachev, that things 
were moving too fast, that there was too much danger of misunderstanding, 
and so he had to talk with Gorbachev. But he, in fact he didn’t even want to 
call it a summit  He wanted to call it an exchange of views, not to make 
agreements, which is what summits usually are, but just to exchange views. 
And he was delighted with the idea of a summit out away from everybody 
where the press couldn’t be hovering around and where there would be little 
pressure for either side to try to make negotiating points or debating points.30
Both Gorbachev and Bush looked forward to the Malta conference as a potential
breakthrough in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Soon, however, events in Europe would
add an even greater importance to the meeting in Malta.
30 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
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Gorbachev faced a crisis not on the agenda for Malta. Nationalists in the
Baltics were calling for independence, claiming that the 1939 agreement between
Hitler and Stalin which led to the annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia had
been illegal. Baltic nationalism threatened the integrity of the Soviet Union itself. It
also had the potential to spread throughout the Soviet Union where Gorbachev’s
strategies for political and economic reforms had made it increasingly difficult to
maintain order. The United States had never recognized the Soviet annexation of the
Baltic states. The risk of breaking a 50-year-old precedent of U.S. policy made it
difficult for Bush to call for gradual change in the Baltics. Yet Bush worried that
separatism could lead to a civil war that could end disastrously for the United States if
nuclear weapons fell under uncertain control. Gorbachev seemed receptive to greater
autonomy for the Baltics; however, if they pushed for separation, Gorbachev might
feel pressure to resort to force. Separatism was spreading to other parts of the Soviet
Union. In Ukraine, nationalists had marched in Kiev in support of independence. No
matter how much he believed in perestroika, Gorbachev could not lose the Soviet
Union’s second-largest republic, its primary source of food. A meeting between
Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher demonstrates just how delicate of a situation the
outbreak of separatism in the republics had become:
Over luncheon with Thatcher, Gorbachev dismissed the problem of 
nationalism with the sweep of his hand. Recalling Charles de Gaulle’s remark 
on how difficult it was to preside over a country that manufactured more than 
120 different kinds of cheese, he said, “Imagine how much harder it is to run a 
country with over a hundred and twenty different nationalities.” “Yes!” 
interjected Leonid Abalkin, a deputy prime minister who served as economic 
advisor to Gorbachev. “Especially if there’s no cheese!”31
31 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 108.
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Even Gorbachev could not continue to gloss over the mounting problems that his 
political and economic reforms were causing in the Soviet Union.
The Fall of the Berlin Wall
Another problem was the situation in East Germany. In May 1989, Hungary
dismantled the barriers along its border with Austria. “Vacationing” East Germans
could slip across into Austria and make their way to West Germany. When Hungary
officially opened their borders on September 10, over 10,000 East Germans poured
across and made their way to the West. It was a public humiliation to the Warsaw Pact
and threatened its cohesiveness. It was even a worse situation for the East German
government. The rising discontent forced a series of resignations within the
government. Repression was now seen as an unlikely option by the government.
Gorbachev claimed that what was occurring in East Germany did not directly affect
the Soviet Union and ordered the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany not to get
involved. This, in effect, demonstrated the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which
asserted the Soviet right to provide assistance, including military assistance, to any
Communist  nation where Socialism was in jeopardy. As Secretary of State Baker
recalls, the Bush administration could no longer doubt that Gorbachev’s deeds
matched his words:
What it proved to us was that the Soviet leadership had, in fact, as they had 
told us they had, ruled out the use of force to keep the empire together. That 
was the critical factor. They told us early on they weren’t going to use force to 
keep the empire together. And when they didn’t that proved that they were 
telling us the truth and that they could be trusted and that we could do business 
with them.32
32 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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East German leader Egon Krenz made a frantic call to Gorbachev asking for
instructions. Gorbachev told him that the Soviets would not get involved and
suggested that he open his borders. East Germany announced on November 9,1989
that it was relaxing its border-control policy with West Germany. Citizens of East
Germany could now leave the country without having to obtain special permission.
Ironically, several mistakes were made by the East German government that allowed
for the historic change. The announcement did not mention the city of Berlin, which
usually received separate status and had stricter exit visa requirements. Also, the new
policy was not meant to take place until after it had been presented to the legislature;
however, GQnter Schabowski, a Politbiiro member and reformist Communist, took it
upon himself to announce the policy at the end of his daily press conference. As two
Bush officials would later conclude:
The truth of the matter is that the hapless East German government had opened 
the Berlin Wall by mistake. In one of the most colossal administrative errors in 
the long, checkered history of public bureaucracy, the Krenz government 
abdicated responsibility of the most important decision in its history to the 
people in the street.33
Confused officials and observers did not understand exactly what was meant; rumors 
began to spread that all travel restrictions were dropped. Crowds formed along the 
Berlin Wall as border guards waited for instructions that would not come. Finally, 
guards gave in to the crowds and people crossed over into West Berlin. The 
atmosphere turned electric as jubilant crowds from both sides of the wall began a 
celebration of the wall’s collapse.
33 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 101.
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T m  not going to dance on the Berlin Wall”
In Washington, President Bush watched the celebration on television.
Bewildered, he remarked to his aides:
If the Soviets are going to let the Communists fall in East Germany, they’ve 
got to be really serious—more serious than I realized.34
Bush’s press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater knew that the president needed to give the
press his view on the historic changes taking place in Germany:
When the wire stories began coming in that people were breaking down the 
wall, I saw it the same way the White House press corps did: as a big news 
story to be handled immediately. I took the wire stories to the president, who 
was sitting in his study off the Oval watching on CNN as people climbed the 
wall and toppled over to the other side. He read the wires slowly, as if making 
an independent determination of their truth. “Do you want to make a 
statement?” I asked. “Why?” the president said. He knew me well enough to 
know that my question was really a recommendation. “Why?” I repeated. 
“This is an incredibly historic day. People will want to know what it means. 
They need some presidential assurance that the world is OK.” The president 
just looked at me. He understood the historic point, of course, but his vision 
was taking him into a future o f German reunification, diminished communism, 
and a new world order to be established. “Listen, Marlin,” he said, “I’m not 
going to dance on the Berlin Wall. The last thing I want to do is brag about 
winning the cold war, or bringing the wall down. It won’t help us in Eastern 
Europe to be bragging about this.” “I understand that, sir,” I said, “but we have 
to show that we understand the historical significance of this. You don’t have 
to brag.” I paused to let him formulate a message in his mind, then added, “We 
can just bring the pool into the Oval Office, you will sit at your desk, and the 
whole thing will be very dignified and presidential.” “OK,” he said.35
Reporters were herded into the Oval Office where President Bush was discussing the
situation with Baker, Scowcroft, and Sununu (See figure 3.3). Bush sat at his desk
with briefing books stacked on his desk, one opened to a map of Germany. Reporters
huddled around the desk to record a brief statement from the president Speaking
34 Beschloss and Talobott, A t the Highest Levels, 132.
35 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing! Bush and Reagan, Sam and Helen: A Decade 
With Presidents and the Press (New York: Times Books, 1995), 261-262.
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Figure 3.3. At bis press conference in the Oval Office following the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, Bush urged 
caution, labeling the momentous occasion as simply “a good development.” (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)
matter-of-factly and without any enthusiasm, Bush labeled the fall of the Berlin Wall
as “a good development” He went on to add:
I don’t think any single event is the end of what you might call the Iron 
Curtain. But clearly, this is a long way from the harshest Iron Curtain days.
Our objective is a Europe whole and free. Is it a step towards that? I would say 
yes. Gorbachev talks about a common home. Is it a step towards that? [with a 
shrug of his shoulders] Probably So.36
When asked by a reporter if there was a danger that things were accelerating too
quickly, Bush responded:
We are handling it in a way where we’re not trying to give anybody a hard 
time. We’re saluting those who can move forward with democracy. We’re 
encouraging the concept of a Europe whole and free. And so we just welcome 
it.37
Lesley Stahl of CBS challenged his less than enthusiastic response:
Stahl: In what you just said, that is a sort of victory for our side in the
big East-West battle. But, you don’t seem elated.
Bush: I’m elated. I’m just not an emotional kind of guy.... We’ll have
Some suggest more flamboyant courses of action for this 
country. But, I think we are handling this properly... and so, the 
fact that I’m not bubbling over, maybe it’s getting along 
towards evening because I feel very good about it.38
While the president was responding to the criticism that he was not elated, he was
leaning back in his leather chair, looking down into his lap and fiddling with a pen.
Fitzwater stood in the background, leaning against the wall, knowing that the president
was not doing well:
From the beginning, he seemed uninspired. As he continued, the president did 
the one thing that made every Bush staffer start to sweat He started sliding 
down in his chair. It was the absolutely ironclad signal that he didn’t like what
36 Press Statement on Berlin Wall, 9 November 1989, video footage provided by the 
George Bush Presidential Library.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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he was doing, didn’t want to be there, and probably going to show it. Soon he 
was talking in a monotone, his head bowed and hands folded across his chest39
To the American public, Bush seemed distracted and disinterested. He was out of
touch with the dramatic changes that they watched on television. At a time when he
could have used a strong public performance to lead the nation in its celebration of the
end of the Cold War, President Bush seemed to be asleep on the job. Even Bush
admitted that the press conference did not go well:
It was an awkward and uncomfortable conference. The press wanted me to 
give a summation of the historic moment. Of course, I was thankful about the 
events in Berlin, but as I answered questions my mind kept racing over a 
possible Soviet crackdown, turning all the happiness to tragedy.
Bush knew that the Cold War was still far from over. As Fitzwater recalls, Bush was
more concerned with ending the Cold War than with his image:
First of all, he didn’t give a damn about his image. And I specifically raised it 
’cause I went to him and said, you know, the wall is coming down and you 
need to say something here that’s going to be strong and show that the 
president recognizes what’s happening and it’d be good for your image and so 
forth. And he said to me he didn’t care about image. That this was not a time to 
be worrying about that sort of thing. And that he wanted to respond in a way 
that Gorbachev would understand and that would be supportive of moving 
ahead in the future relationship. I mean, it’s one of Bush’s more admirable 
traits in the sense that he had enormous discipline in order to do what he 
thought was right for the country even at the personal risk of bad press and bad 
publicity and image consideration. And he wouldn’t do it41
Secretary o f State James Baker also defended Bush’s decision:
I still think that history will prove that he was absolutely right in not trying to 
stick it in the eye of the Soviets, not trying to goad them or, as everyone put it 
at the time, “dance on the wall.” That would have been a terrible mistake 
politically and diplomatically.42
39 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 262-263.
40 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 149.
41 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
42 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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Certainly, Bush had very sound reasons for reacting in the cautious manner that he
did. He feared that a Western celebration of the wall’s collapse might encourage a
backlash by hard-liners in East Berlin and Moscow. But to a skeptical public, Bush’s
actions built upon the images created by his lengthy foreign policy review and his
reaction to the Tiananmen Square massacre to show that Bush, as a symbolic leader,
did not live up to his promise to follow in the steps of Reagan. What the public did
not know was that Bush was acting on a request sent to him by Gorbachev that very
day. As Bush recalled:
On the day the Wall opened, Gorbachev sent messages to Kohl warning him to 
stop talking of reunification, and cabled me urging that 1 not overreact. He 
worried that the demonstrations might get out of control, with “unforeseen 
consequences,” and he asked for understanding. This was the first time 
Gorbachev had clearly indicated genuine anxiety about events in Eastern 
Europe. Heretofore he had seemed relaxed, even blase, about the accelerating 
movements in the region away from communism and Soviet control. It was if 
he suddenly realized the serious implications of what was going on.43
To go against the wishes of Gorbachev would have seriously jeopardized the gains
Bush hoped to accomplish at the upcoming Malta meeting. James Baker explained
Bush’s fear:
He feared that it would make it tougher for us to continue to move forward 
positively with Gorbachev. You don’t stick it in somebody’s eye when 
something is fundamental and as big and important as that happens. You 
celebrate it but you do so in a more statesman like way. Because, that would 
have been counter productive for us to start. . .  even today when we talk about 
winning the Cold War, and I see Gorbachev today, and even today when we 
talk about winning the Cold War, he takes offense at that. He says, “You didn’t 
win the Cold War; we came to an understanding, a peaceful resolution of our 
differences.”44
43 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 150.
44 James A. Baker in , telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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Even with Bush’s acquiescence to Gorbachev’s request, there was no denying that
change was taking place at an unprecedented rate and that the fall o f the Berlin Wall
demonstrated that change to the world. As Brent Scowcroft recalled:
I think that what it did is mostly underscore the importance o f the two leaders 
talking because unexpected events could turn into a crisis very easily. 
Gorbachev was very frightened by the fall of the Berlin Wall.45
The Malta Conference
Bush met with his National Security Council on November 30, 1989, in the 
Cabinet room of the White House.46 It would be the last meeting before his departure 
for Malta:
I don’t want to be begrudging. I don’t want to seem halfhearted. The purpose 
of what I’m going to be doing over there is to show Gorbachev that I support 
him all the way.4
The private statement by the president expressed his desire to use the Malta 
conference to act boldly and shed his public image. He did not mind being labeled as 
cautious, but he could not stand being called timid. Up to this point, Gorbachev had 
been the one to propose bold new initiatives and Bush had been the one who was seen 
as timid. He wanted to use Malta to reverse that situation. Bush was determined not to 
be “out proposed” this time. To that end, the Bush team had been working diligently to 
prepare a list of twenty possible initiatives that Bush could use in his initial 
presentation to Gorbachev. In the end, the list was trimmed to seventeen specific 
proposals. As newspapers began to observe, the goals for the meeting were changing:
45 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
46 National Security Council Meeting, November 30,1989—List o f Participants, 
Condoleezza Rice Files, National Security Council Files, Malta Summit—December 
2-3,1989, George Bush Presidential Library.
47 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 150.
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“The Malta meeting is indeed a summit No one any more on the U.S. side talks about 
a ‘get acquainted’ meeting.. .”48 Gorbachev, on the other hand, had purposefully not 
come up with a list of proposals, taking Bush at his word that there would not be an 
agenda at the meeting. In past meetings, such as Reykjavik and Baker’s meeting with 
the Soviet leader earlier in the year, Gorbachev had been accused of diplomatic sneak 
attacks. Gorbachev was determined not to receive the same criticism at Malta. Dating 
back to his UN address the previous year, Gorbachev had spent the past year 
proposing bold initiatives. Now, he needed to attempt to consolidate whatever 
progress he had already made. He knew that any further arms control proposals at this 
point might create a backlash from hard-liners in the Soviet Union. He also knew that, 
even though the Bush administration was beginning to overcome the earlier doubts 
concerning Gorbachev’s sincerity, there was still strong doubt as to whether or not 
Gorbachev could remain in power. Nervous over the dissettling pace of events in 
Eastern Europe and the increasing uncertainty of the Warsaw Pact, Gorbachev 
desperately needed the United States to reaffirm the superpower status of the Soviet 
Union and his own status as Bush’s equal.49 One French newspaper described the 
Soviet leader’s mission at Malta: “Mr. Gorbachev is racing against time to preserve 
the USSR’s great-power interests.”50 It was becoming increasingly evident with the 
unfolding o f events in 1989 that Gorbachev was the leader of a superpower in decline. 
He hoped to use Malta to portray to the world a U.S.-Soviet partnership that was based
48 Foreign Media Reaction to Malta Summit, December 3,1989, Heather Wilson Files, 
George Bush Presidential Library.
49 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 153-54.
50 Foreign Media Reaction to Malta Summit, December 3,1989, Heather Wilson Files, 
George Bush Presidential Library.
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on mutual understanding and mutual respect between equals. A letter to Bush from
former president Richard Nixon cautioned him that Gorbachev’s actions masked a
political necessity:
There is no question but that he is a remarkable new kind of leader of the 
Soviet Union, and we welcome the initiatives at home and abroad that he had 
already taken. But when you examine the evidence, it is clear that what he is 
doing is making a virtue of necessity. This does not make him a virtuous 
leader.51
Bush knew that Gorbachev was fighting for his political survival:
I worried that we were dealing with a ticking bomb. We could not see what 
inside pressures were building against Gorbachev and his programs. We were 
getting hints from Moscow that one of Gorbachev’s objectives at Malta was to 
gain some sort of “understanding” for his situation and for the measures he 
might take to crack down. I could not give him that, and if I did, it would have 
a lasting historical, political, and moral price.52
Bush also knew, however, that it was in his own best interests to publicly support
Gorbachev in order to bring a stabilizing influence to the dramatic changes that were
taking place. He made clear his support in his departure statement before leaving for
Malta:
America understands the magnitude of Mr. Gorbachev’s challenges. And let 
there be no misunderstanding: We support perestroikaP
Bush’s eight and a half-hour flight from Andrews Air Force Base to Valletta, Malta,
did not provide him with the rest he would need for the meeting. His sleep was
interrupted with phone calls from Washington, D.C., concerning a military coup
51 Letter from  Richard Nixon to President Bush regarding comments on upcoming 
Malta summit, (6pp.), 11/16/89, Condoleezza Rice Files, National Security Council 
Files, Malta Summit Paper (Preparation) December 1989 [3], George Bush 
Presidential Library. Also quoted in James Baker HI, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 170.
52 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 155.
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attempt in the Philippines that attempted to oust President Cory Aquino. By the time
they reached Malta the next morning, the Bush team was a little worn down. During
the Malta conference, Bush would stay on a guided missile cruiser anchored in
Valletta harbor, the USS Belknap—the flagship of the Sixth Fleet (See figure 3.4).
Also anchored in the harbor was a Soviet missile cruiser, the Slava, where the first
meeting was scheduled to be held. The third ship that was scheduled to be involved in
the talks was a large Soviet cruise ship, the Maxim Gorky, which was berthed at the
dock and thus, the most secure and the place where Gorbachev would be staying (See
figure 3.5). Bush spent the first day taking care of protocol with a visit to Malta’s
prime minister, a visit to the USS Forrestal, and some time settling in aboard the
Belknap. By the next morning, the weather had made a turn for the worse with twenty-
foot waves and gale-force winds pounding the ships in the harbor. The venue for the
first meeting was changed to the Maxim Gorky, which was in a far more protected
position at the dock. Scowcroft recalls the feeling of “anticipatory tension” in the
room as both sides greeted each other across a long table (See figure 3.6).54 Before
leaving for Malta Bush had announced in his departure statement that:
My discussions with president Gorbachev will enable us to become better 
acquainted and to better understand each other’s views. We will not be 
negotiating. We will be talking about our hopes and concerns for the future.55
53 Remarks by the President upon Departure to Malta and Brussels, The Rose Garden, 
November 30,1989, Susan Koch Files, George Bush Presidential Library. Video 
footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
54 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 162.
55 Memo to Scowcroft concerning departure and arrival statements fo r Malta with 
attached statements fo r President’s use, Susan Koch Files, George Bush Presidential 
Library.
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Figure 3.4. During the Malta conference, Bush stayed aboard the USS Belknap (right), which was anchored near a Soviet SLAVA 
class missile cruiser (left). (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)
p Figure 3.5. Gorbachev preferred to stay on the more luxurious cruise ship, the Maxim Gorky, berthed at the dock. Because of the bad
weather, the meetings were held on the Maxim Gorky. (Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library.)
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Despite his public announcement, Bush began his presentation of the seventeen
proposals that his team had prepared. An hour and ten minutes later, Bush finished
talking.56 After presenting his avalanche of proposals, Bush joked to Gorbachev, “This
is the end of my non-agenda.”57 Gorbachev, of course, did not have any proposals of
his own. Instead he talked passionately about his desire to achieve a new U.S.-Soviet
relationship in which each side would work to help the other overcome its problems.
As Fitzwater recalled, Bush then leaned across the table and inteijected that he had
already begun to move in that direction of mutual support:
“I hope you noticed that I didn’t dance on the wall when it came down.” And 
Gorbachev said, “I did and I appreciate it very much.” And they talked then 
about the language they would use to describe the new relationship in a post- 
Berlin Wall situation.
The only real tense moment of the first meeting came when Gorbachev brought up the
fact that the Bush administration had been using the phrase “Western values” in
speeches and public statements to describe successful reform efforts in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. As James Baker recalled, Gorbachev felt that the term portrayed
him as a loser and the USSR has having no values, or at least, not good ones:
Gorbachev felt Western implied that reformers in the Soviet Union had not 
embraced or subscribed to some sort of those values, when in fact he felt they 
had. In his concern, I saw the classic Russian tension between the Slavophiles 
and the Westemizers, “Why not call them ‘democratic values’?” I asked. 
“That’s fine,” said Gorbachev, and with that understanding, we had forged a 
new degree of cooperation, at the level of both personalities and principles.59
After the morning meeting, Bush went back to the Belknap to have lunch with his
advisors before meeting with Gorbachev over dinner. But, as the weather continued to
56 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 259.
57 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 163.
58 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
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worsen, it became apparent that the evening meeting would have to be cancelled. At 
the end o f the next day’s meeting, Gorbachev asked Bush to share in a joint press 
conference:
We did gain a deeper understanding of each other’s views. We set the stage for 
progress across a broad range of issues. And while it is not for the United 
States and the Soviet Union to design the future for Europeans or for any other 
people, I am convinced that a cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship can indeed 
make the future safer and brighter.60
The joint press conference and Bush’s statements provided Gorbachev with the
symbolism of a new unity that he desperately needed. It was a dramatic symbol of the
new relationship that the men had been able to achieve in the two-day meeting.
Certainly, the Malta meeting turned out to be very successful for both
Gorbachev and Bush. More importantly, it was a key event in the ending of the Cold
War. As Bush’s press secretary argued, it was the pivotal point in the change of the
U.S.-Soviet relationship:
I would say that [Malta] was the pivotal point at which the West first 
recognized that Communism was changing and may collapse. And we met 
with the purpose of trying to define how that could happen, what our role 
would be, and how we could help guide the future of whatever Russia 
emerged.... And I remember a memo from General Scowcroft to President 
Bush... for Malta that laid out three different scenarios of what might happen 
in the Soviet Union. And one was that Gorbachev was killed or thrown out of 
office by hard-line Communists. The other was that Gorbachev did actually 
change things but it created so much chaos and corruption that the whole 
country fell apart Another one was that it kind of worked moderately 
well—they changed the politics and so forth, but the economy slipped away, 
and he would be eventually replaced by somebody else who might be able to 
run the country. But the point is not how well those three scenarios reflected 
what actually happened, but the point is that that memo indicated that that was
59 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 171.
60 Statements by and Question and Answer Session with President Bush and Chairman 
Gorbachev Aboard the Maxim Gorky, Marsaxlokk Harbor, Malta, December 3, 1989, 
Cooper Evans Files—Cabinet Affairs, Box 3 of 6, George Bush Presidential Library. 
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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the point at which we recognized as a country, as a president, that Communism 
was gone or on its way and were making plans for the post-Cold War world.61
Brent Scowcroft agreed that Malta changed the relationship between the two
countries; however, he saw the affect that the meeting had on the Bush-Gorbachev
relationship as being just as important:
I think the relationship between the two leaders changed. That was the most 
dramatic . . .  that they got comfortable with each other, and from that time o n . 
. .  there was a rough patch the spring of 1990 over the Baltic states. . .  but the 
two knew each other as individuals. They would occasionally call each other 
on the phone and so forth. So the personal relationship changed, and that was 
very beneficial.62
At Malta, Gorbachev told Bush that he did not consider him an enemy anymore and
actually wanted the United States to maintain a presence in Europe. Secretary of State
Baker considered that statement to be the most important statement of the meeting
because, it “showed that the relationship had moved from confrontation to
cooperation.”63 And, even though no agreements were signed at Malta, the meeting
was important because it built trust between the two sides, the two leaders:
There were not a lot of specifics that were accomplished there, but it was a 
very good trust-building meeting. And remember that I had been having 
meetings with Sheverdnadze before Malta at which I had become convinced 
that the Soviet leadership was real when they were talking about reform and 
when they were talking about renouncing the use of force. President Bush 
needed to hear that and see that and experience that himself with the head of 
the Soviet Union.64
From Malta, Bush flew to Brussels, Belgium to speak at NATO Headquarters. It was 
important for Bush to brief his allies about the meeting that he had just finished with 
Gorbachev. He certainly did not want them to feel that they were being left out of
61 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
62 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
63 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
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discussions that directly affected their countries. It would also be the Bush 
administration’s first opportunity to put their spin on what was achieved at Malta. To 
that end, the three senior advisors that traveled with Bush to Malta all appeared on 
U.S. television while Bush continued to brief the Alliance. Brent Scowcroft appeared 
on ABC’s “Good Morning America”; James Baker gave an interview to “CNN 
Headline News,” and John Sununu made an appearance on “CBS Morning News.” All 
insisted that the Malta meeting had been a great success.65 The new understanding 
became even more important as the revolution that was taking place in Eastern Europe 
took a bloody turn. Nicolae Ceausescu, the leader of Romania who criticized 
Gorbachev’s reform efforts and brutally crushed dissent in his own country, was 
toppled by a national uprising and executed, along with his wife, on Christmas Day. It 
was a symbolic act that the communist domination of Eastern Europe was at an end 
and a reminder of how quickly incremental reforms could give way to violent change. 
The U.S.-Soviet relationship that was fostered by Malta would be key in insuring that 
reform meant political and economic progress rather than chaos and disorder. The 
revolutions o f 1989 had begun a transformation in the geopolitical landscape that 
would continue to shape the future of Europe.
At the beginning of the year, President Bush had decided to make a 
fundamental change in the foreign policy approach he had inherited from his mentor, 
Ronald Reagan. By the end of 1989, he was satisfied with his choice:
64 Ibid.
65 Interview o f Secretary o f State Baker by CNN Headline News, Interview o f Brent 
Scowcroft by ABC Good Morning America, Interview o f Chief o f S ta ff John Summu by 
CBS Morning News, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 4,1989,
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I think we followed the right course from the outset, even if  we had no way of 
anticipating what was to happen in the Soviet bloc. We had chosen to switch 
our focus from Moscow to Central and Eastern Europe in part to test the limits 
o f Gorbachev’s commitment to reform, openness, and “new thinking” in 
foreign policy. It was fortunate that we began the Administration with this 
change. By concentrating on Eastern Europe and delaying engaging the Soviets 
on arms control, we were able to pick up immediately on the promising 
developments in Poland. We were in on the ground floor and could encourage 
and take full advantage of the wave of liberalism as it moved through the 
region.66
Bush, who had begun 1989 with intense criticism from the press over his long 
strategic review, had ended the year on a high note. The next step, however, would be 
perhaps more difficult. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which had symbolized the 
changing face of Europe, also vaulted the question of German reunification to the 
center o f the world’s attention. It would not only test the new U.S.-Soviet relationship, 
it would also be a test for NATO and the leader of that alliance, George Bush.
Cooper Evans Files—Cabinet Affairs, Box 3 of 6, George Bush Presidential Library. 
Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
66 Bush and Scowcroft, .4 World Transformed, 180.
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-Chapter 4- 
Personal Diplomacy: 
The Reunification of Germany
In September 1983, Vice President Bush made a trip across North Africa and through 
Central Europe. Bush, as was often the case, served as President Reagan’s diplomatic 
surrogate. From the safety of Vienna, Bush offered a vitualistic denunciation of the 
Iron Curtain:
Can a wall, can guard dogs and machine guns and border patrols deny 
hundreds of years of European history? Can they create and enforce this 
fictitious division down the very center of Europe?... We [the United States] 
recognize no lawful division of Europe. There is much misunderstanding about 
the substance of the Yalta conference. Let me state as clearly as I can: There 
was no agreement at that time to divide Europe up into “spheres of influence.” 
On the contrary, the powers agreed on the principle of the common 
responsibilities of the three Allies for all liberated territories. The Soviet Union 
pledged itself to grant full independence to Poland and to all other states in 
Eastern Europe and to hold free elections there. The Soviet violation of these 
obligations is the primary root of East-West tensions today.1
More unequivocally, President Reagan made a similar point challenging Gorbachev at
Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate in September 1987:
General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this 
gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!2
Those words were of speechwriters, not foreign policy advisors. In practice, Reagan
did not want to jeopardize his goals of nuclear arms reduction with a direct clash over
1 “Vice President Bush Visits North Africa and Europe: Address at the Hofburg, 
Vienna, September 21,1983,” Department o f State Bulletin, vol. 83, no. 2080, 
November 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 19-21.
2 “Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, June 12, 
1987,” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1980- 
1988,1987, Book I—January 1 to July 3, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987), 635.
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the political division of Europe, something the Soviets had fought fiercely to protect. 
Reagan’s strong rhetoric was never matched by action. The contradiction between 
Reagan’s rhetoric and his actual policies mirrored that of other western leaders who, 
while feeling the obligation to support publicly German reunification in the abstract, 
actually supported the status quo. As former British Prime Minister Edward Heath put 
it in 1989, “Naturally we expressed our support of German reunification because we 
knew it would never happen.”3 British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher agreed with 
Heath: “although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany’s 
aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive.”4 According to this 
argument, the Four Powers agreement of June 5,1945, which divided Germany, was 
actually a stabilizing influence on Europe. On the evening of November 9 and early 
morning of November 10,1989, this argument lost relevance; the status quo collapsed 
with the wall. This new reality created enormous problems for both the East and the 
West; however, most observers still viewed reunification in terms of years, not 
months. There were simply too many unsolved problems. Some feared that dramatic 
changes taking place in Germany would lead to violence or possibly a new phase of 
the Cold War. The problems seemed multifaceted. The German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) and German Federal Republic (FRG) were two separate German states with 
markedly different systems of government; Soviet and American troops occupied East 
and West Germany, respectively. Many East Germans liked socialism and feared 
being “second-class” citizens; West Germans condemned the shaky East German
3 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A 
Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 96.
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economy.5 Internationally, there was a fear of new German nationalism: Britain and
France still had vivid memories of two devastating world wars. America worried that a
unified Germany would abandon NATO; the Soviet Union considered East Germany
the heart o f the Soviet security system, an important trading partner, its most loyal
ally, and its most visible “spoil of war” that continued to be an important symbol to
protect against political decline. Both the East and West seemed to have more to lose
than to gain by German reunification. Yet in just 10 months, the partition of Germany
would end and a 45-year-old problem would be resolved. As historian Timothy Garton
Ash put it, “More happened in 10 months than usually does in 10 years.”6 The rapid
and peaceful process toward reunification was a testament to skillful leaders using
behind-the-scenes personal diplomacy, plus a bit of good timing.
This process was in its embryonic state when President Bush and Chancellor
Helmut Kohl talked via telephone on November 10,1989:
Kohl: I’ve just arrived from Berlin. It is like witnessing an enormous fair. It 
has the atmosphere of a festival. The frontiers are absolutely open. At 
some points they are literally taking down the wall.... I hope they will 
continue to be calm and peaceful.7
During the conversation, Kohl expressed concerns about East German refugees and
West German financial support for the GDR. Kohl did not mention reunification; he
did not have to. Both men knew that it would have to be discussed. But for now, Bush
4 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 
792.
5 A. James McAdams, Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press), 208n.
6 Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New 
York: Random House, 1993), 343.
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was content to let events take their course. He needed to wait for Soviet reaction to the 
events in Berlin before he made any decisions. Focused on his upcoming meeting at 
Malta with Gorbachev, now less than a month away, Bush told Kohl that they needed 
to stay in contact via telephone in order to decide what to tell Gorbachev concerning 
the German question. The call was remarkable. In the middle o f reacting to one of the 
most momentous events in German history, the German Chancellor had called to give 
a report of the situation to the American President and ask his advice. Kohl told Bush 
to tell the American people that “without the U.S. this day would not have been 
possible.”8 President Bush could have used this call as the centerpiece of a dramatic 
press conference now that it was clear that the wall had been permanently opened. It 
certainly would help answer the criticism of his guarded press conference in the Oval 
Office, during which he reacted tentatively to the initial reports of the wall’s collapse. 
Instead, the report of this call appeared in a brief statement by Press Secretary Marlin 
Fitzwater.9 As two of Bush’s NSC staff members later admitted, “This was 
characteristic of Bush and his national security staff—often well reasoned on 
substance but inattentive to the ceremonial dimension of the presidency.”10 Though 
attentive to his diplomatic responsibilities, Bush ignored his duties to the American 
press.
7 Memorandum o f Telephone Conversation between Helmut Kohl and George Bush,
10 November 1989, Telcons and Memcons—Bush/Kohl, George Bush Presidential 
Library.
8 Ibid.
9 “Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the President’s Telephone Conversation 
with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, November 10,1989,” Public Papers o f 
the President o f the United States: George Bush, 1989-1992,1989, vol. 2 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 1498.
10 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 105.
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Bush would not have to wait long for the Soviet response. Later that evening,
the White House received a cable from Gorbachev, who wanted an immediate meeting
of the Four Powers to address the German situation.11 Gorbachev warned that the
“chaotic situation” could have “unforeseen consequences.” President Bush recalls
Gorbachev’s reaction:
The Soviet reaction to the opening of the wall was one of outright alarm.... 
Gorbachev sent messages to Kohl warning him to stop talking of reunification, 
and cabled me urging that I not overreact. He worried that the demonstrations 
might get out o f control, with ‘unforeseen consequences,’ and he asked for 
understanding. This was the first time Gorbachev had clearly indicated genuine 
anxiety about events in Eastern Europe. Heretofore he had seemed relaxed, 
even blasd, about the accelerating movement in the region away from 
communism and Soviet control. It was as if he suddenly realized the serious 
implications of what was going on.12
Bush and his advisors felt that the Four Power conference was a bad idea. But, before
a response was sent to Gorbachev, it was important that the West agreed on a common
approach. As the leader of the Western alliance, Bush assumed the responsibility for
orchestrating the response. Scowcroft phoned Kohl’s advisor, Horst Teltschik to get
his opinion. Secretary of State James Baker then called West German Foreign Minister
Genscher and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. All agreed to reject
Gorbachev’s demand for a Four Power conference. Bush proposed a response that (1)
ignored Gorbachev’s warnings, (2) welcomed his public support of the East German’s
decision to open their borders, (3) reaffirmed the desire to maintain public order, (4)
and voiced confidence that the West German government was committed to
11 Unofficial translation o f Gorbachev letter to President Bash, National Security 
Council/Brent Scowcroft Files-9000 APNSA Chrons: Gorbachev, George Bush 
Presidential Library.
12 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 
1998), 149-150.
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incremental change that would not destabilize Eastern Europe. For the time being, 
Bush chose a passive policy, which supported self-determination but with a tone that 
would not further alarm the Soviets. He would not yield to Gorbachev’s insistence on 
Four Power intervention, nor would he jump to premature conclusions on 
reunification. Margaret Thatcher, Francis Mitterand, and Kohl agreed with the 
statement that Bush sent to Gorbachev on November 17,1989.13 The reply would give 
all sides time to properly evaluate the events in Germany and crystallize their view 
concerning what would take place next
The issue of German reunification was problematic. As leader of NATO, it 
was Bush’s responsibility to create a consensus among the members of the Alliance. 
His greatest challenge would be convincing Great Britain to go along with German 
reunification. Britain had traditionally felt that they had a “special relationship” with 
the United States and was the leading supporter of the U.S.-led NATO framework, 
which gave Britain greater authority than its economy and military strength 
warranted.14 Margaret Thatcher had been the most vocal supporter of this “special 
relationship” during the Reagan administration. When Bush took control of the White 
House, however, as Thatcher noted in her memoir, “for... partly personal chemistry 
and partly genuine differences of policy—that relationship had become somewhat
13 Records of calls between Bush and foreign leaders found in Presidential Telcons 
Notebook (July-December, 1989), National Security Council Files, George Bush 
Presidential Library. Records of letters between Bush and Gorbachev found in 
Presidential Memcons Notebook (January-December, 1989), National Security 
Council Files, George Bush Presidential Library.
14 Robbin F. Laird, The Soviets, Germany, and the New Europe (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview, 1991), 79-80.
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strained.”15 Thatcher realized something that many Americans did not: George Bush
had markedly different policies than his predecessor Ronald Reagan. For her part,
Thatcher preferred Reagan. She was uncomfortable with the astonishing pace of
change, warning that “times of great change are times of great uncertainty, even
danger.”16 Germany certainly was seen as a source of danger by Thatcher, who felt
that aggression and self-doubt were an intrinsic part of Germany’s national character.
Thatcher’s foreign policy was animated by an anti-German prejudice common among
persons of her generation. This deep-seated feeling was evident in her remarks to one
of her foreign policy advisors in 1989 while watching the collapse of the Berlin Wall:
You know, there are things that people of your generation and mine ought 
never to forget We’ve been through the war and we know perfectly well what 
Germans are like and what dictators can do and how national character 
basically doesn’t change.17
Thatcher’s fears, however, were not simply based on painful memories from her
youth. She was worried about how a united Germany would affect the power balance
in Europe:
A reunited Germany is simply too big and powerful to be just another player 
within Europe.... Germany is... by its very nature a destabilizing rather than a 
stabilizing force in Europe.18
She worried that the reunification of Germany would undermine Gorbachev, leading
to demands for border changes throughout central Europe. She was even more worried
about Germany’s economic expansion. Thatcher preferred a truly democratic East
Germany to formal reunification. To that end, she sent Bush a message urging that the
15 Thatcher, The Dawning Street Years, 810.
16 Ibid., 360.
17 Quoted in Eric J. Evans, Thatcher and Thatcherism (London: Routledge, 1997),
104.
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priority should be to see genuine democracy established in East Germany and that
“German reunification was not something to be addressed at present”19
France was also be a problem for Bush. France hoped to strengthen the
Alliance via Europeanization, which encouraged European cohesion through
conventional military cooperation with the West Germans and cooperation with the
British on nuclear weapons. This framework emphasized gaining greater
independence from the hegemonic power of the United States, which certainly infused
Europeanism with an anti-American undercurrent. The Bush administration would not
give into this line of thinking. As Brent Scowcroft insisted, the United States would
continue to be a European power:
The United States intends to remain engaged in Europe with a substantial 
military and political presence. We are a European power, with an abiding and 
permanent interest in European security.20
Parts of France’s position could be used by Bush to push for a consensus. Even though
it undercut Atlanticism (American hegemony), the goal of France was a more
independent West European power center. The source of stability for Western Europe
was threefold: NATO (defense), the European Community (economic), and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (political). The source of stability
for the East was imposed from the outside—the monopoly of power by the
Communist party and the readiness of the Soviet Union to use force to maintain its
appointed leaders in power. With that system of coercion quickly crumbling, stability
18 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 791.
19 Ibid., 793.
20 “Speech by Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to President Bush for National Security 
Affairs, Wehrkunde Conference, 3 February 1990,” transcript in Europe Transformed:
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in Eastern Europe, and by means of proximity, Western Europe, was in doubt. Both 
Thatcher and Mitterand accepted the Germans’ right to self-determination, but they 
did not believe that the Germans had a right to upset the political realities of Europe. 
Bush focused on stability in Europe, noting that NATO, unlike the Warsaw Pact, 
provided a solid framework for cooperation in an integrated Europe. This brought 
protests from Thatcher who, for largely economic reasons, did not want Germany to 
be part of an increasingly integrated European Community. She wanted to keep both 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact intact in order to maintain part of the old order.
Consensus within the Alliance was not Bush’s only problem in respect to 
German reunification. East German dissident groups were demonstrating to reform the 
Communist regime while keeping a separate state. In West Germany, Chancellor Kohl 
did not yet have a mandate for reunification because of fear that a union would disrupt 
the economy. An opinion poll taken the month before the fall of the Berlin Wall 
showed that only 56 percent of West Germans favored reunification.21 Given the lack 
of consensus inside Germany, Bush needed a plan that left domestic concerns to be 
worked out between the two German states. There were also fears from countries 
surrounding Germany, particularly Poland, that feared a unified Germany would try to 
alter the Helsinki Accords, which guaranteed its post-World War II borders. East and 
West Germany could not be disentangled from any of their international treaty and 
occupation status before assurances could be worked out to the satisfaction of 
neighboring countries. The most difficult job for Bush, however, would be convincing
Documents on the End o f the Cold War, Lawrence Freedman, ed. (New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1990), 452-457.
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the Soviets to allow a reunified Germany that remained within NATO. The Soviet 
position on reunification came from concern for their security arrangements. East 
Germany, with its approximately 370,000 Soviet troops, was the center of the Warsaw 
Pact. Rather than a mutual defense system, the Warsaw Pact was in essence a series of 
bilateral agreements between each member and the Soviet Union. If reunification 
resulted in a united Germany within NATO, it would mean an impossible disparity 
between NATO and the remainder of the Warsaw Pact.22
Before each side had a chance to develop its own policies, Chancellor Kohl 
surprised everyone with a speech before the Bundestag on November 28, in which he 
outlined a 10-point plan for German unity:
1. Establish measures to provide unhindered travel between East and West 
Germany.
2. Expand technological cooperation with the GDR.
3. Expand economic aid to the GDR if ‘fundamental change of the political 
and economic system in the GDR be agreed upon and put irrevocably into 
effect’ This would require free elections without SED (Socialist Unity party) 
monopoly of power and the dismantling of centralized economic planning.
4. Establish a “contractual community” with the GDR to cooperate 
institutionally on a variety of common problems.
5. Proceed, after free elections in the GDR, to develop “confederate structures 
between the two German states and, eventually, a federal system for all 
Germany, which would include joint governmental committees and a common 
parliament
6. Embed the development of inter-German relations in the pan-European 
process and in East-West relations.
7. Strengthen the EC (European Community), encourage European integration, 
and allow Eastern European countries entrance into the EC once they have met 
certain prerequisites.
8. Speed up development of the CSCE (Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe), including new institutions for East-West economic 
cooperation and environmental relations.
21 Peter H. Merkl, German Unification in the European Context, (University Park, 
Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 315n.
22 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse o f Communism in 
Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 183.
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9. Support rapid progress in arms control.
10. Peacefully overcome the division of Europe and support reunification
through a policy of self-determination by the German people.23
The 10-point plan was actually a modest proposal that was only meant to establish an 
outline for reunification, not speed up the process. What it did, however, was 
encourage all sides to take the issue of reunification seriously. The speech had been 
made without consultation with any NATO countries, something particularly upsetting 
to Mitterand who had met with Kohl just three days earlier. The Soviets immediately 
dismissed the 10-point plan as unrealistic.24 From that point on, each side suggested 
corrections and alternatives to Kohl’s plan. Soviet officials suggested, at various times 
throughout this period, the following counterproposals:
(1) The dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their replacement by 
permanent all-European security structures.
(2) A European-wide referendum on the international and security aspects of 
German unification.
(3) The neutralization and demilitarization of Germany.
(4) A military-political status for Germany in NATO similar to that of France.
(5) Continued, though modified, exercise of four-power occupation rights in 
Germany.
(6) The formation of a center in Berlin to control all military forces in 
Germany.
(7) Membership of Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact
(8) Membership of the Soviet Union in NATO.
(9) Membership of the FRG in NATO and associate status for the eastern part 
of Germany in the Warsaw Pact.25
23 “Speech by Chancellor Kohl to the Bundestag on Intra-German Relations, 28 
November 1989,” Europe Transformed: Documents on the End o f the Cold War, 
Lawrence Freedman, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), 372-376.
24 “Soviet Spokesman G. Gerasimov on Soviet Reaction to Kohl’s Ten Points, 29 
November 1989,” Europe Transformed: Documents on the End o f the Cold War, 
Lawrence Freedman, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), 377.
25 David H. Shumaker, Gorbachev and the German Question: Soviet-West German 
Relations, 1985-1990 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 135.
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The dramatic differences in these proposals demonstrate the vulnerability of the Soviet 
Union. Even when reunification took on the aura of inevitability, Gorbachev did not 
want to give the appearance of acceding to Western demands. The initiatives proposed 
by the various sides quickly began to fall into three broad categories: (1) a major 
conference that would be comprised of all CSCE members and convene to negotiate 
the final peace settlement of World War n, (2) a Four Powers conference to resolve 
what had been agreed on at Potsdam in 1945 as provisional arrangements, (3) or a 
German-only solution that left the FRG and the GDR to handle matters without any 
outside interference.26
The Bush administration developed a plan that combined the German-only 
approach with the Four Powers meeting demanded by the Soviets. This “Two-plus- 
Four” plan would give the two German states control over internal matters while 
allowing the Four Powers to oversee the external aspects of reunification. The plan 
provided a diplomatic process for carrying out rapid reunification in a way that all 
countries involved might accept. Most importantly, it gave Moscow a chance to 
participate in part of the process toward reunification as it was happening rather than 
after the process finished—an important point for Gorbachev, who did not want to 
appear as caving into Western demands. Not all of Bush’s advisors initially embraced 
the Two-pIus-Four approach. There was disagreement between the NSC, who had 
reservations about the plan, and the State Department Scowcroft did not like the idea 
of involving the Four Powers because he feared that the Soviet Union might end up 
dominating the process. There was a greater concern, however, that the FRG and
26 James A. Baker HI with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy:
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Moscow might work out a private deal, as had happened in the past27 In the end,
Baker was allowed to begin negotiations on Two-plus-Four. The administration
undertook an intensive campaign of personal diplomacy to convince others that the
Two-plus-Four approach was best. Baker explained the plan to Hans-Dietrich
Genscher who, realizing that it would give great-power legitimacy to reunification,
agreed with the plan as long as the “Two” preceded the “Four.” As he indicates:
It was important to me that the two German states, the ones most concerned 
with unification, discuss foreign-policy aspects with the Four, rather than the 
other way around. Any appearance of the Four negotiating about Germany 
must not be allowed to arise. This consideration dictated the order in the name 
given the conference: Two plus four, not four plus two.28
This talk along with Bush’s conversation with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd
on January 29 and Scowcroft’s conversation with Kohl’s assistant Horst Teltschik on
February 3 meant that the Two-plus-Four plan had been explained to both the British
and Germans, both of whom seemed favorably disposed. Baker traveled to Moscow to
present the plan to the Soviets, stopping along the way to discuss matters with French
Foreign Minister Roland Dumas. Baker met with Shevardnadze on February 7 and
Gorbachev on February 9. Baker recalls that although German reunification was still
“a very tough topic” as far as Shevardnadze was concerned, he felt that Gorbachev
might be willing to at least consider the American proposal:
I don’t think he had a real problem with the process. I think they were 
interested in a treaty of peace. I think they were interested in seeing Germany
Revolution, War & Peace (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 196-198.
27 For example, the agreements of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, Rapallo in 1922, and the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Accord in 1939.
28 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect o f 
Germany’s Reunification, translated by Thomas Thornton (New York: Broadway 
Books, 1998), 339-340.
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unified outside of NATO, at least with respect to the eastern part of 
Germany.29
Baker paved the way for Gorbachev’s meeting the following day with the West 
Germans.
On Saturday, February 10,1990, Chancellor Kohl and his Foreign Minister
Hans-Dietrich Genscher flew to Moscow to meet with Gorbachev. Kohl’s preparation
for the meeting included help from the Americans. Baker had given him a summary of
his discussions with Gorbachev, including Gorbachev’s concerns about a united
Germany and indicating that Gorbachev might accept the Two-plus-Four plan. Baker
urged Kohl to calm Soviet fears by stressing that Germany’s borders were permanent.
Bush also sent Kohl a letter, pledging America’s full support and asking him to make
it clear to Gorbachev that the neutralization of Germany was out of the question and
that all of a united Germany would remain in NATO:
I was deeply gratified by your rejection of proposals for neutrality and your 
firm statement that a unified Germany would stay in the North Atlantic 
Alliance.... Even if, as we hope, the Soviet Union withdrawals all its troops 
from Eastern Europe, it will still remain far and away the most powerful single 
military power in Europe. U.S. troops in Germany, and elsewhere on the 
continent, backed by a credible deterrent, must in my view continue to help 
preserve the security of the West as long as our allies desire our military 
presence in Europe as part of the common defense. As our two countries 
journey together through this time of hope and promise, we can remain 
confident of our shared ability to defend the fruits of freedom. Nothing Mr. 
Gorbachev can say to Jim Baker or to you can change the fundamental fact of 
our deep and enduring partnership.30
29 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
30 Excerpt of letter from Bush to Kohl can be found in Bush and Scowcroft, A World 
Transformed, 240-241.
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Kohl was ecstatic over the letter, hailing it as “one of the great documents in German- 
American history.”31 By giving Kohl the strongest possible guarantee of American 
support, Bush lessened the chance that West Germany might abandon NATO in order 
to hasten reunification. In a phone call soon after the meeting, Kohl reassured Bush 
that he had made it clear to Gorbachev that neutralization was out of the question. He 
also relayed his belief that Gorbachev could be persuaded to agree:
Kohl: I told Gorbachev again that the neutralization of Germany is out of the 
question for me.
Bush: Did he acquiesce or just listen? How did he react?
Kohl: My impression is that this is a subject about which they want to
negotiate, but that we can win that point in negotiations. The modalities 
will be important, but I do believe we can find a solution.32
The historic meeting between Gorbachev and Kohl was important because Gorbachev
finally accepted that German reunification would be decided by the German people.
He still, however, was not ready to relinquish his right to shape the external aspects of
reunification or accept a unified Germany in NATO. As Kohl told Bush in the
telephone conversation, this still needed to be negotiated.
NATO and Warsaw Pact foreign ministers met in Ottawa, Canada, in February 
1990 to discuss arms control matters, including Bush’s Open Skies proposal. While 
arms control was the official agenda, unofficial private meetings centered on 
Germany. Bush had sent Baker to reach agreement on Two-plus-Four. Gorbachev, 
meanwhile, had sent Sheverdnadze with a mandate to wrap up a CFE (conventional 
forces in Europe) agreement Baker, Hurd, Dumas, and Genscher reached agreement
31 Memorandum o f Telephone Conversation between Bush and Kohl, February 13, 
1990, Telcons and Memcons- Bush/Kohl, George Bush Presidential Library.
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and decided to present the plan to the Soviets. Baker handed the Two-plus-Four 
announcement to Sheverdnadze, who agreed to forward it to Gorbachev. Gorbachev 
gave his consent, provided that it did not mention the mid-March East German 
elections and that the announcement promised to deal with issues of security for 
neighboring states. These demands were meant to placate his allies in East Germany 
and Poland. Baker was delighted with the agreement Especially when Sheverdnadze 
informed him that Gorbachev had dropped his demand of symmetrical force levels in 
Europe, thus clearing the last hurdle for a CFE treaty. In Ottawa, when the joint 
statement on Two-plus-Four was made to the press, the NATO foreign ministers that 
had been left out of the ad hoc meetings were furious. They were not the only ones 
infuriated by the announcement. Hard-liners in Moscow were upset that Gorbachev 
had made this agreement before resolving the West’s demand that Germany remain in 
NATO. Kohl, however, was overjoyed, declaring that Germany was “jumping with a 
single leap” toward reunification: “We have never been so close to our goal, the unity 
of all Germans in freedom, as we are today.”33 The Ottawa announcement was 
important symbolically. It demonstrated that there was a certain degree of consensus 
that German reunification would happen and a process was now in place to manage it. 
Reunification had now moved to the planning stage. There were still significant 
problems. As one Bush administration official noted, “the road to unification still led 
through Moscow.”34 Despite Gorbachev’s eagerness to accommodate Baker and Kohl, 
the Soviet hierarchy was still not ready to accept reunification. Many officials in the
32 Ibid.
33 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f 
the End o f the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), 190.
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Soviet Union and East Germany wanted to retain influence by channeling the process 
through a German confederation, something that would require a victory by the 
Communists and Social Democrats in the upcoming March elections in East Germany. 
According to polls, this seemed likely.35
Helmut Kohl met with President Bush at Camp David on February 24,1990. 
Bush wanted a relaxed atmosphere in which he could talk openly with Kohl (See 
figure 4.1). Their many phone conversations had established good rapport. Bush now 
wanted to capitalize on the relationship that he had so carefully fostered in order to 
coordinate the path to reunification, keep Germany committed to NATO, and renew 
German commitment to the Oder-Neisse line as its permanent eastern boundary. As 
for the border issue, Kohl proposed that the United States should mediate the dispute. 
Bush accepted Kohl’s offer, resolving the Polish-German border issue by the end of 
March, largely thanks to private mediation between Kohl and Polish Prime Minister 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki. The NATO issue was a bit more complex. Kohl agreed that a 
united Germany should be a member of NATO; however, the precise definition for 
Germany’s NATO membership was not yet clear. Should Germany’s membership be 
similar to France’s and not participate in NATO’s military structures? Should there be 
a transition period? Should NATO forces and nuclear weapons be prevented from 
being stationed on East German soil? These questions had clearly not been resolved by 
Kohl, something that truly concerned President Bush. Bush did not want another 
France in NATO. He wanted Germany to remain in NATO, felt that U.S. troops and
34 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 196.
35 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 245.
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the George Bush Presidential Library.)
nuclear weapons should remain in Germany, and believed that the territory of the
former East Germany should have a “special military status” that would allow its
integration into NATO. Bush also made it clear to Kohl that Soviet opposition to full
German membership in NATO would not be tolerated:
The Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany’s relationship with 
NATO. What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. To hell 
with that! We prevailed, they didn’t. We can’t let the Soviets clutch victory 
from the jaws of defeat36
Bush’s strong words showed that this point was not up for negotiation. Kohl suggested
that the Soviets might acquiesce for the right price and that convincing the Soviets
about membership might “end up as a matter of cash. They need money.”37 He went
on to say that the trick would be to get the Soviets to tell the West the real price for
agreeing to German membership in NATO. The Camp David meeting was
instrumental in allowing the United States to coordinate the objectives and procedures
for the upcoming Two-plus-Four negotiations. Following the Camp David meeting,
the NSC staff prepared a blueprint for the talks to limit their scope. The United States
circulated the following plan to its allies so that the position of the West would be
clear:
• Four Power rights, including the fate of Berlin: decide in Two-plus-Four.
• Borders: decide in Two-plus-Four with sovereign German voice.
• NATO’s obligations toward the former GDR: sovereign German decision; no 
discussion in Two-plus-Four.
• German forces in GDR: sovereign German decision; could be discussed in 
Two-plus-Four.
• Soviet troops in GDR: sovereign German decision and subject for bilateral 
German-Soviet agreement; could be discussed in Two-plus-Four.
• Nuclear weapons in FRG: to be decided by Germany or in arms control 
negotiations; no discussion in Two-plus-Four.
36 Ibid., 253.
37 Ibid., 253.
145
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
• German NATO membership: sovereign German decision; no discussion in 
Two-plus-Four.
• Prohibition of German nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons: sovereign 
German decision; could be discussed in Two-plus-Four.
• Size of the Bundeswehr: to be decided by Germany or in arms control 
negotiations; no discussion in Two-plus-Four.38
This plan would be used at the Two-plus-Four meetings and for future consultations
with allies. It is clear by the clarity and level of detail in this list that the Bush
administration was setting down the law to its allies in order to ensure Western
solidarity, something on which the U.S. strategy depended. The belief that Soviet
compliance was a matter of money proved important as the United States and West
Germany began work on an “incentives package” for the Soviet Union. In the press
conference following the Camp David meeting, the United States and West Germany
appeared to be in full agreement. Bush called Thatcher, Mitterand, and Gorbachev the
following day to brief them, in very general terms, what had happened.39 All knew that
nothing could be resolved until the March 18 elections in East Germany. Most
observers in the West feared that even though the Communists would probably lose,
the voters would turn to the Social Democrats, making it hard for Kohl and the
Christian Democrats to regain momentum.
There were two basic possibilities for reunification according to the Basic Law
of West Germany. Article 146 allowed for a constitutional assembly following all-
German elections to create a new political state with a new constitution and new form
38 Original list in memorandum from Zelikow through Blackwill to Scowcroft and 
Gates on 12 March 1990, “The Two Plus Four Agenda,” National Security Council 
Files, George Bush Presidential Library. A summary of this memorandum can be 
found in Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 227.
146
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of government. The Soviets hoped that the result would be a weak confederation. The 
other lawful possibility was for East Germany to dissolve and be absorbed through a 
direct takeover by West Germany under Article 23, thus creating a larger, more 
powerful FRG with its current system of government intact. Led by Kohl, the official 
West German position favored using Article 23. East Germans would have their 
chance to voice their opinion when the first free general elections in the GDR were 
held on March 18, 1990. With an amazing 93 percent voter turnout, the Alliance for 
Germany garnered more than 48 percent of the vote; the Social Democrats (SPD) 
received 22 percent; the ex-Communists, the Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS), 
received 16 percent of the vote.40 It was a decisive vote for the absorption of East 
Germany into the more prosperous West: over 75 percent of the vote went to parties 
promoting reunification. It was a mandate for Kohl’s plan for unity. The new East 
German government was dedicated to a rapid West German takeover under article 23, 
giving Kohl complete control of internal unification. President Bush phoned Kohl to 
congratulate him on a stunning victory, exclaiming, “You’re a hell of a campaigner!”41 
Having already begun discussions with the SPD-East leader BOhme in anticipation of 
victory, the election caught the Soviets by surprise. As a result, the Soviet position 
became weaker after the elections.
39 A record of these telephone calls can be found in the Presidential Telcons Notebook 
(January-June 1990), National Security Council Files, George Bush Presidential 
Library.
40 “Results of the Parliamentary Elections in East Germany, 18 March 1990,” Uniting 
Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944-1993, Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker 
Gransow, eds., translated by Allison Brown and Belinda Cooper (Providence, RX: 
Berghahn Books: 1997), 128.
41 Memorandum o f Telephone Conversation between Bush and Kohl, March 20,1990, 
Telcons and Memcons- Bush/Kohl, George Bush Presidential Library.
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While Kohl continued handling the internal aspects of reunification, it was up
to the United States, as Baker recalls, to address the major task of leading a
fundamental change in NATO and the CSCE:
A unified Germany would alter the fundamental geo-strategic, political, and 
economic architecture of Europe. That meant that NATO had to become a 
more political institution, CSCE had to be strengthened, and a clear and 
complementary division of responsibilities among these institutions and the 
European Community would have to be defined.
Resolving German reunification meant taking a fresh look at European security as a
whole. Secretary Baker had mapped out his plan for a new European architecture in
December 1989. Now, the position of the United States needed to go even further. A
fundamental change in NATO’s strategy would have to be made if it were to
incorporate a unified Germany without angering the Soviets. It was necessary to
convince the Soviet Union that Europe’s political and security institutions were
evolving. The Soviet Union needed to feel unthreatened by a NATO strengthened by
the addition of a unified Germany. After all, the Soviet Union still had 350,000 troops
stationed in the GDR and had the legal right to refuse to give up their Four Power
rights and remain a military presence in Germany. The best approach for the United
States was to convince them that such an action would isolate them diplomatically. As
Bush’s advisors believed:
It must at least be clear that the costs of continued rigidity would be a 
deterioration in the smooth, stable relations so essential to the benign 
international environment in which the Soviet leaders could concentrate on 
domestic reform.43
42 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 232.
43 Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, 246.
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In order to achieve this level of isolation, there had to be complete solidarity on the 
part of the West Now that the German election made it clear that unity could not be 
halted, Mitterand and Thatcher began to play a more constructive role. Bush met with 
Thatcher in Bermuda and Mitterand in Key Largo, Florida, to discuss the goals of the 
upcoming Two-plus-Four conference. Bush sent letters after these meetings and his 
meetings with Kohl to reiterate what had been agreed upon so that the Western 
position on NATO and Two-plus-Four was clear. He would then make statements to 
the press to provide public repetition of the agreements, speaking as the official voice 
of a solidified West, thus locking up debate. Bush dramatically improved the solidarity 
of the West’s position by the end of April. The first meeting of the Ottawa Group was 
held in Bonn on May 5,1990. The day before, Bush spoke on the future of NATO at a 
commencement address at Oklahoma State University, once again using a low-profile 
media event to make an important policy speech. Bush had previewed his ideas to 
NATO leaders in the days leading up to his speech, meeting with Thatcher, Mitterand, 
and Kohl, and talking via telephone to NATO Secretary General Woemer. As with 
previous dealings with NATO leaders, Bush wanted to make sure everyone was on the 
same page—his. Bush proposed an early NATO summit to review NATO’s political 
role in Europe, review its strategy in conventional defenses and nuclear weapons, and 
establish a consensus on the future of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). This “wide-ranging NATO strategy review for the transformed 
Europe of the 1990s” was meant most of all to signal to Gorbachev that NATO was 
changing and would not be a threat:
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As military threats fade, the political dimension of NATO’s work—always 
there but seldom noticed—becomes prominent....our enemy today is 
uncertainty and instability.. ..we must plan for a different kind of military 
presence focused less on the danger of an immediate outbreak of war.44
In the same speech, however, he also sent a message that Germany would remain a
part of NATO:
And we should reaffirm the importance of keeping a united Germany as a full 
member of NATO.45
Bush made it clear that the West was committed to changing NATO’s traditional role,
which had been one of defense against a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe,
and re-inventing it as a political alliance. This idea built on a speech Secretary Baker
made before the Berlin Press Club the previous December in which he called for a
“new architecture” for a new era:
As we construct a new security architecture that maintains the common 
defense, the non-military component of European security will grow. Arms 
control agreements, confidence-building measures and other political 
consultative arrangements are going to become more important. It is in such a 
world that the role of NATO is going to evolve. NATO will become the forum 
where the Western nations cooperate to negotiate, to verify and to extend 
agreements between East and West.46
NATO had to adapt to a new role if the United States was to stay in Europe.
Gorbachev had suggested doing away with NATO and the Warsaw Pact in favor of
other European alliances. Bush had to demonstrate that NATO, the EC, and CSCE
were complementary, not competitive. To further that goal, the Bush team put together
44 “Remarks at the Oklahoma State University Commencement Ceremony in 
Stillwater, May 4,1990,” Public Papers o f the President o f the United States: George 
Bush, 1989-1992,1990 Book I-January 1 to June 30,1990 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1991), 627.
45 Ibid.
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a proposal that would, as Brent Scowcroft put it, “help Moscow save face,” and 
transform the alliance in four areas:
1. It would emphasize its political mission and develop cooperation and 
partnership with former adversaries. The alliance pledged never to be the 
first to use force, proposed a non-aggression pact with members of the 
Warsaw Pact (not with the Pact itself), and invited those governments to 
establish diplomatic missions at NATO headquarters in Brussels.
2. It called for changing the character of conventional defense by moving 
away from “forward defense” and relying increasingly on more mobile, 
truly multinational forces. The document also proposed conventional arms 
control negotiations (after the conclusion of a CFE treaty) to further limit 
offensive military manpower in Europe.
3. It announced a new NATO nuclear strategy, modifying “flexible response” 
to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and make them “truly weapons of 
last resort.”
4. It proposed strengthening the CSCE process by giving it a new mandate to 
promote democratic institutions, operational capacity in the area of conflict 
prevention, and, for the first time, an institutional structure through a new 
secretariat and other bodies.47
These proposals would be made at the NATO summit to help resolve the obstacles to
Soviet acceptance of German reunification within NATO.
Persuading Gorbachev to give his approval for German membership in NATO, 
however, would require more than just a change in NATO. Kohl urged Bush to agree 
to Gorbachev’s request for financial assistance. But Bush could not give Gorbachev 
the $20 billion for which he had asked, not while the Soviets were still blockading 
Lithuania and not until Gorbachev made economic reforms to demonstrate that the 
money would not be wasted. What the United States actually offered was the image of 
a deal being struck between the two superpowers. Gorbachev desperately needed this 
image, even if the economic assistance came from a different source. The Bush
46 Excerpt in Renata Frftsch-Boumazel, Europe and German Unification (New York: 
S t Martin’s, 1992), 66-67.
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administration planned a Washington summit at which they would shower Gorbachev 
with attention. Gorbachev arrived on May 31,1990, and was greeted with a parade of 
soldiers wearing ceremonial Revolutionary War uniforms of the Old Guard from Fort 
Meyer. Gorbachev and Bush reviewed the fife and drum corps on the South Lawn of 
the White House against the backdrop of the Washington Monument before moving 
into the Oval Office for a private meeting at which Gorbachev hinted at financial help. 
Bush planned the type of summit that Gorbachev needed to boost his image. Unlike 
Malta, the Washington summit was full of ceremonial events, where Gorbachev 
mingled with prominent business leaders, intellectuals, and celebrities. By the end of 
the summit, Gorbachev would receive various honors, including the FDR for 
Freedoms Medal from the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Institute, the Peace Prize from 
the Albert Einstein Peace Prize Foundation, and the Martin Luther King, Jr., Non­
violent Peace Prize. The first day concluded with a formal State Dinner honoring 
President and Mrs. Gorbachev. The dinner had a long and varied guest list ranging 
from political leaders, such as Henry Kissinger and Richard Gephardt, to movie stars, 
such as Morgan Freeman and Jessica Tandy.48 In his toast Bush laid it on thick:
Mr. President, you deserve great credit for the course you’ve chosen—for the 
political and economic reforms you’ve introduced—and for creating within the 
Soviet Union a commitment to change. As I said this morning as I welcomed 
you to the White House, we want to see perestroika succeed—we want to see 
this transition now underway in the Soviet Union maintain its momentum.49
47 Summary of proposals found in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 293.
48 Detailed information concerning the Washington summit can be found in White 
House Press Office: Fitzwater’s Files, Subject File: USSR-US/USSR Summit 5/30/90- 
6/03/90, George Bush Presidential Library.
49 ‘Texts of Remarks by the President During Toast Honoring Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev, the White House, Washington, D.C., May 31,1990,” White 
House Press Office: Fitzwater’s Files, Subject File: USSR-US/USSR Summit, 
5/30/90-6/03/90 [1], George Bush Presidential Library.
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Of course, this type of praise and effort by the Bush administration to boost
Gorbachev’s image was not meant as a one-way gesture. Bush hoped Gorbachev
would move slowly to embrace NATO membership for Germany. At 4:30 the next
afternoon, both sides crowded into the Cabinet Room to discuss Germany. At first,
Gorbachev seemed unwilling to soften his position on NATO membership for a united
Germany. Bush had tried all the standard arguments, but to no avail. Then, as Bush
recalls, he tried something else:
I tried a new track. I reminded Gorbachev that the Helsinki Final Act stated 
that all countries had the right to choose their alliances. To me, that meant 
Germany should be able to decide for itself what it wanted. Did he agree? To 
my astonishment, Gorbachev shrugged his shoulders and said yes, that was 
correct. The room suddenly became quiet Akhromeyev and Valentin Falin 
looked at each other and squirmed in their seats.50
Amazingly, the leader of the Soviet Union had, on his own and without consulting his
advisors, now conceded that German membership in NATO was a matter for the
Germans to decide. Knowing that Kohl had already publicly stated that Germany
wanted to join NATO, Gorbachev had just given Germany the right to make that
decision without having to gain approval from the Four Powers. The American side
almost could not believe what they had heard:
Bob Blackwill slipped me a note asking whether I thought I could get 
Gorbachev to say that again. I nodded to him. T m  gratified that you and I 
seem to agree that nations can choose their own alliances,’ I said. ’Do you and 
I agree that a united Germany had the right to be non-aligned, or a member of 
NATO, in a final document?’ asked Gorbachev. ’I agree with that, but the 
German public wants to be in NATO,’ I replied. ‘But if they want out of 
NATO, we will respect that They are a democracy.’ ‘I agree to say so 
publicly, that the United States and the USSR are in favor of seeing a united
50 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 282.
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Germany, with a final settlement leaving it up to where a united Germany can 
choose,' said Gorbachev.51
Gorbachev’s concession angered his own side:
By this time, the dismay in the Soviet team was palpable. Akhromeyev’s eyes 
flashed angrily as he gestured to Falin. They snapped back and forth in loud 
stage whispers in an agitated debate as Gorbachev spoke. It was an 
unbelievable scene, the likes of which none of us had ever seen 
before—virtually open rebellion against a Soviet leader.52
Despite this opposition, Gorbachev refused to recant his concession to Bush’s major
point. He suggested that the foreign ministers work out the details. Shevardnadze
refused, saying that it was a matter for the presidents to decide. The Americans had
managed to get a major concession from the Soviet leader and were not about to let
him forget his pledge (See figure 4.2).
The rest of the summit went as planned, with discussions of other pressing
matters. There were no further discussions of Germany between Bush and Gorbachev
during the summit. Instead, Gorbachev pressed for a trade agreement that included
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. He almost seemed agitated at times, desperate to
go home with some tangible accomplishment from the summit. Considering
Gorbachev’s newfound flexibility on Germany, the Bush administration was inclined
to accommodate him. The only problem was the situation in Lithuania. The trade
agreement would have both a public side and a private one. The United States would
sign the grain and trade agreements but would not send the package to Congress until
the Soviets passed legislation on emigration, something that had been a precondition
for MFN status. The package would also not be sent for congressional approval until
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., 282-283.
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the Soviets lifted the economic embargo on Lithuania and began negotiations. With
those stipulations, the trade agreement was signed and Gorbachev had a tangible
accomplishment to take back with him to bolster his support at home. Gorbachev’s
accomplishment came at considerable public expense for President Bush. Unaware of
the secret conditions behind the agreement, the press attacked Bush for abandoning
Lithuania. The next day the two men traveled to Camp David for more relaxed
discussions (See figure 4.3). Bush had gotten Gorbachev to be flexible on German
membership in NATO, and Gorbachev had gotten his trade agreement to help his
struggling domestic economy. At the press conference at the end of the summit, Bush
sought to get Gorbachev’s pledge on record (See figure 4.4):
On the matter of Germany’s external alliances, I believe, as do Chancellor 
Kohl and members of the Alliance, that the united Germany should be a full 
member of NATO. President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view. But 
we are in full agreement that the matter of Alliance membership is, in 
accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide.33
The statement had been cleared with the Soviets. From that point on, Gorbachev never
publicly opposed the idea that alliance membership was a matter for the Germans to
decide. The Washington summit had been a success. In Copenhagen on June 5,
Shevardnadze met with Baker during a session of the CSCE and told him that the
Soviet Union would accept a unified Germany in NATO and that the unification
process could be completed by the end of 1990. This offer, of course, would be
dependant on the United States following through with the assurance that had been
53 “Press Conference by the President and President Mikhail Gorbachev, the East 
Room, June 3,1990,” White House Press Office: Fitzwater’s Files, Subject File: 
USSR-US/USSR Summit: 5/30/90-6/03/90, George Bush Presidential Library. Video 
footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
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promised in the nine-point plan.54 Baker marched over to Genscher’s hotel to get him
out of bed to tell him the good news.55 Gorbachev made it official the following week
on June 12 when he publicly announced from Moscow that he would accept a unified
Germany as a member of NATO if certain conditions were met. In an amazingly short
time span, the Soviet position had moved from an adamant “no” to a “yes, but”
Bush sought to eliminate Gorbachev’s remaining reservations at the NATO
Summit in London on July 4. Despite some objections by Thatcher and Mitterand
concerning some of the language used in his proposals, Bush was largely able to push
through his plan for a new NATO structure. On his flight from London to the G-7
summit in Houston, Bush sent Gorbachev a personal message transmitted from Air
Force One that described how the NATO declaration addressed Soviet concerns:
Working solely from a draft text I circulated to my NATO counterparts, we a 
few hours ago issued a declaration that promises the Alliance’s transformation 
in every aspect of its work and especially of its relationship with the Soviet 
Union. As you read the NATO declaration, I want you to know that it was 
written with you importantly in mind, and I made the point strongly to my 
colleagues in London.... I hope today’s NATO declaration will persuade you 
that NATO can and will serve the security interests of Europe as a whole.
At the G-7 meeting, Bush sought to address Gorbachev’s remaining condition:
economic assistance. Unfortunately, the international consensus that had helped push
through the London declaration did not exist when it came to large-scale aid. Instead,
over the objections of Kohl, the leaders asked the International Monetary Fund to start
a year-long review of the economic needs of the Soviet Union. Direct assistance
would have to wait...or come solely from the Germans. That is exactly what
54 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 230.
55 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 255.
56 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 295.
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happened. Kohl and Gorbachev met on July 14 in the Caucasus at Gorbachev’s home. 
Kohl agreed to assume all GDR economic obligations to Moscow, arrange a credit of 
DM 5 billion ($3 billion), and pay the costs of Soviet troops in East Germany during 
the transition period. Finally, Gorbachev was ready to agree to German unification 
within NATO without conditions or reservations.57 As Margaret Thatcher cynically 
assessed, “The Soviets were prepared to sell reunification for a modest boost from 
Germany to their crumbling economy.”58 Although the final concession was monetary, 
the Washington summit and NATO declaration had allowed Gorbachev to accept the 
final terms without, at least in his mind, appearing to concede to Western ultimatums. 
No matter when or why he decided to concede to the American position, Gorbachev 
knew that he had to sell German NATO membership to the Soviet people. He would 
soon find out how good a salesman he had been.
The reunification process went smoothly after the Gorbachev/Kohl Caucasus 
meeting with the Two-plus-Four talks producing a final document that detailed the 
international conditions of German reunification. The Treaty on the Final Settlement 
with Respect to Germany was signed with little fanfare on September 12, 1990.59 
There was little reason for celebration. The true accomplishment had not come during 
the Two-plus-four talks, where negotiators quibbled over minutiae. It had come 
months earlier during the private meetings, letters, and phone conversations between 
leaders from both the East and the West. It was during those moments that personal
57 “Kohl on His Caucasus Meeting with Gorbachev, 17 July 1990,” Uniting Germany: 
Documents and Debates, 1944-1993,175-178.
58 Thatcher, The Dawning Street Years, 792.
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diplomacy proved to be decisive. The United States in particular used personal
diplomacy to achieve what had once been unthinkable. Convincing the Soviet Union
to allow a unified Germany to remain in NATO was an important foreign policy
achievement for the Bush administration. As Secretary Baker recalls, the Bush
administration “took advantage of a very narrow window of opportunity.”60 The first
step was to unite Western leaders. Bush accomplished this through extensive
meetings, letters, and telephone conversations with Western leaders. As Baker recalls:
Personal Diplomacy was very important I think President Bush believes in i t I 
certainly believe in i t  and personal diplomacy to me does not mean that you 
put personal relationships ahead of principle or ahead of your party’s or 
country’s interests. It just means that if you can trust a person on the other side 
of the table, you have a better chance at getting things done.61
This was particularly important in relations with Helmut Kohl. Bush had to make sure
that the Germans would remain in NATO. Bush ensured Kohl’s partnership by
offering him full support for his plan for German reunification as long as it was
understood that the end result would be a unified Germany inside NATO. As
Scowcroft recalls, the Bush-Kohl meeting after Malta was the turning point in their
partnership:
It was pivotal because Kohl was sort of out on his own, both inside Germany.
. .  Genscher, they had a free democratic party, was worried about moving too 
fast and wanted a different kind of relationship between East and West 
Germany. The other allies didn’t want German unification, so Kohl was kind 
of feeling his way. And they had this meeting and the president said that, you 
know, “I’m not worried. I like your ideas. You go ahead; I’ll back you. I’ll
59 “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, 12 September 1990,” 
Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944-1993, Jarausch and Gransow, eds., 
translated by Brown and Cooper, 204-208.
60 James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
61 Ibid.
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keep everybody else off your back.” So he gave, in essence, a blank check to 
Kohl to move ahead. And from then on it was a pretty steady course.62
After that meeting it was a pretty steady course as far as Western solidarity was
concerned. But getting the Soviets to accept what had been difficult even for some
Western leaders to accept would prove much more difficult. America’s strategy
depended on Western solidarity and Soviet unwillingness, or inability, to take decisive
action. Just as having a clear plan of attack was key for the West, disagreements
within the Soviet hierarchy weakened their resolve. The Bush administration needed
to hold firm in their demands, try to diplomatically isolate the Soviet Union, and hope
for a crack in the Soviet position. Getting a defeated Soviet Union to accept an abrupt
realignment of the European power balance would require the Bush administration to
wait for an opening. That narrow window of opportunity was created when Gorbachev
simply could not provide an acceptable alternative to the position taken by the United
States. Scowcroft describes Gorbachev’s dilemma:
There were two problems. First of all, there was the problem of unification 
itself. And that is that East Germany was the crown jewel of the Soviet bloc. 
That was the major achievement, if you will, out of World War H. And so it 
was difficult to say, “Yes, we [the Soviet Union] failed there.” And secondly, it 
was the heart of the Warsaw Pact. It’s pretty hard to have a viable Warsaw 
Pact if East Germany is not in i t  So that was the problem with unification. 
Then there was an added problem: suppose you let Germany unify—What do 
you do about membership in NATO? Because East Germany was in Warsaw 
Pact West Germany was in NATO. And that was a very hard pill for 
Gorbachev to swallow. And in the end I think that he swallowed it only 
because he didn’t have a better alternative. He toyed around with the idea of a 
neutral Germany, but I think he decided that that would be more 
dangerous—to have a neutral Germany loose in Europe, than one tied down by 
the United States.63
62 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
63 Ibid.
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Not having an acceptable solution of his own, facing increasing domestic problems, 
and desperately needing foreign financial assistance, Gorbachev broke with the hard­
liners and acquiesced at the Washington summit to allow a unified Germany to remain 
in NATO. These same hard-liners blamed him for losing Eastern Europe and 
weakening the Soviet Union.
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-Chapter 5- 
“When You Lose Your Best Enemy”: 
The Collapse of the Soviet Union
Although the Bush administration was preoccupied with the Persian Gulf War during
the latter part of 1990 and the first part of 1991, the new relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union was becoming increasingly evident. When Iraq
invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, James Baker and Edward Shevardnadze met to
discuss the situation. The following day, August 3, Baker and Shevardnadze signed a
joint statement condemning the Iraqi invasion that, at least to Baker, made it clear that
the Cold War was over:
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and Iraq was a big Soviet client state. And I 
flew back, I happened to be in Mongolia at the time, I flew back through 
Moscow. And Shevardnadze, without clearing it with Gorbachev, joined with 
me in a statement condemning the invasion and calling for an arms embargo of 
Iraq. Now that was historic. The first time ever that the Soviet Union foreign 
minister and the Secretary of State of the United States would ever have a joint 
press conference condemning the action of a Soviet client state. That’s the day, 
at least to me, it was quite clear, if it wasn’t clear the day the wall fell, it was 
certainly clear that day that the Cold War was over. But that’s the kind of 
cooperation we were able to achieve from them. I mean nobody could conceive 
of that happening.1
Later, on November 29,1990, the United Nations, with Soviet support, would 
authorize “all necessary means” to compel compliance with UN resolutions on 
Kuwait This, basically, allowed military intervention by the UN forces to end Iraqi 
aggression against Kuwait Wanting to illustrate the new U.S.-Soviet relationship, 
Baker called for actual Soviet participation in the multinational force. Baker’s 
suggestion was not widely embraced on the American side. Bureaucrats within
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Baker’s own command at the State Department argued that sanctioning a Soviet 
military presence in the Persian Gulf directly contradicted more than 40 years of 
American diplomacy designed to keep the Soviets out of the region. According to both 
James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, President Bush, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, and 
Scowcroft, also expressed initial misgivings. Baker recalls that “Powell was especially 
worried about giving the Soviets a role in a possible attack on Iraq in the Future.”2 
Powell disputes Baker’s claim, adding, “I certainly don’t remember any particular 
conversations.”3 What was more important to Powell was the fact that the United 
States had the support of the Soviet Union where it really was needed—during votes at 
the United Nations where a solid bloc of support was needed to pass resolutions 
against Iraq. Regardless of which view is accurate, there is no denying that Soviet 
participation in the Persian Gulf War, whether direct or indirect, was an event 
unthinkable during the Cold War. The coordination of superpower positions on the 
Gulf crisis showed a level of cooperation that demonstrated just how far the 
relationship between the two countries had progressed. That does not mean that there 
was complete unanimity throughout the crisis. But disagreements were worked out in 
meetings that simply would not have taken place during the Cold War. The Soviets did 
end up playing a role in the coalition effort, albeit a small one. They sent a few ships 
to join the international flotilla and monitor the blockade but did not participate in the 
coalition ground forces. Although their help was not needed, their support was 
essential. According to U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Jack F. Matlock, Jr.,
1 James A. Baker IB, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
2 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy:
Revolution, War & Peace (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 282-283.
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Soviet support of the United States during the Gulf War was “the final nail in the
coffin” in terms of the Cold War rivalry.4
During the course of negotiations with the Soviets over their support for the
UN resolutions that would allow the use of force, Secretary Baker had successfully
lobbied Saudi Arabia to extend a $4 billion line of credit to the Soviets to help them
during their transition into a market economy. It was, Baker insists, instrumental in
maintaining the Soviet’s support for coalition efforts.5 It also demonstrated the
growing crisis in the Soviet Union. Originally brought to power in 1985, in part
because of dissatisfaction with the faltering Soviet economy, Gorbachev had
orchestrated a revolution in Soviet economic thinking. However, surprisingly little
progress was made in reshaping the Soviet economy. A 1990 State Department
evaluation concluded that:
Despite all the rhetoric about economic reform, the Soviet economy still 
operates in much the same way it did when Gorbachev came to power. 
Enterprise decisions on production, prices, investment, wages, supplies and 
product mix are still constrained by central planners; innovators have no 
incentive to innovate, nor workers to work.
According to this report, the old central planning system had been disrupted by
ballooning deficits, inconsistent reform measures, labor unrest, and national conflicts.
No new framework had been utilized to replace the crumbling system.
Consequently, the economy slowly deteriorated between 1985 and 1988; more
3 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
4 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society for Historians of American 
Foreign Relations, Boston, January 6,2001.
5 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 294-295.
6 Theme Paper: Perestroyka and U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations, 21 May 1990, 
Department of State Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, 
http://foia.state.gov/
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noticeably in 1989. In 1990, the GNP declined by 7-9 percent; 1991 looked to be even
worse. Under Gorbachev’s perestroika, wages and government budget deficits rose
significantly faster than production. This, in turn, caused a “ruble overhang” that led to
an explosion of shortages, rationing, and inflation. The resulting deterioration in living
conditions sharpened social and ethnic conflicts throughout the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev responded to the growing economic crisis with a “radicalization of
rhetoric,” assuming the “executive” presidency and announcing a move to a “full-
blooded” market. Unfortunately, this rhetoric was not followed by real economic
reform programs such as monetary stabilization, the creation of property rights and
incentives, microeconomic reform to create enterprise competition, and the creation of
a safety net based on income subsidies rather than price subsidies. The report
concluded that Gorbachev had been able to survive primarily because no other
credible leader had emerged.7 As Ambassador Matlock concluded:
Public confidence had plummeted just as the public was being allowed to 
express its views. Nationalism found sustenance in nutrients thrown off by the 
centrally controlled economy. Economic reform had been bungled—or rather 
had not been seriously attempted—and the stumbling economy was causing 
growing distress.8
Even Gorbachev admitted in his memoirs that “Perestroika did not give the people 
prosperity, something they expected of me, as head of state, based on an ingrained, 
traditional feeling of dependence.”9 If the economic crisis was not addressed, the 
people would eventually find a new leader upon which to depend.
7 Ibid.
8 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account o f 
the Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 293.
9 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs: Mikhail Gorbachev (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 
673.
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Gorbachev’s domestic difficulties were complicated by his policies in regard to 
foreign affairs, which opened the door for the democratization of Eastern Europe, the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the stand down of Soviet forces, and German 
reunification.10 First, Gorbachev’s concessions to the West angered hard-liners in 
Moscow that increasingly began to view Gorbachev as a traitor, blaming him 
personally for the country’s problems. At a meeting with Gorbachev in November of 
1990, more than a thousand military officers openly expressed their dissatisfaction 
with Gorbachev’s leadership.11 Gorbachev was shaken by this meeting, fearing a 
military coup. Second, the events in Eastern Europe both directly and indirectly 
promoted separatist tendencies within the Soviet Union. The doctrine of self- 
determination, which Gorbachev promoted in Eastern Europe, was used by Latvians, 
Lithuanians, and others calling for secession. Gorbachev’s goals of decentralization 
and democratization directly worked against his desire to preserve the Soviet Union’s 
political and territorial integrity.12 Finally, Gorbachev had to worry about maintaining 
his political authority. Boris Yeltsin was growing increasingly popular. A poll in the 
Soviet Union at the end of 1990 to select the “Man of the Year” showed that 32 
percent supported Yeltsin; only 19 percent backed Gorbachev. This was a dramatic 
change from the end of 1989 when 46 percent had supported Gorbachev and only 6 
percent Yeltsin.13 It was becoming increasingly apparent that Yeltsin could appeal to
10 Theme Paper: European Security, 22 May 1990, Department of State Freedom of 
Information Act Electronic Reading Room, http://foia.state.gov/
11 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 422-423.
12 Glenn R. Chafetz, Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine: Soviet Policy 
Toward Eastern Europe, 1985-1990 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993), 124.
13 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 447. Polls conducted by Yuri Levada’s All-Union 
Public Opinion Center.
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the reformers who felt let down by Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s approval rating also 
plummeted, dropping from 52 percent in December 1989, to 44 percent by January 
1990, to 39 percent by May, to 28 percent by July, and to 21 percent by October.14 
Gorbachev made a sharp turn to the right politically in an effort to protect against 
public and political opposition from Yeltsin and his allies on the left. This angered 
Shevardnadze who, already under intense criticism for his decision to join the 
Americans in support of the Gulf War, resigned on December 20,1990, delivering a 
scathing speech:
Democrats, I will put it bluntly: comrade democrats, in the widest meaning of 
this word, you have scattered. The reformers have gone to seed. Dictatorship is 
coming; I state this with complete responsibility. No one knows what kind of 
dictatorship this will be and who will come—what kind of dictator—and what 
the regime will be like. I want to make the following statement: I am resigning. 
Let this be—and do not respond, do not curse me—let this be my contribution, 
if you like, my protest against the onset of dictatorship.13
The move stunned Gorbachev, whom Shevardnadze had not consulted before making
his surprise announcement in the Congress of People’s Deputies. Gorbachev stood and
blasted the idea that a coup was possible or that there was an approaching dictatorship,
charging that Shevardnadze was deserting him at his most difficult time. Certainly, it
was a sign that Gorbachev’s problems would only get worse.
The U.S. Viewpoint
General Colin Powell made a trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1991.
Arriving on July 22, Powell met with his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Moiseyev, and
was, in his words:
14 Ibid.
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...dragged through Red Army showcase exercises, paratrooper operations so 
choreographed that they resembled skydiving ballets; tours of mess halls where 
my guides would have you believe the Soviet chief quartermaster was 
Escoffier; inspections of fighter aircraft, T-80 tanks, and AK-47 rifles until I 
was ready to scream.16
But, as Powell recalls, behind the facade the rot was evident. The Soviet leaders would
only let him see the elite troops that they were putting on display to impress him. They
denied his requests to see how the Soviet troops who had been pulled out of Eastern
Europe were living and denied his requests to talk with ordinary Russians. President
Bush, who was scheduled to arrive in the Soviet Union shortly after the general, asked
for a report. The resulting observations depicted a military in serious decline and, with
it, a deep dissatisfaction in the upper reaches of the Soviet military:
After traveling across the Soviet Union and talking to a lot of their generals, 
many of whom just didn’t understand the reality of the situation they were 
i n . . .  I still remember lecturing a bunch of Soviet generals at the General Staff 
Academy, and afterwards when I was through, my colleague, my counterpart 
General Moiseyev and all the others just leaping up and not really facing the 
realities. I said, ‘You guys, you’re going to have to cut back sharply; you’re 
probably going to have to go to a volunteer force,’ and they just kept 
dismissing i t  And so there was a lack of reality to the situation they were in. I 
also could sense a deep, deep uncertainty and discomfort among the senior 
ranks of the Soviet military leaders. They were also very troubled over what 
they saw in Desert Storm and in what they saw in terms of the sophistication of 
the West and what we could do, and we were no longer that weak sistered, 
soft, not terribly competent military that they might have been counting on. 
And finally, I just saw generation after generation of Soviet weaponry 
abandoned in airfields. Every time they brought in a new generation of 
equipment, they just left the other generations laying around. And I could see 
the Red Army was essentially bankrupting the country, and it could not 
continue; it was not sustainable.17
15 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the 
Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 442- 
443.
16 Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Random 
House, 1995), 537.
17 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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The problems were not merely with the Soviet military. As Colin Powell recalls, the
problems in the Soviet Union had taken their toll on its political leader as well:
The Mikhail Gorbachev whom I met on this trip was not the supremely 
confident figure of earlier summits. He seemed beaten down by the incessant 
battering he was taking in this convulsed country [the Soviet Union].18
When President Bush arrived in Moscow the following week, he found Gorbachev in
better spirits (See figure 5.1):
I saw Gorbachev late in the morning in Saint Catherine Hall Gorbachev
was marvelous, and how he could stand up to all the pressures against him I 
simply did not know. At first I thought he still believed that there would be 
some windfall of Western money that would help bail out the Soviet 
economy—he seemed confident as he spoke—but it was soon clear that he was 
pragmatic and resigned to the fact that he would not get funds.19
The fact is that by 1991 Gorbachev was more comfortable talking to President Bush
than he was most officials in the Soviet Union. Despite the very tenuous beginning to
their relationship during “the pause,” Bush and Gorbachev became genuinely friendly
after Malta. During the spring and summer of 1991, Bush and Gorbachev spoke on the
telephone almost every week (See figure 5.2).20 Yet, Bush could not give Gorbachev
what he really needed—economic aid. The Bush administration’s reluctance to
provide economic aid to the Soviet Union would fall under heavy criticism, some of
the most pointed of which coming from the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union:
I think at first, in ’89, there was a fear, particularly on Baker’s part, that the 
Soviets would simply get into the international financial and other 
organizations as trouble makers, as spoilers, and he didn’t want to let them in. 
And it was true that many of these organizations were setup for market 
economies, and they [the Soviet Union] did not have a market economy. But I 
think that’s also a reflection of the fact that Baker hadn’t quite grasped that the
18 Powell with Persico, My American Journey, 537.
19 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf,
1998), 511.
20 Based on Telcon and Memcon records, Bush Presidential Library.
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Cold War really was over and they were looking for advice and help on how to 
become a capitalist society, though they didn’t want to use that word. And I 
think they were very slow in grasping that.... I knew that he [Bush] would 
want something new, and I thought that given his background in business and 
whatnot, to make economic cooperation to bring the Soviet Union into the 
world economy and to create a market economy there could be, you might say, 
the watchword for the Bush administration. So I was trying to give him 
something new. But I think they [the Bush administration] didn’t really grasp 
the potential until too late.21
The Bush administration did start to address the problem of economic aid to the Soviet
Union in the fall of 1990 when Gorbachev’s support of U.S. actions against Iraq
prompted the Bush administration to be more inclined to help. Bush sent Secretary of
Commerce Robert Mosbacher with a group of top executives to the Soviet Union to
suggest investment and trade possibilities. The trip demonstrated to Gorbachev the
benefits that could come from continued Soviet cooperation with the United States
during Security Council votes on Iraq. But, as far as producing any real help to the
Soviet economy, the trip did little good because, as Matlock explains:
[The trip] was without any strategy and without any real briefing about what 
we wanted to encourage. They hadn’t really given any thought to that, and 
whereas Gorbachev never came up with something worthy of support, at the 
same time we never gave him any coherent advice either. And the time to give 
him that advice was ’89, and ’90 at the very latest. By 1991 it was too 
late—things had fallen apart too much. But there could have been a lot more 
direct support for the reformers there if we’d have gotten involved earlier.22
Bush did not get involved in helping the Soviet economy early on in his administration
and refused to offer large-scale aid, citing ballooning budget deficits in the United
States. Matlock takes issue with that excuse:
I think they could have found the money if they wanted to. Obviously this 
made it more difficult that there were budget deficits. But I think they could 
have, and that is what Thatcher, in effect, when she was no longer Prime
21 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
22 Ibid.
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Minister... was pressing them to do: You know, George, we need to do it and 
you don’t have to do it all. But, you know, press the Germans. And, by the 
way, Major was willing to give very substantial support in January and 
February ’92 after the Soviet Union collapsed. It was no longer Gorbachev, 
and it was Bush who turned it down.23
Certainly, Bush quickly found money in his budget to finance the Persian Gulf War. In
that case, Bush told the American people that even though they were experiencing
financial difficulties at home, the stakes in Kuwait were too great to sit idly by and let
aggression stand. When it came to the Soviet Union, however, he treated it more like a
corporation evaluating a large-scale investment and deciding not to take a risk.
The Coup Attempt
The Bush administration had always been worried about a coup attempt by the 
hard-liners in Moscow. In fact, one of the reasons that the Bush administration had 
been slow in embracing Gorbachev had been their uncertainty over whether or not he 
would be able to maintain power or, in the event of a coup, whether or not his reforms 
would prove to be merely temporary and reversible, with a new government relapsing 
into earlier policies. There had been rumors of a coup attempt in July of 1991. Bush 
had even warned Gorbachev through a message sent through Ambassador Matlock. 
But Gorbachev had dismissed the rumors as false. It was during July that negotiations 
were taking place concerning a new Union Treaty. The republics had built upon the 
example of Russia and declared their sovereignty. They then began the task of 
securing as many rights for themselves as possible. Although most of the republics’ 
leaders recognized that they needed some central authority capable of resolving 
common problems, they also wanted to tackle their own affairs without interference.
23n>i<[
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The details of the Union Treaty were agreed upon on July 23,1991—the same month 
that Boris Yeltsin was officially inaugurated as the president of Russia. The Union 
Treaty was scheduled to be signed the following month. On Sunday, August 18, just 
two days before the Union Treaty was scheduled to be signed, information began to 
filter to President Bush, who was vacationing at his home in Kennebunkport, Maine, 
that Gorbachev had been removed from office and that a “State Committee for the 
State of Emergency” had been setup. The committee included Vice President Gennady 
Yanayev, Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, KGB 
chief Vladimir Kryuchkov, Oleg Baklanov, who was in charge of the military- 
industrial complex, Interior Minister Boris Pugo, and two civilians: Valery 
Starodubstev and A.I. Tizyakov. These eight men were all hard-liners and now seemed 
to be in control of the Soviet government That was the problem facing the Bush 
administration. They really did not know if the coup was successful or what had 
become of Gorbachev. Bush immediately engaged in frantic telephone diplomacy, 
calling John Major, Fran?ois Mitterrand, and Helmut Kohl to see if they had any more 
information than the Americans had been able to obtain. Coordinating their responses, 
all agreed to avoid statements that might give legitimacy to the new coup. Bush 
conducted an impromptu press conference at Walker’s Point at which he described the 
coup attempt as “extra-constitutional” and a “disturbing development.” Admitting that 
he had few details of the situation currently taking place in the Soviet Union, Bush 
promised to “watch the situation unfold” before taking any action, warning that it was 
too early to write off Gorbachev because coups are not always successful—“Coups
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can fail,” he added hopefully.24 By the end of the day, Bush had received a letter from
the plotters explaining the “official” reasons for the coup:
There has emerged a situation of uncontrollability with too many centers of 
power. All this cannot but cause widespread discontent of the population.
There has also been a real threat of the country’s disintegration, of a 
breakdown of the single economic space, and the single civil rights space, the 
single defense, and the single foreign policy. A normal life under these 
conditions is impossible. As a result of inter-ethnic clashes there has been 
bloodshed in many areas of the USSR. A disintegration of the USSR would 
have gravest concerns not only internally, but internationally as well. Under 
these circumstances we have no other choice but to take resolute measures in 
order to stop the slide towards catastrophe..
The deep uncertainty and discomfort among the senior ranks of the Soviet military that
General Powell had witnessed earlier that year were apparent in the letter. And
although Yanayev claimed that the new regime would honor the international
agreements and continue Gorbachev’s reforms, there were plenty of reasons to doubt
him. Bush flew back to Washington that night still wondering what, if any, action he
should take. His daily diary indicates that he was especially concerned with how his
administration would be criticized. Reporters were already asking why the Bush
administration had not anticipated the coup. This was evident in the fact that Bush,
along with many of his cabinet, was on vacation. The Bush team quickly assembled an
eight-point plan for action:
1. Make an assessment Meet with advisors to determine how we can 
influence the situation. Perhaps through arms control or economic aid
2. Get Marlin [Fitzwater] back to Kennebunkport
3. Contact the South American leaders and stress to them the necessity for the 
entire hemisphere to speak out against the coup
4. Make sure the U.S. message is constant and steady
5. Stay in touch with Yeltsin
24 Presidential Press Conference from Walker’s Point, Kennebunkport, Maine, 19 
August 1991. Video footage provided by the George Bush Presidential Library.
25 Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 524.
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6. No politics
7. Get our information out to our people so that we speak with one voice
8. Change the work schedule from the relaxed vacation schedule to one that 
was more formal26
The plan of action was more reactive than proactive; however, there was little that
Bush could do until he learned more about the situation in the Soviet Union. The most
important item on the list was the need to stay in constant contact with Yeltsin.
Bush placed a call to Yeltsin the next morning, August 20,1991. Unlike his
repeated calls to Gorbachev, Bush was actually able to reach Yeltsin who informed
him of the situation:
The situation is very complex President Gorbachev is located in Foros in
the Crimea. He is absolutely blocked, no way of reaching him. President [sic] 
Yanayev is using the pretext that Gorbachev is ill, but this is not yet confirmed. 
Essentially a committee of eight people has taken over the presidency and 
established a state of emergency in Russian territory and the Baltics. Troops 
have been brought up to Moscow, not only in the city, but in Moscow District 
and surrounding towns. And by issuing [these] decision[s], the group has 
exposed itself as no more than a right-wing junta. I appeared before the people 
and soldiers and I said that actions of the committee were unconstitutional, 
illegal, and have no force on Russian territory.27
Remarkably, the man that most observers considered Gorbachev’s main political
opponent ardently defended him during the coup attempt Over the next few days,
Bush stayed in regular contact with Yeltsin and came to gain a new respect for the
Russian leader. While Yeltsin was voicing his condemnation of the coup in Russia,
Bush continued to call for the restoration of the legitimate government In a press
conference on August 20,1991, Bush, in a somber and resolute tone, declared that
26 Reported by CNN on August 22,1991. Video footage provided by the Bush 
Presidential Library.
27 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, 
8/20/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bums/Ed Hewitt Files, George Bush 
Presidential Library. Also quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 527.
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U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union—MFN status, grain credits, etc.—would be put 
on hold until there was a resolution of the crisis and the constitutional government was 
restored. In his statement, Bush praised Yeltsin for “standing courageously against 
military force.”28 The intent of Bush’s words was not to threaten the coup plotters but 
to keep the heat on. He knew that the United States did not need to get involved 
militarily and he knew that the coup leaders controlled enough of the military to crush 
Yeltsin. Bush had to rely on international pressure and hope that Yeltsin, who 
organized a demonstration of more than 150,000 people, could generate enough public 
pressure to force the coup leaders to release Gorbachev. Bush was betting that the 
coup leaders had underestimated the power of the people in their calculations, that the 
Soviet people were committed to democracy, and that the reforms started by 
Gorbachev could not be easily reversed. He knew that, if the coup failed, the hard­
liners’ influence would be broken and democracy would take a gigantic leap forward. 
Bush and the world watched over the next few days as Yeltsin put on a masterful 
performance. He had the Russian Supreme Soviet unanimously declare the coup 
attempt illegal. The other republics soon followed suit and the coup fell apart. Bush, 
on vacation and out riding in his boat, the Fidelity, was summoned to shore to receive 
a telephone call. Scowcroft had instructed the Signal (military) switchboard to 
periodically attempt to call Gorbachev and had finally gotten through. Bush rushed 
into his home at Kennebunkport to speak with Gorbachev (See figure 5.3):
Bush: Oh my God, that’s wonderful. Mikhail!
28 Press conference on 20 August 1991. Video footage provided by the George Bush 
Presidential Library.
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Gorbachev: My dearest George. I am so happy to hear your voice again.
Bush: My God, I’m glad to hear you. How are you doing?
Gorbachev: Mr. President, the adventurers have not succeeded.29
The two men talked like old Mends excited to hear from the other. It also suggests
why some felt that Bush had become too Mendly with Gorbachev and had stayed with
him even when it was becoming apparent that Yeltsin was gaining power. James
Baker explains the Bush administration’s outrage to such charges:
The press loved that argument and they used to write i t  They also wrote that 
Clinton stuck with Yeltsin too long. But when you’ve got a reformer in power 
and things are going the way you want ’em to go, then you stick with that 
person, particularly when they’re freely elected, as Yeltsin was. So, that’s just 
a fun and games exercise by the press that don’t know what they’re talking
about What did we lose by hanging in there with Gorbachev and
Shevardnadze? When Yeltsin came to power, he embraced us even more 
whole-heartedly. We didn’t lose a damn thing. And we gained a lot. So, we’ll 
shoot that one down.... That argument is just totally without foundation or 
without rationality or reason. If you look at what happened, yes, we stuck with 
Gorbachev. He was the general secretary and then president of the Soviet 
Union. And when Yeltsin came onboard. . .  when I went over there in 
December o f ’91 before the implosion of the Soviet Union, I met with Yeltsin. 
He met me in St. Catherine’s Hall. Why’d he do that? To stick it in 
Gorbachev’s eye. But certainly his embrace of the United States was total and 
complete, 100 percent, every bit as much as Gorbachev. We didn’t lose 
anything by doing that.30
Certainly, Bush did side with Gorbachev until the coup attempt. During and after the
coup attempt, however, Bush switched his support to Yeltsin. Yeltsin’s actions during
the failed coup attempt made him a force to be reckoned with, and Gorbachev faced a
very difficult political reality. Central Soviet authority was declining at an accelerated
rate and the Communist  Part/ was discredited. Telephone records show that calls
29 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Mikhail 
Gorbachev, 8/21/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bruns Files, George Bush 
Presidential Library. See also Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 531-32.
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between Bush and Yeltsin increased sharply beginning with the coup and continued to
outpace calls between Bush and Gorbachev until the Soviet Union collapsed.31 Bush’s 
diary just a couple of months after the coup, the day before he was to meet with 
Gorbachev in Madrid, demonstrates just how quickly things changed:
Diary, October 26
It is clear to me that things are an awful lot different regarding Gorbachev and 
the Center than they were. He’s growing weaker all the time. I am anxious to 
see what his mood is. He’s still important in nuclear matters, but all the 
economic stuff—it looks to me like the republics have been more and more 
exerting themselves. It will be interesting to figure out his mood. I remember 
not so long ago how he couldn’t stand Yeltsin. How he, up at Camp David [in 
June 1990], made clear he didn’t think Yeltsin was going anywhere. But, now 
all that has changed. Reports recently that he might not be around long. The 
briefing book indicates this may be my last meeting with him of this nature. 
Time marches on.32
This shift in power was also evident in Bush’s public comments. Every time that Bush 
mentioned Gorbachev, he now also mentioned Yeltsin—an obvious sign of the 
changing reality in the Soviet Union. This change had begun when Yeltsin won his 
popular election and became a properly-elected leader. During the coup attempt, the 
world watched Yeltsin in charge, on top of a tank, directing the opposition, almost 
single-handedly defeating the coup. That is the image people remembered because 
Gorbachev was not to be seen. Even Bush was sure to mention to the press that 
Gorbachev’s first telephone call had been to Yeltsin. Yeltsin was, along with the 
republics, on the rise. The failed coup had accelerated the demise of Gorbachev, and 
with him, the Soviet Union.
30 James A. Baker HI, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
31 Based on an analysis of the Telcon and Memcon records, George Bush Presidential 
Library.
32 Bush’s Presidential Diary quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 
548.
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At the time of the coup attempt, the world did not really know what had 
happened to Gorbachev. In his memoirs, Gorbachev gives a detailed account 
supported by passages from his wife’s diary of what was occurring in his dacha.33 He 
was visited on the night before he was scheduled to leave for the signing ceremony of 
the new Union Treaty by several of the coup plotters who informed Gorbachev of the 
creation of an emergency committee and demanded that he sign the decree on the 
declaration of a state of emergency. When he refused, they suggested that he turn 
control over to Vice President Yanayev because of “failing health” or resign 
completely. Gorbachev refused; the plotters stormed out of the dacha leaving 
Gorbachev and his family confined to the premises and with all outside 
communications severed. Gorbachev would remain there for a total of 73 hours, as the 
emergency committee told the world that Gorbachev was experiencing “health 
problems.” It would not be until August 21, with the realization by the coup plotters 
that they had failed to gain public support, that outside communications were restored 
to Gorbachev’s dacha and he was free to leave. The coup had failed in large part to the 
fact that Gorbachev had succeeded in establishing better relations with the outside 
world. Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein were the only world leaders to express 
approval of the coup. Along with the democratic achievements of perestroika and 
Yeltsin’s ability to rally public support, the condemnation by world leaders helped 
convince the coup leaders to end Gorbachev’s captivity. Upon returning to Moscow, 
Gorbachev made a statement:
33 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 626-645.
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I have come back from Foros [where he was held captive] to another country, 
and I myself am a different man now.34
Gorbachev’s statement was correct in many respects. He had hoped that the Union
Treaty would help transform the Soviet Union into a viable democratic federation. But
the coup attempt had delivered to the separatists and extreme radicals a compelling
argument to support the breakup of the Soviet Union. In an ironic twist, the coup,
which had been led by hard-liners attempting to keep the Soviet Union from
transforming, led to its complete breakup. The coup produced, in the words of
Gorbachev, a “landslide” and “a strong impulse for disintegration.”35 Gorbachev
himself resigned his post of general secretary of the Communist Party and
recommended that the Central Committee be dissolved because he felt betrayed by the
party leadership and a large number of party functionaries who had not supported him
during the coup attempt. All of the republics declared their independence in September
and October 1991. The coup shattered the process of establishing new Union ties
between sovereign states and had left the machinery of the state in disorder.
Authorities within the republics implemented only those decisions of the Union
ministries they considered advantageous for themselves, ignoring the rest To make
matters even harder to control for Gorbachev was the fact that power was now divided
between the Kremlin and the Russian White House. This, of course, is explained by
Yeltsin’s increased status; he continued issuing decrees that applied to the entire
Union for several days after Gorbachev returned to power. It seemed only a matter of
time before Yeltsin would use his power to take complete control of the Kremlin.
34 Ibid., 642.
35 Ibid., 646.
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The breakup of the Soviet Union seemed to many to be a victory rather than a 
tragedy. The debate quickly centered on what would emerge out of the old Soviet 
Union. Gorbachev urged a union of sovereign states, a confederative state that would 
carry out the functions delegated to it by the various republics. Yeltsin, however, 
wanted a commonwealth of fully independent countries. Gorbachev warned that any 
gains attained from sovereignty could not compensate for the losses incuned as a 
result of the complete breakup of the USSR. The final agreement came as a result of a 
secret meeting between Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuck, the president of Ukraine, and 
Stanislav Shushkevich, the president of Belarus. They met at Minsk during the first 
days of December 1991. At the meeting, the three leaders decided to dissolve the 
USSR and establish the CIS, or Commonwealth of Independent States. The purpose of 
the meeting had been zealously guarded because the three leaders did not want 
Gorbachev to attempt to stop them. It was not until the three leaders had reached full 
agreement and called President Bush to ask for his support that they called Gorbachev 
to inform him of the situation. During their phone call to Gorbachev, they told him 
President Bush had already given his support to their agreement. Gorbachev angrily 
replied to Yeltsin:
What you have done behind my back with the consent of the U.S. president is a 
crying shame, a disgrace!36
According to Bush, he had been very careful not to either accept or reject the
agreement reached by the three leaders at Minsk:
To me, the provisions sounded as though they’d been designed specifically to 
gain U.S. support for what was being done, since they directly addressed the
36 Ibid., 659.
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conditions for recognition we had laid out. I did not want to imply prematurely 
our approval or disapproval. ‘I see,’ I said simply.37
Since the transcript of that phone conversation remains classified, there is no way yet
to know whose account to believe.38 Gorbachev believed that Bush had given his
approval to the Minsk agreement and the subsequent actions by the Bush
administration did nothing to suggest otherwise. In fact, even in Bush’s account, he
basically told Yeltsin that he would go along with the agreement if Yeltsin gained the
support of the other republics:
I promised to read the accord as soon as he sent it to me and to respond 
quickly. I felt a little uncomfortable. ‘We will work with you and others as this 
develops,’ I said. ‘Of course, we hope that this whole evolution is a peaceful 
process.’ Sidestepping the question of American support for Yeltsin’s 
implication, I added that we understood this must be sorted out by the 
participants, not by outside parties such as the United States. Yeltsin agreed, 
and confidently added that he was sure all of the other republics would join 
them soon.39
Another reason that Gorbachev was willing to believe that Bush would go along with 
Yeltsin’s plan was the way that he had acted since the coup attempt. Gorbachev knew 
that Bush had been shifting his support to Yeltsin and was under increasing domestic 
pressure to recognize the sovereignty of the republics. In fact, the key to Yeltsin’s 
success in convincing the other republics to agree to the Minsk agreement was the 
situation in Ukraine, which had not agreed to join the new Union proposed by 
Gorbachev. Yeltsin, and many other presidents of republics, did not feel that the 
Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States would be viable without Ukraine. Without
37 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 555.
38 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Boris Yeltsin, 
12/8/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bums/Ed Hewitt Files, George Bush 
Presidential Library.
39 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 555-556.
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Ukraine, the two Slavic countries, Belarus and Russia, could be outvoted. Adding to 
Gorbachev’s troubles was Bush’s decision to recognize Ukraine. The information had 
leaked out after a meeting between Bush and some Ukrainian Americans. The news 
infuriated Gorbachev, who called Bush to voice his displeasure. Bush, however, had 
made up his mind. His decision to recognize Ukrainian independence, a decision that 
came four days before the Ukrainians themselves voted on independence, was based, 
according to Brent Scowcroft, entirely on domestic politics.40 Bush had complained to 
Gorbachev in October during a Middle East peace conference in Madrid that the 
coming year was going to be difficult for him because of the looming presidential 
election.41 Bush’s foreign policy decisions would increasingly be influenced by 
domestic policy concerns. His decision to recognize Ukrainian independence as well 
as his decision to back Yeltsin seem, in retrospect, almost inevitable given the 
pressures that he faced at home and the disagreement within his own foreign policy 
apparatus.
American policy disagreements came to a head in a long NSC meeting on
September 5,1991. It was a complex situation: the Baltics had been granted
independence by the Soviet State Council and republics throughout the Soviet Union
were threatening to secede. It was still very unclear what would happen. Dick Cheney
called for an aggressive approach:
I assume these developments are far from over We could get an
authoritarian regime still. I am concerned that a year or so from now, if it all 
goes sour, how we can answer why we didn’t do more.. . .  We ought to lead 
and shape events The voluntary breakup of the Soviet Union is in our
40 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
41 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 665.
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interest If  it's a voluntary association, it will happen. If democracy fails, we’re 
better off if they’re small.42
Cheney, in essence, argued that the United States should actively encourage the
breakup of the Soviet Union. He did not simply want to react to events—he wanted to
use the leverage that he believed the Bush administration had to shape the outcome.
He suggested establishing consulates in all the republics and providing humanitarian
assistance. Cheney’s basic premise rested on his belief that the United States would be
dealing with 15 or 16 independent countries. Baker disagreed: “The peaceful breakup
of the Soviet Union is in our interest. We don’t want another Yugoslavia.”43 In
particular, Baker wanted to avoid a Russian-Ukrainian clash. He felt it was best not to
exacerbate any disputes among the center, Russia, and Ukraine.44 When Scowcroft
and Baker added that aid programs from the West were based on the premise of a
strong center and that the United States should try to prop up the center, Cheney
dismissed it as “old thinking.” He saw Ukraine as the key to whether or not a viable
Union could be maintained and predicted that it would not join a new Union. The
possibility of a weak center especially disturbed Colin Powell, who worried about the
fate and command and control of nuclear weapons:
We want to see the dissolution of the old Soviet Union. I am not sure that 
means fifteen republics walking around. Some confederation is in our interest
as well as seeking out bilateral relationships 1 am comfortable with where
they [nuclear weapons] are. Who has them is the more important question. The 
Red Army has them now. If they move back to Russia, I am not sure who will 
be in control.45
42 Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 541.
43 Ibid.
44 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 560.
45 Quoted in Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 542.
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The meeting ended without any clear decision. Scowcroft explains that the Bush
administration really could not decide which plan would be preferable:
We had a long debate about what our preferences were, and Baker was on one 
side of the arguments that you just made [that it would be preferable to have at 
least some form of the Soviet Union survive rather than face the possibility of 
chaos because a strong central authority could at least maintain reliable control 
over the nuclear arsenal]; Cheney was on the other side saying we actively 
ought to split up the Soviet Union. And we debated and came to no firm 
conclusion. So we really didn’t have a position. We just let nature take its 
course.46
Bush knew, however, that he wanted the process, regardless of which one occurred, to
be a peaceful one and one that did not rush to independence at the expense of true
democratic reforms. In Ukraine, in what would be labeled by the press as his “chicken
Kiev” speech, Bush warned against local despotism:
But freedom cannot survive if we let despots flourish or permit seemingly 
minor restrictions to multiply until they form chains, until they form shackles. 
Later today, I’ll visit the monument at Babi Yar, a somber reminder, a solemn 
reminder of what happens when people fail to hold back the horrible tide of 
intolerance and tyranny. Yet freedom is not the same as independence. 
Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a 
far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a 
suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred. We will support those who want 
to build democracy47
Many members of the press mistakenly thought that Bush’s speech was meant to
dissuade the republics that were seeking self-determination. Instead, rather than
calling for the Soviet Union to remain intact, Bush was warning against the outbreak
of violence that could result from an upsurge of intolerant nationalism. U.S.
46 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
47 “Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of the Ukraine in Kiev, Soviet 
Union, August 1,1991,” Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: George 
Bush, 1991, Book II-July 1 to December 31,1991 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 
1007.
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Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock explains the reason for Bush’s 
warning:
Well, there were several reasons. One was that the nationalists in several of the 
republics wanted independence for their own reasons, and the Communists in 
other republics, once they saw that the Communist Party was losing power, 
wanted independence in order to save themselves and stay in power. This 
happened in central Asia. You ended up with five dictators in central Asia in 
those five countries and keeping the old system primarily open; therefore, with 
all of their talk of opening up the economies, they were basically a totalitarian 
political system in die way that they controlled things. I think that is why I 
think Bush was right when he said don’t confuse independence with freedom. 
In other words, if you have freedom and you want independence, eventually 
you’re going to get i t  But if you take independence under conditions before 
you get freedom, you could be deprived of freedom for a long time, and that’s 
happening in a lot of the republics. In fact in all of them, except the Baltic 
states, it’s happening. Now, I think we understood that we couldn’t do it for 
them. It’s something they had to do for themselves.48
While the Bush administration had varying views on what course of action would be
best for the Soviet Union, the overriding concern, notwithstanding Cheney, was that
they wanted the Soviet Union to work out the internal problems on their own and in a
way that ensured a peaceful process. This preoccupation with assuring a peaceful
process led Baker and the State Department to come up with a set of “five principles”
that were similar to the “four principles,” which had been used as a guideline on
German unification:
(1) peaceful self-determination consistent with democratic values and 
principles
(2) respect for existing borders, with any changes occurring peacefully and 
consensually
(3) respect for democracy and the rule of law, especially elections and 
referenda
(4) human rights, particularly minority rights
(5) respect for international law and obligations49
48 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
49 Baker with DeFrank, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 525.
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Baker intended to use the “five principles” to create a political structure to guide U.S. 
policy through the transition period of the Soviet Union. Later, a sixth principle would 
be added—central control over nuclear weapons, and safeguards against internal or 
external proliferation. Despite these principles, the Bush administration never arrived 
at a rigid policy on the potential breakup of the Soviet Union. This was due to the 
sheer rapidity of the events and the fact that many in the administration still had views 
that differed from Baker’s. Most agreed, however, that the United States did have 
some role to play in regard to external concerns and obligations. Knowing that he 
would need the support of the United States, Yeltsin obviously geared the Minsk 
agreement to meet the concerns publicly expressed by the Bush administration. The 
plan that he read over the telephone after secretly meeting with the presidents of 
Ukraine and Belarus guaranteed international obligations, including foreign aid debt, 
under agreements and treaties signed by the former Soviet Union and provided for 
unitary control of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. It was reasonable for Yeltsin 
to assume that the Bush administration would likely agree to a plan that seemed to 
mesh with the six principles outlined in various official U.S. public statements. That 
is, of course, if he could follow through with his claim that the other republics would 
soon be in agreement. And Yeltsin’s prediction soon came true. The Minsk agreement 
was released while the republics’ parliaments were reviewing the Treaty on the Union 
of Sovereign States drafted by the USSR State Council and supported by Gorbachev. 
Their attention quickly turned to the Minsk agreement with 11 republics approving it 
almost immediately and the Central Asian states joining in at a  later date. Despite the 
continued objections by Gorbachev, the Declaration of Adherence to the
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Commonwealth of Independent States was signed on December 21,1991, at Alma-
Ata, by all of the republics save the Baltic states and Georgia.
On December 25,1991, Gorbachev signed a decree relinquishing his duties as
president of the USSR. The end of the Soviet Union was not a surprise. President
Bush had already had his staff write a letter to Gorbachev to be sent on the day he
resigned. He had also had them write a draft statement on the resignation that praised
Gorbachev for his contributions in ending the Cold War. Bush received the final draft
the day before Gorbachev’s announcement.50 In reality, Gorbachev’s resignation was
anticlimactic. Yeltsin had been methodically stripping Gorbachev of power since the
coup, thus ensuring that the Soviet Union would cease to exist The morning of
Gorbachev’s resignation Bush received a final call from Gorbachev.51 Bush was
spending Christmas day at Camp David with his family. Despite the events that led to
Gorbachev’s fall and Bush’s role in recognizing Yeltsin, Bush and Gorbachev
remained close friends. In fact it bad been Bush who tried to keep relations between
Gorbachev and Yeltsin as cordial as possible and ensure a peaceful transfer of power.
As Bush’s press secretary recalls:
Maybe one of the best examples was when Yeltsin replaced Gorbachev after 
the coup attempt It was President Bush who got on the phone to Yeltsin and 
convinced him that in a peaceful turnover, he needed to be good to Gorbachev. 
And [he] told him to give him a car, give him a house, and treat him well. And 
Yeltsin didn’t want to because he hated Gorbachev, and then Bush called 
Gorbachev and said the same thing—You want to demonstrate a peaceful 
transition; you got to be praising Yeltsin or at least don’t be criticizing him in 
public. Don’t be tearing him down and picking a fight. You two guys have got
50 “Draft Statement of Resignation of President Gorbachev,” 12/24/91, National 
Security Council, Nicholas Bums Files, George Bush Presidential Library.
51 Memorandum of telephone conversation between George Bush and Mikhail 
Gorbachev, 12/25/91, National Security Council, Nicholas Bums Files, George Bush 
Presidential Library.
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to show that you can change power peacefully. And that’s the hallmark of that 
period for President Bush.
Despite the relationship between Bush and Gorbachev, in the end, Bush supported the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Many western politicians of the Cold War Era had seen
the breakup of the Soviet Union as the main goal of the Cold War. Bush was of that
generation but was also fearful that the disintegration of the Soviet Union could leave
a dangerous and unpredictable geopolitical vacuum. In that final telephone
conversation, Gorbachev assured Bush that he was leaving everything under reliable
control. He was, of course, referring to the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons.
The lack of central authority did open up the danger of the loss of physical control of
the country’s nuclear weapons. The Soviet arsenal of nuclear weapons was
concentrated in four republics: Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. The United
States was not entirely confident that all four of the republics could handle or secure
the weapons or fissionable materials to their satisfaction. The Bush administration had
finally, after much debate among the advisors, reached the conclusion that it would be
preferable to see the nuclear weapons under the control of one entity that had both the
experience and stability to control them. Gorbachev agreed with this and, just before
leaving office, turned over the “presidential briefcase,” which contained the control
system for nuclear arms to Yeltsin, so it would be controlled by the Russian
Federation.53 Russia would also take the Soviet Union’s place on the United Nations
Security Council. Gorbachev assured Bush that he could celebrate Christmas without
worry. In an address from the Oval Office on Christmas night, Bush spoke to the
52 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
53 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 671
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nation to explain the historic change that had taken place that day (See figure S.4).54 
He expressed gratitude to Gorbachev for his commitment to peace—giving 
Gorbachev’s policies the credit for changing the USSR. But he also gave credit to 
American policies, citing the nine American presidents since the Cold War started as 
playing key roles in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bush then offered a three-tier 
recognition process. The United States would first fully recognize Russia and Yeltsin. 
Then full diplomatic recognition would be extended to the republics that had taken 
proper steps to achieving stability. Finally, the United States would recognize the 
independence of the rest of the republics on a conditionary basis. “Our Enemies have 
become our partners,” Bush told American viewers—with that, the official seal was 
placed on the end of the Cold War. One final vestige of the Cold War was wrapped up 
by START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). The breakup of the Soviet Union 
had convinced Bush to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides even 
further than what had been agreed upon in START. Scowcroft suggested getting rid of 
all tactical nuclear weapons with the exception of air-delivered ones. Short-range 
nuclear weapons were becoming increasingly undesirable. For example, in Europe, 
with the unification of Germany, short-range nuclear missiles would detonate on 
German territory. They were also problematic for the Navy, who had received 
complaints from countries that were reluctant to allow warships carrying nuclear 
weapons into their ports. Scowcroft also suggested de-MIRVing of the ICBM force,
54 Address from the Oval Office, December 25,1991. Video footage provided by the 
George Bush Presidential Library.
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perhaps the most destabilizing nuclear weapons used by either side.55 These 
suggestions developed into START II, which was signed just before President Bush 
left office in January 1993.
Why did Gorbachev fall?
If the basic goal of the Cold War was seen by many to be the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, then it is important to understand Gorbachev’s failure because the 
collapse of the Soviet Union mirrored the collapse of Gorbachev. An understanding of 
Gorbachev’s failure thus provides an explanation of why the Soviet Union itself 
imploded. The first step is to look at the task that Gorbachev had to address 
immediately upon taking power—the failing Soviet economy. The Soviet economy 
was failing because of isolation from the world economy. A fundamental shift in the 
Soviet Union’s foreign policies had to be made in order to end its economic and 
political isolation. Those foreign policies had, in the past, made the Soviet Union a 
pariah within the international system. Shifting those foreign policies, however, would 
directly contradict what had been a source of pride for the Soviet Union. As Soviet 
expert Condoleezza Rice points out, “The Soviet Union had taken pride in being a 
pariah—neither an accomplice to nor a victim of global capitalism’s exploitation of 
the world.”56 This was the basic understanding of Marxist-Leninist ideology that had 
been used by Soviet leaders. The central tenet of Marxist-Leninist ideology since 
Joseph Stalin’s rule had been that the Soviet Union’s long-term interests could not be 
reconciled with the interests of an “international economic and political order
55 This would mean that intercontinental ballistic missiles would no longer have 
multiple warheads that could be targeted separately.
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dominated by capitalist democracies.”57 According to this ideology, the Cold War and 
the separation that it required was the very foundation of the Soviet Union. Until the 
day when socialism finally triumphed, that division had to be maintained in order to 
provide insulation from an international economic system tbat could destroy the Soviet 
Union. Stalin had actually formulated this plan prior to World War II. He felt that the 
Soviet Union should be self-sufficient until a “ring of socialist brother states” would 
come along to provide the resources and additional insulation and security to protect 
against capitalism. Once this happened, a truly alternative system would be in place to 
counter capitalist democracies. This helps explain the evidence presented by the 
Venona intercepts and why the Soviet Union would be waging an espionage war 
against a supposed ally.58 Of course, Stalin achieved the spheres of influence that he 
needed in the aftermath of World War II. He would use Eastern Europe’s resources to 
build a stronger Soviet Union, one that could hope to outlast capitalism. But the 
socialist economies had a flaw that the capitalist democracies did not—the system 
could not be regulated by the market. Therefore, the Soviets had to build a structure to 
coordinate the socialist economies. This structure, found largely in the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), would further isolate them from the capitalist 
democracies of the West. The American containment policy actually mirrored Stalin’s 
original blueprint, providing further insulation. Unfortunately for the East, it also kept 
them from gaining access to changing technologies that would have benefited the
56 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: 
A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 7.
57 Ibid.
58 See John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in 
America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999).
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Soviet military economy as well as civilian needs. This flaw was readily apparent in 
the 1970s as the Soviet Union increasingly relied on foreign technologies as well as 
imported grain. This did not dissuade the Soviet Union from its goal. It hoped to 
revitalize its system through detente by acquiring technological help from the West 
while affirming its superpower status. On the other hand, the West hoped to use 
detente to force the Soviets into a “web of interdependence” that would chip away at 
the insulation from the economic and political order dominated by capitalist 
democracies. The hopes of the West had dissipated by the end of the 1970s as they 
realized that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the Soviet buildup of 
conventional forces demonstrated that they were trying to turn detente into a victory 
rather than an accommodation. President Carter responded to this challenge by 
ordering a sharp increase in defense spending at the end of his term. President Reagan 
extended this increase to even higher levels. After decades of economic stagnation, the 
Soviet Union could not match American technological innovation and could not afford 
to continue trying to overwhelm with brute strength. This placed Gorbachev in a very 
difficult position. He knew that the very foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology was 
the precept of a “permanent revolution” in which the socialist states would have to 
outlast the capitalist democracies. He knew that although the Soviet system was not in 
immediate danger of collapsing, the reality was that the West could almost certainly 
last longer. He could either follow the pattern set by previous Soviet leaders and wait 
for the system to eventually collapse because of economic pressure, or he could seek 
to reform the system by ending Soviet isolation and reintegrating it into the 
international system creating, in the words of Gorbachev, a “common European
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home.” This, of course, would mean the end of the Cold War. His critics would charge
that such a move would shake the very foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology and
the Communist Party. Gorbachev, however, was more concerned with practical and
fundamental reforms. He was a genuine reformer whose goal, unlike his predecessors,
was not to accumulate more power for himself and the Communist Party but to
establish a government based on the consent of the governed. In theory and on paper,
the Soviet state was a voluntary federation of sovereign republics. But in practice, the
Soviet Union operated as an imperial state. As Gorbachev himself recalls, perestroika
was meant to end this totalitarian system:
Yes, there were political, economic, and social problems—and problems 
between nationalities. These were not, however, problems of our country as a 
whole but of the system that had been established. This administrative- 
bureaucratic system, this totalitarian system, could not respond adequately to 
the problems that had built up. Not only did it fail to contribute to their 
solution; it deepened and intensified them. As a result, by the 1980s our 
country had entered a stage of crisis. It was in order to overcome this crisis that 
perestroika was begun.59
The realization in the 1980s that the Soviet Union could not win the arms race helped 
Gorbachev deal with the hard-liners. Yet he still could only push limited reforms for 
fear of being removed from office by the Central Committee if he began to be seen as 
too radical. In short, Gorbachev realized that the Soviet Union could not continue as it 
had. He knew that the change must occur internally but with the cooperation of the 
West But Gorbachev wanted to reform the Soviet Union, not destroy it, as the hard­
liners accused him of doing. He wanted to transform the empire into a federated or 
confederated state:
59 Mikhail Gorbachev, On My Country and the World, Translated from Russian by 
George Shriver (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 84.
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Today the assertion can often be heard that the Union treaty that was to be 
signed in August 1991 would have meant the destruction of the Soviet Union 
anyway. No! The signing of the treaty would have been a real alternative to the 
breakup of the Union. It would have meant preservation of Union-wide 
citizenship, which was recognized as a separate point in the document. The 
citizen of any state belonging to the Union was simultaneously a citizen of the 
Union. That was Article 2 of the treaty. The new Union treaty would have 
meant preservation and development of a unified Unionwide market Armed 
forces under a single command (not “joint command”) would have been 
preserved. The state security of the Union as a whole and a unified foreign 
policy would have been assured. Preservation, renewal, and reform of the 
Union was my main political and, if you will, moral task in my position as 
president of the USSR. I consider it my greatest sorrow and misfortune that I 
did not succeed in preserving the country as a single whole. All my efforts 
were focused on trying to preserve that unity.60
But Gorbachev failed to preserve that unity. His failure was assured by the August
coup and the damage that it did to his ability to lead. According to Boris Yeltsin’s
journal:
Instead of a gradual transition from the Unitarian Soviet Union to a softer, freer 
confederation, we had a complete vacuum at the political center. The 
center—in the person of Gorbachev—was totally demoralized. The emerging 
national states had lost faith in him. Something had to be done.61
The only real chance that the Soviet Union had of remaining intact was for Gorbachev
and Yeltsin to cooperate. Their personal antagonism prevented this from happening.
From the time of the coup attempt, Yeltsin began seizing the bureaucratic structures of
the Soviet Union in an effort to destroy the Soviet state and, with it, Gorbachev. In the
past, Russia had been ruled directly by the central ministries. A fully sovereign Russia
needed the institutions of government controlled by Gorbachev in order to prevent
political gridlock. Certainly, Yeltsin would not remain content to share Moscow with
Gorbachev. Thus, it was Gorbachev, backed into a comer by the August coup and
60 Ibid., 158.
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Yeltsin, who bore the primary responsibility for bringing about the end of communism
as a system of rule in the USSR and the end of the Soviet Union itself. The United
States, as Ambassador Matlock explains, could only play a supporting role:
Obviously, some of the things we pushed for to end the Cold War, such as 
opening up the country, bringing in democratic processes, supporting the 
election process, were things that made the eventual disintegration of the
Soviet Union possible In that sense, by opening up the country,
encouraging them to open up and so on, we created conditions which when 
they could not deal with these other pressures, the state collapsed. So I’m not 
saying that none of our policies had any relevance. I’m just saying that we 
didn’t bring it about We didn’t have the power to bring it about. It was 
brought about internally. Some of these internal forces had been encouraged by 
the United States and the West in general, not so much by a direct action, 
although by that to, but by our very existence. After all, as long as we [the 
West] existed as free societies, as democratic societies, with economies that 
seemed to work, we were a threat to the Soviet system. And what their task 
was to try to be more like us without admitting it. And we were really in favor 
of that. It turned out that they couldn’t. Well, that was their problem.62
The end of the Cold War set in motion forces that attacked the very foundation of the
socialist system. By encouraging democratization, human rights, and the free flow of
information, the United States helped introduce outside pressure on a flawed system.
But in the end, Gorbachev would be the one who had to alter the existing system in an
effort to save his country, not destroy it. The type of radical change that could have
made the Soviet Union viable, however, was exactly the type of change that it had
been designed to block.63
61 Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle fo r Russia, Translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New 
York: Times Books, 1994), 105-106.
62 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
63 Matlock, Autopsy on an Empire, 650.
201
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
-Chapter 6- 
The Prudent Cold Warrior: 
The Foreign Policy Legacy of George Bush
Assessing the impact of any recent president is a difficult task for historians. The very 
use of the word legacy suggests a sense of judgement that is unavoidably subjective. It 
is necessary, however, now that a reasonable amount of time has passed since the 
ending of the Cold War, to examine the presidential organizational and policy making 
arrangements that shaped that end at a time when many of the men and women who 
influenced those decisions are still alive to be questioned by historians. Interviews 
with President Bush’s principal aides and advisors have been a central underpinning of 
this study. It is still impossible to provide a complete, if history is ever complete, view 
of the end of the Cold War because of limited, though not inconsequential, amount of 
documents available for research. Documents have been declassified and released to 
the public in sporadic bursts, offering a continuously changing image of exactly what 
occurred. This study is based on many recently declassified documents that challenge 
some of the well-accepted views of the Cold War. There is no reason to be alarmed if 
some preconceptions are challenged or even replaced. As Cold War historian John 
Lewis Gaddis reminds us, “Cold War historians should retain the capacity to be 
surprised.”1 Thus, it has been the purpose of this study to show the foreign policy 
apparatus and the decision-making process of the Bush administration to provide an 
accurate portrayal of the Bush administration’s role in ending the Cold War.
1 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1997), 294.
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No one man ended the Cold War. Neither Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev,
George Bush, or any other single leader had that type of impact. But each influenced,
by their foreign policy successes and mistakes, when and how that end would occur.
In order to gage the true impact of these figures, one must understand when and
exactly how that end was realized. The exact date has been endlessly argued by Cold
War historians. For the general public, the end of the Cold War is usually marked by
the fall of the Berlin Wall. The dramatic television images of Germans “dancing on
the wall”—something George Bush refused to do—are memorable. But the building
of the Berlin Wall did not mark the beginning of the Cold War, nor did the fall of the
Berlin Wall mark its end. So when did the Cold War end? Participants cannot agree on
an exact time. Some members of the Reagan administration still insist that it was over
by the time that Reagan left office. Attorney General Edwin Meese, perhaps Reagan’s
most devoted admirer, hailed Reagan as “the man who ended the Cold War.”2
Secretary of State George Schultz implies much the same as he recounts the final
months of the Reagan administration in his memoir:
It was as if the whole world had breathed a deep sigh of relief. An immense 
tension had gone out of the system. The world had changed. Margaret Thatcher 
had it right. In an interview with the Washington Post and Newsweek on 
November 17, during her last official visit to Washington during the Reagan 
administration, she said flatly, “We’re not in a Cold War now.” Despite this 
new reality, many in the United States seemed unable or unwilling to grasp this 
seminal fact. But to me, it was all over but the shouting.3
The “shouting,” as Schultz describes it, would entail the collapse of Communist
control of Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, the disintegration of the
2 Edwin Meese, With Reagan: The Inside Story (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 
1992), 163.
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Warsaw Pact, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Claiming that the Cold War ended 
in 1988 and declaring Reagan the man who had single-handedly won the war shows, 
of course, very heavy bias by Reagan loyalists whose own reputations and legacies are 
inextricably tied to that of Reagan’s. There is strong evidence to negate the claims of 
Reagan loyalists. Certainly Reagan’s strategy of “peace through strength” or 
“negotiation from strength” had helped the Soviets to lose ground to the United States 
as far as military and economic power. But the Soviet Union remained a formidable 
nuclear power and, in terms of raw numbers, still held an edge in conventional forces 
in Europe. In addition, as historian Joseph Powers argues, “With the rise to power of 
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 a Soviet leader once again assumed a prominent role in 
world affairs reminiscent of Khrushchev’s during the 1950s.”4 Certainly the Soviet 
Union in January of 1989, while perhaps beaten, was not vanquished. The few people 
that served in both the Reagan and Bush administrations tend to take a more moderate 
view of Reagan’s accomplishments. Marlin Fitzwater, White House Press Secretary 
for both President Reagan and President Bush, felt that Reagan had won the Cold War 
by 1988, but that the Malta conference on December 2-3,1990, was the pivotal point 
in changing the relationship with the Soviet Union and making plans for the post-Cold 
War world:
I would say that [the Malta conference] was the pivotal point at which the 
West first recognized that Communism was changing and may collapse. And 
we met with the purpose of trying to define how that could happen, what our 
role would be, and how we could help guide the future of whatever Russia 
emerged.... [the Malta conference] was the point at which we recognized as a
3 George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years A s Secretary o f State (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 1131.
4 Joseph Smith, The Cold War: Second Edition, 1945-1991 (Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1998), 149.
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country, as a president, that Communism was gone, or on its way. And we 
were making plans for the post-Cold War world.5
According to this view, although Reagan had accelerated the demise of the Soviet
Union, there were still many aspects of the Cold War that had to be addressed before it
would completely end. To Fitzwater, Malta was the turning point. Other officials
would point to other “turning points” as the date when the Cold War could
conclusively be deemed at an end. Bush’s Secretary of State James Baker argues that
the Cold War ended on August 2, 1990:
Suddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and Iraq was a big Soviet client state. And I 
flew back, I happened to be in Mongolia at the time, I flew back through 
Moscow. And Shevardnadze, without even clearing it with Gorbachev, joined 
with me in a statement condemning the invasion and calling for an arms 
embargo of Iraq. Now that was historic. The first time ever, that the Soviet 
Union foreign minister and the Secretary of State of the United States would 
ever have a joint press conference condemning the action of a Soviet client 
state.... That’s the day, at least to me, it was quite clear, if it wasn’t clear the 
day the wall fell, it was certainly clear that day that the Cold War was over.6
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft takes a different view. He points to July
15, 1990, as the end:
The point at which I was willing to say the Cold War is over is when 
Gorbachev in July of 1990 . . .  Kohl went over to visit him. . .  and Gorbachev 
said it was alright if a united Germany could belong to NATO. To me that was 
the end of the Cold War.7
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell was not willing to say that the Cold
War was over until December 25,1991:
The end of the Cold War, I guess for me as a finite date in time was Christmas 
1991 when the Soviet Union ended.8
5 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
6 James A. Baker ID, telephone interview by author, 22 May 2000.
7 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
8 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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How can there exist so much disagreement concerning an end date to the Cold War? 
How can historians set a date if the very men that lived through the events and made 
the decisions that shaped the end are in open disagreement? To answer that question, 
we must examine the Cold War as a whole rather than as a series of isolated events. 
That requires an examination of the origins of the Cold War. After all, the Cold War 
could not end until the original issues that set in place the foundation of the Cold War 
had been resolved.
Origins of the Cold War
The origins of the Cold War can be traced back to the Bolshevik revolution in 
November 1917. The United States, in opposition to communism, was the only great 
power to refuse to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. The United 
States finally relented in 1933; however, both countries largely withdrew from Europe 
in the 1920s and 1930s, thus preventing any potential confrontations. The military 
realities of World War II forced the two into an uneasy, and unavoidable, military and 
political alliance to stop Nazi Germany—a foe that neither the Soviet Union nor the 
U.S./British forces could defeat independently. With Hitler’s demise seeming 
increasingly more certain, the one thing that the leaders at the Crimean (Yalta) 
Conference in February of 1945 agreed upon was that Germany had to surrender 
unconditionally and that it would be occupied for an undetermined length of time. 
When the Soviet and U.S. troops met on April 25,1945, in the center of Germany, it 
was meant to be a symbol of a joint victory. In reality, it marked a division of Europe 
that would last for decades. Despite President Roosevelt’s policy of friendship and 
accommodation toward the USSR that had been adopted during the war effort, the
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Soviet Union had used the period of 1942 to 1945 to launch an unrestrained espionage 
offensive against the United States. Through the Venona intercepts, which were some 
2,900 deciphered encrypted Soviet diplomatic communications, the National Security 
Agency (U.S. Army’s Signal Intelligence Service) was able to learn that the Soviet 
Union was launching an espionage attack of the type that a nation directs against an 
enemy state. By the late 1940s the evidence provided by Venona of the massive size 
and intense hostility of Soviet intelligence operations caused both American 
counterintelligence professionals and high-level policymakers to conclude that Stalin 
had already launched a covert attack on the United States. Senior Army officers in 
consultation with the FBI and the CIA decided to keep Venona a secret from the 
public and even restricted knowledge of it within the government.9 The Soviet 
espionage offensive would be one of the reasons that the “practice of wartime 
cooperation did not become a habit that would extend into the postwar era.”10 
Evidence of the growing divide would be increasingly apparent as, throughout 1946 
and 1947, both sides began to solidify their opposition to the other. Joseph Stalin’s 
speech in February of 1946, which suggested the existence of a protracted conflict 
between the communist-based Soviet Union and the capitalist powers, and Winston 
Churchill’s famous “iron curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, 
heightened the rhetoric of opposing camps. In March 1947, Truman unveiled the 
Truman Doctrine, which was used to commit the United States to defending Greece 
and Turkey against communist forces. The announcement of the Marshall Plan in June
9 John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in 
America (New Haven: Yale, 1999).
10 Gaddis, We Now Know, 15.
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of 1947, which offered economic aid to Western and Eastern Europe, followed by its 
rejection by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European states, which were now firmly 
within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, solidified the division of Europe. The 
authors of the Marshall Plan even recognized before it was offered that it would 
solidify the division of Europe. During the discussions leading up to the unveiling of 
the plan, policy advisor George Kennan insisted to George Marshall that the assistance 
be offered to all of Europe so that “if anyone was to divide the European continent, it 
should be the Russians, with their response, not we [the United States] with our 
offer.”11 The Marshall Plan would become the chief instrument of a new foreign 
policy doctrine that had been suggested by George Kennan—containment. Kennan 
was credited as the architect of containment policy after publishing an article in the 
July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, under the pseudonym of “X.”12 The concept of 
containment, however, had been developed by Kennan over the previous two years 
and presented in various forms, most notably the 8,000 word “long telegram” of 
February 22, 1946. Simply stated, the idea was to contain the Soviet Union and 
communism from spreading further in Europe until it decayed from within and 
brought the Soviets to the bargaining table. Designed to keep the peace while 
preserving the balance of power, Kennan realized that by 1945 American-Soviet 
relations had crystallized on three levels: (1) Soviet predominance in most of Eastern 
Europe could not be avoided, (2) the Soviet Union was ruled by a Communist tyrant 
and must be contained within its existing and unduly swollen limits, and (3) such a
11 George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 343.
12 X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, 
no. 4 (July, 1947), 566-582.
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containment must not only mean an American commitment to the defense of non- 
Soviet Europe but also that it would eventually lead to a withdrawal of some of the 
most extended positions of Soviet armed presence in Eastern and Central Europe after 
which serious discussions about the correction of the division of Europe (including 
Germany) should occur.13 Only the second precept was accepted by the American 
government in 1947 and developed into the official containment doctrine employed by 
the United States—an incomplete version that ignored Kennan’s long-range 
considerations and took on more of a military character than Kennan had proposed. 
This prompted his resignation from the government in 1953. He felt that the Cold War 
that evolved from that point was “a reflection of misunderstandings on both sides of 
the intentions of the other side, each ascribing to the other the intention to try to solve 
the division of the European continent by military means.”14 In his view, on neither 
side were these military fears justified.
Containment doctrine had been meant to address the division of Europe. But 
the Cold War’s sudden expansion into Asia in 1949-50 demonstrated that World War 
II had “left not just a single power vacuum in that part of the world, as in Europe, but 
several.”13 The expansion of the Cold War to Asia meant that Americans began to 
look at the Cold War in more global terms. Korea and Vietnam would be the sites for 
much of the “hot” parts of the Cold War, with soldiers being brought home in body 
bags. The second phase of the Cold War moved beyond the division of Europe and 
went from the practical, concrete problem seen by George Kennan and into a more
13 George F. Kennan and John Lukacs, George F. Kennan and the Origins o f 
Containment; 1944-1946 (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 16-17.
14 Ibid., 63.
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ideological one, pitting Communism against Capitalism, Totalitarianism against 
Democracy—no matter where they collided.16 The Cold War became much more than 
just the division of Europe, and Kennan’s containment policy began to be used in 
ways that he had not foreseen. That second phase of the Cold War, the one built on 
ideology, was the war that Ronald Reagan had fought. That war had been fought with 
rhetoric—a moral crusade to defeat the Evil Empire and stop the approaching 
Armageddon. While that might seem like a stretch, it is exactly how Ronald Reagan 
felt. It was the undercurrent of almost all of his speeches concerning the Soviet Union 
during his first term in office and indeed the undercurrent of his anti-Communist 
speeches on behalf of the Screen Actors Guild early in his career. He became more 
conciliatory during his second term as it became apparent that the United States was 
winning, and by 1988, the second phase of the Cold War was all but won. But the 
original phase of the Cold War—the one Kennan had addressed—had not been 
resolved. The division of Europe still existed. Two armed camps still were entrenched 
in Europe, exerting their power over their spheres of influence and forcing the other to 
be ready for an onslaught that would never come. More concerned with ideology and 
rhetoric, nuclear weapons and Armageddon, Reagan could not see that the division of 
Europe had to end before the Cold War would be completely finished. In fact, as Jack 
Matlock recalls, Reagan saw the division of Europe as a symptom not the cause of the 
Cold War.17 For the 20 years prior to the Reagan administration, the conflict between
15 Gaddis, We Now Know, 54.
16 Richard L. Russell, George F. Kerman's Strategic Thought: The Making o f an 
American Political Realist (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 10.
17 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech given at a luncheon forthe Society of Historians of 
American Foreign Relations, Boston, Massachusetts, January 6,2001.
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the United States and the Soviet Union had been fimneled into arms control
negotiations—a place where both sides could safely flex their might and use hot
rhetoric to demonstrate that the Cold War was a battle between superpowers. Both
sides wanted to show that their country, and thus their ideology, was superior. When
Brent Scowcroft was given the opportunity to be Bush’s national security advisor, he
saw an opportunity to fundamentally change how the Cold War was being fought—to
move it from an ideological battle fought with rhetoric to a pragmatic agenda resolved
through diplomacy:
I wanted to change that a little and to focus on Eastern Europe. There was 
ferment in Eastern Europe, especially Poland. And I wanted to take advantage 
of that ferment to try and get die Soviet army out of Eastern Europe, or at least 
reduce their presence to allow the Eastern Europeans to develop in a 
progressive way.18
And that is exactly what the Bush administration accomplished. They both encouraged 
and helped manage the end of the division of Europe in a way that would help it end 
with minimal turmoil and minimal bloodshed. Thus, the original phase of the Cold 
War, and with it the Cold War itself, ended when the division of Europe ended. More 
precisely, it ended when the center of Europe, where the Soviet and U.S. troops had 
met in 1945 to symbolize victory, was unified. The reunification of Germany ended 
the original phase of the Cold War. The official conclusion took place on September 
12,1990, when France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
East and West Germany signed an agreement that ended Allied occupation rights and 
united Germany, thus fully restoring its sovereignty.19 The practical end, however,
18 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
19 Kenneth L. Hill, Cold War Chronology: Soviet-American Relations, 1945-1991 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1993), 327.
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took place on July 1S, 1990, when Gorbachev finally agreed to a unified Germany in 
NATO, thus clearing the final hurdle for reunification. That reunification, along with 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern 
Europe, and NATO’s shift toward a greater political and less military role, ended the 
division of Europe and fulfilled the third precept of Kennan’s containment policy.
The argument that there existed in reality two distinct dimensions to the Cold 
War is the only credible argument that explains the differences in President Reagan’s 
and President Bush’s foreign policy initiatives, and it is the only one that resolves the 
original suggestions made by Kennan concerning containment. It also explains why 
Kennan became one of the more vocal critics of how the government was putting the 
Containment Doctrine into practice. In 1966, Kennan argued against the war in 
Vietnam on grounds of American self-interest.20 To him, the Cold War was a practical 
concern that need not evolve into the United States fighting communism in every part 
of the globe. It was not in America’s self-interest to fight a military war to end 
communism. The Soviet Union had no intention, as the American military 
establishment feared immediately following the Second World War, to conquer 
Western Europe and establish subservient Communist regimes. He understood the 
willingness of the government and the military to accept this image because it would 
give the military “a new purpose, a new function, even in a sense a new legitimacy, to 
the greatly swollen military bureaucratic establishment with which the end of the war
20 Allen J. Matusow, “The Vietnam War, the Liberals, and the Overthrow of LBJ,” 
Retracing the Past: Readings in the History o f the American People, 4th ed., vol. 2, 
Gary B. Nash and Ronald Schultz, eds. (New York: Longman, 2000), 208-220.
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had left us.”21 The suspicions on the Soviet’s part, contends Kennan, were confirmed 
by “the entire trend of American policy in the immediate postwar years.”22 The 
unwillingness of the United States to pursue any realistic discussions, discussions 
advocated by Kennan, about the future of Europe added to the fact that the United 
States intended to rearm the West Germans and admit them to NATO, events that 
convinced the already oversuspicious Stalin that the West was determined to steal the 
spoils that he had won in World War Q. Kennan argues that Stalin failed to realize that 
the members of the NATO alliance were not adequately prepared or unified enough to 
mobilize in an attack on the Soviet Union. On the other side, the Americans had no 
reason to justify their belief that the Soviets were preparing an onslaught against the 
rest of Europe. A Soviet victory would involve the unification of Germany under a 
single Communist government—something Stalin did not want. Moving the center of 
European Communism to a united Germany would have been dangerous because such 
a powerful regime would not remain a puppet of Moscow for long and could 
eventually challenge the Russian Communist regime for superiority. Thus, from a 
practical standpoint, the situation that solidified in the opening years of the Cold War, 
at least according to Kennan, was absurd. He particularly disagreed with how the 
problem of Soviet power was treated in NSC-68, a document that formed the basis of 
postwar American foreign policy.23
Between 194S and 1950, relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union had greatly deteriorated and had become increasingly hostile. The contest,
21 Kennan and Lukacs, George F. Kennan and the Origins o f Containment, 1944- 
1946, 64.
22 Ibid., 64.
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however, had been fought largely on political and economic grounds. During this time, 
foreign policy had stressed economic assistance through the Marshall Plan and 
collective security through the North Atlantic Treaty and a program of very modest 
military aid to its allies. That changed when NSC-68 argued that the West needed 
large, ready military forces to stop the expansion of communism and the Soviet Union. 
President Truman’s budget of 19S0, the year NSC-68 was drafted, called for spending 
less than $13 billion for the military—less than S percent of the gross national product 
(GNP). The next year, after NSC-68 was officially adopted, Truman requested more 
than $60 billion for the military—18.5 percent of a robust GNP.24 Military power 
would continue to have primary claim on U.S. resources throughout the Cold War 
period as the militarization of the Cold War began in earnest with NSC-68, presented 
to Truman in April of 1950, and, just two months later, the Korean War. NSC-68 had 
presented four possible courses of action to Truman: (1) continuation of current 
policies, (2) isolation, (3) war, (4) and “a more rapid building up of the political, 
economic, and military strength of the free world than provided under [option number 
one], with the purpose of reaching, if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations 
without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is 
attacked.”25 The study strongly recommended that Truman pursue option number four. 
Just as Kennan’s famous “X” article, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan 
marked a turning point in 1947 and provided the basis for the Cold War based on a
23 Ibid., 70.
24 Ernest R. May, ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: 
Bedford Books, 1993), vii.
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political and economic struggle, 1950 witnessed the Korean War and NSC-68
providing the example and rationale, respectively, for U.S. strategy during much of the
Cold War. It was not by coincidence that NSC-68 was formulated immediately after
Kennan stepped down as the director of the Policy Planning Staff and Paul Nitze
assumed the position. Kennan, who saw the international confrontation as essentially
political in nature and thus necessitating a political response, would not have
recommended to President Truman a military solution. Indeed Kennan would spend a
good part of the rest of his career voicing his disagreement to the treatment of the
problem of Soviet power in NSC-68, warning that:
History shows that belief in the inevitability of war with a given power affects 
behavior in such a way as to cripple all constructive policy approaches towards 
that power, leaves the field open for military compulsions, and thus easily 
takes on the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy.26
But, Nitze felt that the report answered the fundamental question of national security:
How do we get from where we are to where we want to be without being struck by
disaster along the way?27 Nitze and Kennan disagreed on both where they were and
where they wanted to be. Aside from Kennan’s disdain for the militarization of the
Cold War, there was a more fundamental disagreement. Both NSC-68 and Kennan
viewed American security as being dependent upon the maintenance of a balance of
power. But NSC-68 argued that the balance of power was very fragile and could shift
at any moment. Kennan believed that there were only five real centers of power—the
25 “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” (April 14, 
1950), reprinted in American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, Ernest R. May, 
ed. (Boston: Bedford Books, 1993), 21-82.
26 George F. Kennan, The Cloud o f Danger: Current Realities o f American Foreign 
Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 201-202.
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industrial complexes of the United States, Great Britain, the Rhine valley, the Soviet 
Union, and Japan. As long as the West maintained control of four out of those five, no 
threat to the international order would exist. Kennan saw a very tangible struggle 
based primarily on geography and economic capacity. NSC-68 suggested that changes 
in the balance of power could result from intangibles such as intimidation, 
humiliation, and loss of credibility. Within the argument for pursuing the fourth 
option, the authors of NSC-68 cited an important advantage as being its 
“psychological impact.”28 Historian John Lewis Gaddis explains the impact of such a 
line of reasoning:
The implications were startling. World order, and with it American security, 
had come to depend as much on the perception of the balance of power as on 
what that balance actually was. And the perceptions involved were not just 
those of statesmen customarily charged with conducting international affairs; 
they reflected as well mass opinion, foreign as well as domestic, informed as 
well as uniformed, rational as well as irrational. Before such an audience, even 
the appearance of a shift in power relationships could have unnerving 
consequences; judgments based on such traditional criteria as geography, 
economic capacity, or military potential now had to be balanced against 
considerations of image, prestige, and credibility. The effect was to vastly 
increase the number and variety of interests deemed relevant to the national 
security, and to blur distinctions between them.29
These proliferating interests would have to be defended by an increase in defense
expenditures. This completely went against the perception of limited resources, which
had been one of the underpinnings of Kennan’s views on containment. Instead, there
was not to be any distinction between peripheral and vital interests. Indeed, if
27 Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: A t the Center c f Decision (New York: 
Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 95.
28 “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” (April 14, 
1950), 73.
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American security depended as much on perception of the balance of power as on
what that balance actually was, all interests were vital. NSC-68 suggested:
... a way to increase defense expenditures without war, without long-term 
budget deficits, and without crushing tax burdens: if, as Truman’s domestic 
economic advisors had argued, the administration would learn to live with 
temporarily unbalanced budgets in the interests of stimulating the economy, 
then the means of defense could be expanded as necessary to protect the 
American position in the world.30
The debate over NSC-68 implied that the country could achieve expandable means if a
threat to its survival existed. Clearly, NSC-68 recognized such a threat. The
comparisons between this approach and Reagan’s “Peace through Strength” program
are obvious, as are the comparison of Kennan’s approach based on limited resources
and Bush’s approach amid huge deficits and a weak economy. Another comparison
can be made between NSC-68’s view of American security based on perception and
Reagan’s fight against the “Evil Empire,” which was based on rhetoric and ideology.
Certainly, Kennan’s emphasis on geography and economic capacity has direct
correlation with Bush’s emphasis on Eastern Europe. It seems clear, at least in light of
this study, that there was a marked difference between the policies of 1947 and 19S0;
between the policies of 1981 and 1989.
The hypothesis of two distinct levels of the Cold War can not only be seen in
the writings of George Kennan and Paul Nitze but also in the words of official who
where there when the Cold War ended. Take, for example, the words of Marlin
Fitzwater, who served as Press Secretary to both Reagan and Bush:
29 John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” 
International Security, Spring 1980, vol. 4, no. 4 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1980), 164-176. (166)
30 Ibid., 166.
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When Reagan came [into office] in 1988, we were in the heat of the Cold War, 
and Reagan was the Cold Warrior. He knew how to fight communism. He had 
a strong ideology, a strong belief in America, and so he was a perfect president 
to take’em on and say America’s going to win this war. And when President 
Bush came in he had the international background and the diplomatic 
experience to then negotiate the new realities of an East-West relationship.31
He identified Reagan’s fight, and his strength, as being based on ideology. He was
“the Cold Warrior” because he “knew how to fight Communism”—with ideology.
This ideology was manifested in rhetoric. Fitzwater identifies Reagan as the perfect
president to take them on and “soy [emphasis added] America’s going to win this
war.” When Fitzwater refers to Bush, he praises him for his international background
and diplomatic experience. Bush was the right president to “negotiate [emphasis
added] the new realities of an East-West relationship.” In that same interview,
Fitzwater indirectly refers to Bush’s ability to “navigate [emphasis added] the waters
of European change.” The difference in terminology could not be more striking.
Reagan is going to “fight communism,” “take’em on,” and “say America’s going to
win.” Bush is going to use his “diplomatic experience” to “negotiate” and “navigate.”
The two presidents were addressing the Cold War in two distinct ways. That is
because they were fighting two different levels of the Cold War, partly because of
their two markedly different backgrounds and partly because of the circumstances in
which they found themselves:
The point is that the world changed there and it changed just about the time we 
changed presidents, so you can’t really judge President Bush, his views on 
ending the Cold War, against Reagan’s because the Cold War was different 
when he became president.32
31 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
32 Ibid.
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It is difficult to compare the effectiveness of the foreign policy approach of each man
because they had such different goals and such different concepts of the war that they
were fighting. Reagan put his belief in words, words such as freedom  and democracy.
He felt that espousing those words was a goal in itself. If he could get people,
Americans and Soviets, to believe in those words, successful policies would naturally
follow. In essence, he used ideology as both a guide for policymaking and as a tool to
justify policy once it was made. In his memoir, Reagan explains the essence of what
the Cold War meant to him:
Democracy triumphed in the Cold War because it was a battle of values— 
between one system that gave preeminence to the state and another that gave 
preeminence to the individual and freedom.33
To Reagan, the Cold War was a battle of ideology and values that had been won once
it was demonstrated that democracy was superior. Indeed Jack F. Matlock Jr., who
served on Reagan’s National Security Council staff from 1983-86 and as U.S.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union under both Reagan and Bush, confirms that Reagan
viewed the Cold War as a war of ideology: totalitarianism versus freedom.34 Matlock
distinguishes between the ideological phase of the Cold War and the diplomatic phase.
He points to Gorbachev’s speech before the United Nations as the point at which the
Cold War philosophically came to an end:
I distinguish between the ideological end to the Cold War and, as I say, all of 
the cleanup diplomacy, which was important. It’s sort of like something 
happening as die end of a crisis, but you don’t know if there’s going to be a 
relapse if you’re speaking in medical terms. So it had to be confirmed, but it 
was confirmed over the next two years.... So I think that, in general, we no 
longer had totally antagonistic goals. After all, the Cold War was conceived as
33 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 715.
34 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Speech at a luncheon for the Society of Historians of American 
Foreign Relations, January 6,2001.
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a zero-sum game—any gain for one was [a loss for] the other—and then 
suddenly we were looking at how we can disengage, how can we serve the 
interests of everybody.... that’s why I say I think it ended ideologically. That’s 
not to deny that there was a lot of diplomacy to be done to clear up the 
remnants of the Cold War, the results.35
According to this view, when President Bush took office, the United States needed a
skillful diplomat who excelled at personal diplomacy and could help “wrap things up”
peacefully—what Matlock refers to as cleanup diplomacy. Although the Cold War’s
back had been broken in terms of ideology, the responsibility for cleaning up the
remnants of the Cold War would fall on Bush. It was a role that Bush, who was wary
of excessive rhetoric and preferred pragmatic (he would say “prudent”) diplomatic
solutions, was well suited to perform. That is certainly the view of Brent Scowcroft:
The Carter administration. . .  well, they had a tough time. But in a way it was 
sort of a disaster because everything was going wrong for us and it was the end 
of Vietnam and Watergate, and the Soviet Union was talking about the 
correlation of forces and the world was changing in their favor and so on. So 
what we needed was Reagan to restore American spirits and to have us stand 
up and stand up tall. But it took Bush to bring it to an end.36
Scowcroft certainly felt that Bush ended the Cold War:
The Cold War . . .  well, you know the Reagan administration tends to think 
they ended the Cold War. I think the Cold War was not at all ended when Bush 
came into office. Eastern Europe was still divided just like it was before. The 
Soviet army was still manning barricades and so on. No, it happened under 
President Bush, and it happened the way it did in considerable part because of 
his great skill at diplomacy about eliciting cooperation from people, both 
friends and opponents.37
Notice what Scowcroft points to as the reason the Cold War had not ended—Eastern
Europe was still divided:
35 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., interview by author, Boston, Massachusetts, 6 January 2001.
36 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
37 Ibid.
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I thought that. . .  the Cold War was really about Eastern Europe. And, with the 
unification of Germany and its membership in NATO, that really finished the 
Cold War.38
The division of Europe that Kennan had addressed with his Containment Doctrine had 
to end before the Cold War could be over. However, the division of Europe could not 
end, at least peacefully, until the Soviet Union allowed for that division to end.
Gorbachev and the “new thinkers” who gained power in 1985 provided the 
initial conditions needed for the end of the Cold War. But he did not intend to end the 
division of Europe: he was more interested in internal change. Changes in foreign 
policy were merely designed to help perestroika succeed. Gorbachev looked favorably 
on world developments that he felt promoted perestroika and never considered that 
they might lead to the emergence of anti-communist and anti-Soviet governments: “If 
we can bring people back into the socialist system instead of alienating them, we can 
give socialism a second wind.”39 This optimistic remark in July of 1989 demonstrated 
that the purpose of his policies was not to promote separation or grant independence. 
Instead, they were intended to “inspire much-needed reform and modernization.”40 His 
belief that socialism would be strengthened depended on his ability to revitalize the 
Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s domestic reforms, however, could not revive an economy 
beleaguered by mismanagement and inefficiency. With falling agricultural and 
industrial production, inflation, and increased foreign debt and trade deficits, criticism 
of Gorbachev’s reform efforts led to demands for local autonomy by many of the more
38 Ibid.
39 Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse o f Communism in 
Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 75.
40 Joseph Smith, The Cold War: Second Edition, 1945-1991 (Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 1998), 142.
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than 100 different nationalities within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s reforming 
activities and his denunciation of Brezhnev’s “years of stagnation” did not merely 
impact the Soviet Union. The rising expectations sparked by glasnost (open debate on 
government policies) and perestroika (economic restructuring) led to movements in 
the satellite states for the same type of fundamental reforms and, thereby, challenged 
the power and authority of the local communist bosses. This progression of change 
from ‘below’ followed the path that Gorbachev was taking from ‘above.’ As Jack 
Matlock recalls, Gorbachev’s initial foreign policy approach was that of a dogmatic 
defender of traditional nationalistic, exclusive, and intolerant Soviet attitudes. But 
within just a few years he had rejected the class struggle ideology and embraced 
universal human values. Gorbachev knew that a less confrontational foreign policy 
would allow him to lower defense spending, thus freeing up needed resources for 
internal economic reform. Also, Soviet leaders had used the Cold War to justify 
internal repression. Gorbachev knew that the needed reforms might be blocked by 
hard-liners as long as the Cold War continued. In addition, continuing a 
confrontational security policy would make it imperative that the coercive control of 
Eastern Europe be maintained—something Gorbachev increasingly began to view as 
incompatible with his policies of democratization and economic reform within the 
Soviet Union.41 Reducing the Soviet sphere of influence would have the added benefit 
of reducing the cost of economic subsidies to Eastern Europe, which had long been a 
burden to Soviet resources. For example, by ending the Soviet sale of oil and natural 
gas to Eastern Europe at prices far below world market, a key source of hard currency
41 David S. Painter, The Cold War: An International History (London: Routledge,
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for the Soviet Union could become available. Gorbachev’s change in foreign policy 
was also done to help his country overcome “the hostility, and permanent tension with 
the outside world that the Bolshevik Revolution had engendered.”42 Gorbachev knew 
that, in order for his efforts to succeed, he was going to need better relations with the 
West. This change in relations started during Reagan’s second term and was nearly 
complete by the time Bush assumed the presidency. Gorbachev recognized that 
between his last visit to the United States while Reagan was still in office and the first 
visit under President Bush, “the ‘enemy image,’ used to fuel the Cold War 
confrontation for decades, had lost much of its appeal.”43 Gorbachev’s ideological 
pronouncements were more than a shift in rhetoric; they led to the reorientation of 
Soviet foreign policy to conform to them. That is why Gorbachev, unlike previous 
Soviet leaders, consistently used force not as a first but as a last resort.44 That is why, 
in the end, he was willing to agree to arms reductions based on equality rather than 
along proportional lines, which would have maintained Soviet superiority. That is why 
he took a non-interventionist policy toward Eastern Europe and allowed those 
countries to leave the Soviet sphere of influence; why he allowed a unified Germany 
in NATO and opposed aggression by a former Soviet client state in the Persian Gulf. It 
is worth remembering that the Bush administration had its best success in negotiations,
1999), 104.
42 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on An Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account 
o f the Collapse o f the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1995), 658.
Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs: Mikhail Gorbachev (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 
536.
44 Unlike his non-interventionist policy towards Eastern Europe, Gorbachev was 
prepared to use armed force to maintain the Soviet Union itself. But, again, only as a 
last resort.
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for example Gorbachev’s agreement for a unified Germany, when the discussion was
couched in the rhetoric of universal human values. As Matlock concludes:
He [Gorbachev] did not originate the specific program that eventually ended 
the Cold War and eliminated the East-West divide. But he came to understand 
that the Soviet Union could benefit from joining the rest of the world, and he 
made an essential contribution when he found and adopted an ideological 
justification for making peace with the world.43
Thus, Bush dealt with a Soviet leader with no clear strategic vision, but one that
eagerly wanted his internal reforms to succeed. The task was to find common interests
that could move forward the U.S. objective of ending the division o f Europe and aid
Gorbachev in his task of preserving and developing the democratic transformations
that were occurring within the Soviet Union.
Conclusion
Foreign relations are a major concern of every presidency. This was especially 
true in the presidency of George Bush, during which the Cold War ended, Germany 
was reunited, the Soviet Union collapsed and the former Soviet Bloc countries began 
the transition to democracy and market economics, and the United States led the 
alliance that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi control. In no other area does the president 
play more of a central role than in foreign affairs. This is especially true when, as in 
the case of Bush, both houses of Congress are controlled by the opposing party. The 
concept of George Bush as an excellent president with regards to foreign policy and a 
poor president in regards to domestic policy seems to have been universally accepted. 
In fact, it is now almost a cliche. It is worth noting that out of all o f the Bush 
administration officials interviewed for this study, when asked to list the achievements
43 Matlock, An Autopsy On An Empire, 658.
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of the Bush administration, not one cited a domestic policy achievement. All 
exclusively focused on accomplishments in foreign affairs. The press were quick to 
see this disparity and focused on it throughout the Bush presidency. At the end of 
1990, Time magazine named its “Man of the Year.” The award was supposed to go to 
the person who, for better of for worse, had made the most impact on news that year. 
Their selection was unusual in that they named “the two George Bushes” as “Men of 
the Year.”46 They claimed that George Bush had seemed like two presidents: one 
displaying a commanding vision of a new world order, the other showing little vision 
for his country. In short, they were making a distinction between a remarkably 
successful “International George Bush” and a rudderless “Domestic George Bush.” 
This perception was not confined to 1990 nor was it limited to Time magazine. In fact, 
this is the image that most of the general public, and many trained observers and 
historians, have of George Bush’s entire presidency. Economist Robert Reich 
mockingly labeled Bush the “best secretary of state we’ve ever had.”47 Economist 
John Kenneth Galbraith added that, in his opinion, “[Bush] becomes slightly depressed 
when he has to come home and deal with economic or other dreary subjects of that 
sort.”48 Bush did have some limited success on domestic policy such as passage of a 
clean air bill, legislation to help the handicap, an improved immigration bill, and 
efforts to bail out the savings-and-loans. But then-Senator A1 Gore seems to have 
summed up the prevailing opinion when he labeled Bush a “do nothing president on
46 George J. Church, “Men of the Year A Tale of Two Bushes,” Time, 7 January 
1991,18-33.
47 “Bush-7/me Man of the Year,” CNN, 30 December 1990. Video footage provided
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domestic problems.”49 It is not unusual for a president who was in office during a war, 
indeed Bush had to deal with both the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War, to be 
remembered primarily in conjunction with that war. But Bush is one of the few who is 
remembered only in relation to the wars that he fought. If not for the victories in two 
wars, the assumption is that Bush would have been a rather forgettable president or 
remembered only as the man entrusted with the Reagan legacy. Such a hypothesis 
attempts to separate Bush from his historical context and judge him apart from the 
events that confronted his presidency. Such an effort would be foolish. The success of 
a president depends largely on the crises that confront him. How he deals with the 
situation in which he has been placed determines how he should be remembered. 
George Bush was president at a time when the United States needed a capable foreign 
policy leader. Bush’s accomplishments must be seen as the culmination of his long 
career in foreign affairs and national security policy. His tenure as U.S. ambassador to 
the United Nations, envoy to China, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and 
vice president of the United States uniquely prepared him to be an excellent foreign 
policy president. Even apart from the shadow of Reagan, Bush was highly qualified to 
assume the presidency when it was apparent that the Cold War was coming to a 
conclusion. And it was logical in 1992, with the end of the Cold War and foreign 
policy expertise not needed as much as domestic policy experience, that George Bush 
would lose the presidency. And it is within the context of historical events that Bush 
should be judged. That does not mean that Bush should be hailed as having 
masterminded the end of the Cold War. Indeed, Bush received substantial criticism at
” lbi1
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the beginning of his administration for inaction, and many of the decisions made in
1989 in particular were reactionary in nature. But just as American foreign policy
from 1947 to 1950 was not merely a working out of a clearly delineated Doctrine of
Containment, Bush did not chart a clear course of action. Both Truman, with the help
of men such as Kennan and Marshall, and Bush, with Scowcroft and Baker, decided
upon the major elements of an American response to the Soviet Union in a piecemeal
and staggered manner.30 The events in 1989 in particular were so unpredictable that
any precisely laid out plan would have to be continually altered. According to Brent
Scowcroft, Bush, with his strong background in foreign affairs, excelled in this sort of
ad hoc policymaking:
He was not a great strategist, but he had wonderful instincts and he wanted to 
move out and get things done. And so when you’d give him an idea, if it was a 
good one, he was ready to charge off on it, and did frequently.51
In fact, one of Bush’s strengths, as Scowcroft recalls, was his ability to recognize and
then guide the effects of the historic events that occurred during his presidency:
President Bush recognized historic change was taking place. He didn’t create 
the change. But what he did is manage it in a way that these really cataclysmic 
changes in the world structure took place without a shot being fired.52
Bush led a transition: a transition from the Cold War to a post-Cold War world. Bush
recognized practical diplomatic problems and addressed them with practical
diplomatic solutions. Marlin Fitzwater argues that Bush should get credit for that
transition:
50 For a detailed description of foreign policymaking between 1947 and 1950 see 
Wilson D. Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making o f American Foreign 
Policy, 1947-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
51 Brent Scowcroft, telephone interview by author, 23 May 2000.
52 Ibid.
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(Bush should get credit] for transitioning, for understanding the relationships 
o f the country, for having a geo-political view o f the world that allowed him to 
work cooperatively with Gorbachev and with Kohl and with Mitterand in 
France and with John Major in Great Britain in a very cooperative way in 
shaping that year or two where Germany was reunited and the Soviet Union 
was trying to sort itself out.53
And he was responsible for it ending it peacefully. The Cold War did not have to end
peacefully. General Colin Powell, who served under both Bush and Reagan, explains
Bush’s foreign policy legacy:
He [Bush] is the one who guided the Cold War to its end, and he did it with 
great skill. The unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
without us gloating about it was very wisely done by the president, certain 
magnanimity in the manner in which he dealt with Gorbachev and then 
Yeltsin, and I think he played a key role at the end.54
It was Bush’s adroit management—diplomatic and political management—that
allowed for a peaceful transition. The Bush presidency had many faults—especially
with the domestic agenda and the inattention to the ceremonial aspect of the
presidency—but its one great strength allowed for the division of Europe to finally be
resolved and for the Cold War to end with a whimper and not a bang.
53 Marlin Fitzwater, telephone interview by author, 9 May 2000.
54 Colin Powell, telephone interview by author, 7 August 2000.
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-Appendix A- 
Marlin Fitzwater Interview
I  spoke with Marlin Fitzwater via telephone from his home in Deale, Maryland, on 
May 9,2000. Fitzwater served as White House press secretary from 1982 to 1992 
under both Ronald Reagan and George Bush.
How would you contrast the differences between President Reagan and President 
Bush as far as their ability to deal with the media?
Well, they were both very effective but in totally different ways. President Reagan 
pretty much ignored the media in a personal sense. He read the press a lot and, of 
course, was very sensitive to what was being portrayed on television, but he seldom 
took it personal. And he tended to conduct his press relations in the same way. He held 
48 press conferences in eight years. He tended to use press conferences to speak 
directly to the American people on issues, and generally conducted his press relations 
through formal kinds of meetings like the press conference. President Bush, on the 
other hand, knew all the reporters. They had covered him during eight years as vice 
president before being president. He tended to interact with them personally. He gave 
240 press conferences in four years, and he appeared in the press briefing room often, 
sometimes even two or three times a day. So he was much more interactive with the 
press on an individual basis.
Did you as press secretary have to make any adjustments when say working for 
President Reagan or working for President Bush?
Well, yes. At the end of the Reagan administration, President Bush asked me to be his 
press secretary. And we sat down and had a talk about how he wanted to conduct his 
press relations. And that was my advice to him that he was good with the press, he 
should be more personal in his relationships, hold more press conferences, talk to them 
on a regular basis so there wasn’t this huge build up for press conferences every 
month.
And when he was gearing up for the 1988 election, what steps did he take to try 
to establish his own image separate from Reagan?
Well, now that, see I wasn’t involved. I was President Reagan’s press secretary 
through ’88. So, I don’t really know.
Did the Reagan administration, during the 1988 election, make a conscious effort 
to try to stay out of the campaign so Bush could form his own identity?
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No, we made a conscience effort to stay in the campaign. One of the reasons was that 
President Bush was not trying to create a separate identity. I mean, he was to a small 
degree, but his challenge was to show that his policies were the same as Ronald 
Reagan’s because they had worked together for a long time, and they were both 
conservatives. People wanted to know if he was going to be loyal to the Bush, I mean, 
Reagan policies. And the press were always trying to drive a wedge between he and 
President Reagan. So it’s just the opposite of what we have today. Today, Gore is 
trying to get away from Clinton. But in the Bush-Reagan period the question was 
could they stay together, and the press was always trying to find differences on tax 
issues particularly. And, so that was the different challenge.
Do you think that the interview that Bush had with Dan Rather during the 1988 
election helped him overcome the press charges of the wimp label or do you think 
that hurt him in the long run by focusing more attention on the Iran-Contra 
Affair?
Oh, I think it helped him considerably. I don’t recall any fallout on Iran-Contra 
because it didn’t have anything to do with the substance of that matter. But the 
confrontation itself was helpful because simply it did kind of have a symbolic 
manhood effect if you will. Dan Rather came out of it looking really bad. He was 
angry and felt he’d been humiliated and so forth. So I think on the whole it was very 
helpful for President Bush and the campaign. In the long term, it hurt his relationship 
with CBS, and that was always a difficult relationship from then on through his 
presidency. But the immediate effect was definitely good for President Bush and bad 
for Dan Rather.
Once Bush became president, what steps were taken as far as style to distance 
him from Reagan? Did he try to lower expectations once he became president?
Well, I don’t know about lowering expectations, but as I’d described the differences in 
their press relationship, and that was the most obvious one was that President Bush 
was just always available to talk to the press. And he would talk to them at meetings 
and during photo ops, in the driveway and so forth, which was a lot more open kind of 
personal relationship than Reagan had. That was the most dramatic kind of effect. I 
don’t know that he tried to change relationships and that sort of thing. President Bush 
wasn’t much for PR strategies. If  you tried to take him some strategy on say, well, 
let’s raise our profile or lower expectations or something, his view was that that was 
pretty much phony and it was best that you just do your job and things will work out. 
That wasn’t always true, but he hoped it was.
What problems were created with the press by the foreign policy review at the 
beginning of President Bush's presidency?
Well, yes, because, o f course, the press is always an impatient group. I mean, a day is 
forever in the news business. And you promise a policy review and they expect to
242
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
have it tomorrow or the next day. And if  it drags on for six or eight months, something 
like that, that seems like a long time and you’ve got to expect you’re going to start 
getting editorials and others saying, “Where’s that policy review?” So, you always 
have to deal with media impatience.
When the foreign policy review was complete, it was revealed in a series of 
speeches. What was the reasoning behind that and why were they not televised?
No, they weren’t nationally televised. Well, the problem was, first of all, we had to 
have some way to put it out And secondly, the review that took place was a more 
informal one between the president the national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, 
Secretary of State Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney, and so it was, ya know, it 
didn’t lend itself to kind of being published in a book. This review really was, 
amounted to a lot of private discussion, a lot of meetings they had had and so forth. So 
they needed some way to kind of say to the American people, “Here’s what my 
policies are going to be.” And the speeches simply were a, seemed to be, the most 
effective tool for producing three or four documents on three or four different areas of 
foreign policy that outlined where he intended to go from here.
Reagan used the media to help shape our relationship with the Soviet Union. 
What was Bush’s strategy as far as utilizing the press to shape foreign policy?
Did he use the press like Reagan did?
Well, not so much. First of all, the relationship was different. President Reagan used 
the media very effectively in holding up a spotlight on Communism. He criticized 
them in his speeches. When we went to Moscow in 1987, he made the walk in Red 
Square, which was the symbolic way of showing a new relationship with the Soviet 
Union. Then he went to an orthodox church to show, to highlight freedom of religion, 
and then he went to Moscow State University to highlight freedom of speech and 
education. Then we met with dissidents and had some dissidents come over to the U.S. 
embassy, again as a symbolic way of highlighting freedom of speech and movement. 
So Reagan used the media and used symbolic events very dramatically to highlight the 
Cold War fight between democracy and Communism. By the time President Bush 
came into office, Communism was in its last throws if you will. And the question was 
not so much, in 1989, how does democracy defeat Communism; the question was how 
does democracy help communism go away in a peaceful way that maintains some 
semblance of civility and peace and so forth within the country. And how do we help 
guide what was going on in the Soviet Union.
So by the time Bush became president, he, instead of using the grand, symbolic 
gestures to the media, he would need to use more personal diplomacy, correct?
More personal diplomacy and direct policy help. So President Bush’s first meeting 
with Gorbachev as president was in Malta in the shipboard meeting. And the first 
thing President Bush said was, in the meeting, “Before we even start, I would like to
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open the meeting with a statement” And in that statement he presented Gorbachev 
with a seventeen-point economic plan for helping them transition into this new kind of 
perestroika world that Gorbachev was defining. And it cleared a pathway to get access 
to the World Bank and the international monetary fund, included changes to the 
Jackson-Vanik trade bill to increase trade activity, and a number of other points. But 
that was really the first kind of direct support that America gave the Soviet Union- 
—ever. But that was an entirely different kind of approach, of course, than President 
Reagan had had when we were fighting more the ideology—the differences of the two 
countries.
Speaking of negotiations—when Reagan was negotiating with Gorbachev, he 
realty used SDI to bring him to the bargaining table, correct?
Right
Did Bush back off of SDI and not push it as much with Gorbachev?
No, he did, and in all the summit meetings I was in with Reagan and Gorbachev, 
everyone of them ended in the Soviet Union’s plea toward getting us to drop SDI.
That was the objective, and the reason was because they always thought it was an 
offensive system. President Reagan presented it as a defensive shield, but they always 
thought we were going to get up in space, build some platform, and then launch a 
nuclear attack on Russia. And their problem was that they felt they couldn’t afford to 
match i t  And so, they knew. . .  that’s when they started getting serious about arms 
reduction. Their view was, we don’t have the money to ever build a space-based 
system; let’s get out of the arms race. So they started reducing nuclear weapons. 
President Bush kept the pressure on in the same way when he met with Gorbachev and 
then with Yeltsin, after Yeltsin replaced him in ’90, their goal was still the same. They 
still focused every meeting on how to get us to back out of SDI. So President Bush 
wanted to hold that pressure point out there all through his four years as well.
Was Malta seen as the pivotal point in the change in the relationship with the 
Soviet Union, going from the symbolic, more confrontational time of Reagan, and 
now Bush working to try to help improve the relationship through specific 
programs?
No question in my mind. I would define that a little differently though. I would say 
that that was the pivotal point at which the West first recognized that Communism was 
changing and may collapse. And we met with the purpose of trying to define how that 
could happen, what our role would be, and how we could help guide the future of 
whatever Russia emerged. And so it didn’t have so much to do w ith. . .  basically 
Reagan had won the Cold War by 1988, especially as we look back on i t  At the time 
it wasn't quite so clear, but it was clear. And I remember a memo from General 
Scowcroft to President Bush, which I’m pretty sure that all of this is in Bush’s book 
Looking Forward, but in any case, I remember a memo from Scowcroft, and I talk
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about it in my book Call the Briefing/, that for Malta they laid out three different 
scenarios o f what might happen in the Soviet Union. And one was that Gorbachev was 
killed or thrown out of office by hard-line Communists. The other was that Gorbachev 
did actually change things but it created so much chaos and corruption that the whole 
country fell apart Another one was that it kind of worked moderately well—they 
changed the politics and so forth, but the economy slipped away, and he would be 
eventually replaced by somebody else who might be able to run the country. But the 
point is not how well those three scenarios reflected what actually happened, but the 
point is that that memo indicated that that was the point at which we recognized as a 
country, as a president, that Communism was gone or on its way and were making 
plans for the post-Cold War world. And certainly then the whole economic assistance 
was a post-Cold War situation even though there were still a lot of uncertainties.
Bush faced a great deal of criticism over his reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Was he less concerned with his image and more concerned with ending the Cold 
War and tying up all the loose ends as far as not wanting to Mrub it in” to the 
Soviet Union?
First of all, he didn’t give a damn about his image. And I specifically raised it ’cause I 
went to him and said, you know, the wall is coming down and you need to say 
something here that’s going to be strong and show that the president recognizes what’s 
happening and it’d be good for your image and so forth. And he said to me he didn’t 
care about image. That this was not a time to be worrying about that sort of thing. And 
that he wanted to respond in a way that Gorbachev would understand and that would 
be supportive of moving ahead in the future relationship. I mean, it’s one of Bush’s 
more admirable traits in the sense that he had enormous discipline in order to do what 
he thought was right for the country even at the personal risk of bad press and bad 
publicity and image consideration. And he wouldn’t do it. But it paid off, and when 
we went to Malta and they sat down at the table and one of the early things he said 
was, “I hope you noticed” . . .  maybe it wasn’t Malta. It was the first meeting after the 
wall fell anyway, and he said to Gorbachev, “I hope you noticed that I didn’t dance on 
the wall when it came down.” And Gorbachev said, “I did and I appreciate it very 
much.” And they talked then about the language that they would use to describe the 
new relationship in a post-Berlin Wall situation.
And did that help smooth over with Gorbachev the idea of a unified Germany?
It did. It was very helpful. And what it showed was that the United States and 
Germany, again, were more interested in building real relationships and moving the 
process forward then they were just taking credit for winning the Cold War.
Because of his symbolic gestures and his media presence during the end of the 
Cold War, Reagan gets a lot of credit for ending the Cold War. Do you think that 
a distorted image exists concerning Bush’s accomplishments because he cared 
more about actual policy-making decisions than his media image?
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No, I don 't I think President Bush gets a lot of credit for the transition to, over the end 
of the Cold War and moving into the new relationship. The point is that the world 
changed there and it changed just about the time we changed presidents, so you can’t 
really judge President Bush, his views on ending the Cold War, against Reagan’s 
because the Cold War was different when he became president And so I think 
President Bush has gotten pretty good credit for, again for transitioning, for 
understanding the relationships of the country, for having a geopolitical view of the 
world that allowed him to work cooperatively with Gorbachev and with Kohl and with 
Mitterand in France and with John Major in Great Britain in a very cooperative way in 
shaping that year or two where Germany was reunited and the Soviet Union was 
trying to sort itself out Maybe one of the best examples was when Yeltsin replaced 
Gorbachev after the coup attempt It was President Bush who got on the phone to 
Yeltsin and convinced him that in a peaceful turnover, he needed to be good to 
Gorbachev. And told him to give him a car, give him a house, and treat him well. And 
Yeltsin didn’t want to do it because he hated Gorbachev, and then Bush called up 
Gorbachev and said the same thing—You want to demonstrate a peaceful transition; 
you got to be praising Yeltsin or at least don’t be criticizing him in public. Don’t be 
tearing him down and picking a fight. You two guys have got to show that you can 
change power peacefully. And that’s the hallmark of that period for President Bush.
You just spoke of Bush’s relationships with foreign leaders. During my research I 
found that Bush spent a great deal of time trying to establish personal 
relationships with foreign leaders. Was that different than Reagan? Did Bush 
spend more time in communication and correspondence with foreign leaders and 
in establishing relationships?
Yes, and there are two or three reasons for that One is that he had long had an interest 
in foreign policy and had been a student of foreign policy in a way that President 
Reagan hadn’t as governor. President Bush, as you recall, by the time he had been 
president had already been envoy to China, ambassador to the United Nations, and 
director of the CIA. All three of those are major kinds of diplomatic foreign policy 
jobs. And they are ones at which he came to know the heads of state of many countries 
around the world So he just brings about a much different background to the job at 
that time. I think he was ideally suited to the changes in the world affairs, that we’re 
lucky we didn’t have a president come in in ’88, well, like Dukakis, who was a 
governor with no foreign policy experience. I think he would have had a lot of trouble 
navigating the waters of European change.
So you're saying that Reagan came in at the right time because at that point we 
needed the grand symbolic gestures. But when Bush came in, foreign policy 
expertise was needed to tie up all of the loose ends of the Cold War.
No, what I’m saying is that when Reagan came in in 1988, we were in the heat of the 
Cold War, and Reagan was the Cold Warrior. He knew how to fight communism. He
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had a strong ideology, a strong belief in America, and so he was a perfect president to 
take 'em on and say America’s going to win this war. And when President Bush came 
in he had the international background and the diplomatic experience to then negotiate 
the new realities o f an East-West relationship. I think it goes to the very substance of 
world affairs at those times.
Thank you.
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-Appendix B- 
James A. Baker HI Interview
l  spoke with James Baker via telephone from his office in DaUas, Texas, on May 22, 
2000. Baker served as Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff, 1981-85, and secretary of the 
treasury, 1985-88. Under George Bush, Baker served as secretary of state, 1989- 
1992, and chief ofstaff, 1992.
BAKER: I’ll be happy to talk to you, but my book will go into a heck of a lot more 
detail than what I can tell you in a 20-minute conversation on the phone. And it tells 
you a lot about President Bush’s role in managing the end of the Cold War. What I 
basically say there is that he did a superb job of seeing to it that the Cold War ended 
with a whimper and not with a bang. It’s called Politics o f Diplomacy. It was 
published by Putnam and Company, Putnam and Sons. I got it out in about September 
of ’95. It’s hard to find, but if you look for it, you can find it. It’ll give you a lot more 
than I can give you over the phone. Secondly, if you haven’t done it, you ought to also 
read At the Highest Levels.
Yes, sir, I’ve read that book.
OK, good. Well, go ahead and shoot.
As the campaign manager during the fight for the 1980 Republican nomination, 
would you point to the debate in Nashua, New Hampshire, as the turning point of 
that nomination?
I think probably it was one turning point. I think it would have been very difficult for 
an unknown like George Bush, someone who was not known at all nationally—even 
after Iowa—to upset Ronald Reagan who had almost knocked off an incumbent 
president for the nomination in ’76. He came very close to knocking off Gerry Ford. 
And people don’t remember this but Governor Reagan started running for president in 
1968. So I think that it would have been very tough for Bush to win in any event, but 
conceivable, and the Nashua debate was critical.
And once he lost that early momentum during the debate, it was pretty much 
over from that point?
Well, it was except that, you know, we won a lot o f delegates and the reason he was 
put on the ticket. . .  Reagan didn’t  want to put him on the ticket because they’d had a 
fairly contentious primary, and Bush lasted through Michigan and Pennsylvania, well 
into May. He didn’t have to get out of the race until sometime in the first or second 
week in May, and he had a lot of delegates at the national convention. And, if you 
recall, in Detroit, Reagan tried to go to Ford and that never worked out He really
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didn’t want to do Bush but then when that collapsed, when the Ford effort collapsed, 
there wasn’t anyplace to go except to Bush because he had delegates.
What was the main goal behind the lengthy foreign policy review at the 
beginning of Bash’s term in office?
Well, any new administration, even if it’s one of the same party, has got to put its 
imprint on foreign policy, and you needed to have a Bush imprint on the nation’s 
foreign policy. Also, you needed to make sure that there had not been an overly 
aggressive effort to conclude a deal just, you know, just before time ran out with the 
Soviets. Nothing had been concluded. Also, you had to, you know. . .  Vice President 
Bush had not really been in those meetings with Gorbachev. He had to satisfy himself 
that Gorbachev was for real. The Cold War still was on. You have to remember that. 
They were still supplying weapons through Cuba to Nicaragua. There was still the 
Angola problem. We had major arms control negotiations going on, and many of them 
were stuck. Chemical weapons was stuck. Sea launch cruise missiles and the linkage 
with START was a sticking point. We had a lot, there’s still a lot of problems. So it 
wasn’t a case of the Cold War being over. I mean, I really sort of think, you know, you 
can’t underestimate the significance of Ronald Reagan’s role in ending die Cold War. 
But there’s a lot of grounds to debate exacdy when that Cold War ended. A lot of 
people will tell you it ended when the wall came down. Course, Ronald Reagan called 
for the wall to come down. Ronald Reagan was the architect of our buildup of peace 
through strength when we first came in in ’81. But I think it’s a mistake really to try 
and say it ended on one time or another. I mean I think it was the combined effort. . .  
the policy of peace through strength, which was a policy of the two Reagan 
administrations and the Bush administration, that caused a peaceful end to the Cold 
War. And primarily President Bush managed that end skillfully. That did not have to 
end peacefully.
So the policy review didn’t really alter the basic policy approach; it was just a 
matter of stopping to see where they were at and how President Bush could move 
forward?
That’s correct. It didn’t stop i t  Well, you say stop i t . . .  it put a little pause in it there 
for a while while we completed the review. If you read the books, including mine, 
you’ll see that the review was a disappointment We didn’t feel that it really went into 
the depth that it needed to go into. But by May of the first year of the Bush term we 
had concluded that Gorbachev and Sheverdadze were people we could do business 
with, and that we should move forward and move forward rather aggressively. And we 
did.
Was the Bush administration hesitant to provide concessions to Gorbachev out of 
concern that he would not be able to maintain power?
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Well, that was certainly a factor throughout, but we always felt that Gorbachev was a 
reformer. As I told you earlier, we had to determine whether or not we could trust 
these guys. We had to determine whether or not the positive steps toward change in 
the relationship that occurred at the end of the Reagan administration were in fact 
legitimate or real. So I guess you’d have to say yes to your question. I mean, we had to 
make sure that these were people that wanted to reform. And by May of ’89, we had 
concluded that, at least I had and you’ll see that in my book and in At The Highest 
Levels, we concluded. . .  and then President Bush had by July because we went ahead 
and had a summit right then and there. If you remember we had Malta. . .  I guess that 
was July.
Did the foreign policy review hurt the Bush administration on the domestic 
front? Did he take a lot of criticism for that?
Well, there was a lot of press criticism, but it was the right thing to do, in my opinion, 
rather than just charging, hard charging, in there. If Gorbachev and Sheverdnadze had 
not been for real, it would have been a mistake.
Did the events surrounding the 1989 revolution in Eastern Europe and the fall of 
the Berlin Wall prove to the Bush administration that the changes being made by 
Gorbachev were not merely cosmetic or easily reversible? That they were more 
permanent?
No, what it proved to us was that the Soviet leadership had, in fact, as they had told us 
they had, ruled out the use of force to keep the empire together. That was the critical 
factor. They told us early on they weren’t going to use force to keep the empire 
together. And when they didn’t that proved that they were telling us the truth and that 
they could be trusted and that we could do business with them.
What was Bush’s private reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall?
Oh, he was very very pleased with it. We were all . . .  it was quite an emotional event. 
But I still think that history will prove that he was absolutely right in not trying to 
stick it in the eye of the Soviets, not trying to goad them or, as everyone put it at the 
time, “dance on the wall.” That would have been a terrible mistake politically and 
diplomatically.
Did he fear that a Western celebration of the wall's collapse might encourage a 
backlash by the hard-liners in East Berlin and Moscow?
He feared that. Well, yes he feared that in part, but also he feared that it would make it 
tougher for us to continue to move forward positively with Gorbachev. You don’t 
stick it in somebody’s eye when something is fundamental and as big and important as 
that happens. You celebrate it but you do so in a more statesmanlike way. Because, 
that would have been counter productive for us to start. . .  even today when we talk
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about winning the Cold War, and I see Gorbachev today, and even today when we talk 
about winning the Cold War, he takes offense at that He says, “You didn’t win the 
Cold War, we came to an understanding, a peaceful resolution of our differences.”
At Malta, Gorbachev said to Bush, “We don’t consider you an enemy anymore.” 
And then he went on to say that he actually wanted the U.S. to maintain a 
presence in Europe. You mention in your book that you considered that to be the 
most important statement of the Malta conference. Why was that so important?
Well, because it showed that the relationship had moved from confrontation to 
cooperation. I mean, for 40 years we’d been enemies.
There were no formal agreements reached at Malta. Was it primarily a trust- 
building meeting?
Yeah, I think *so. Yeah, there were not a lot of specifics that were accomplished there, 
but it was a very good trust-building meeting. And remember that I had been having 
meetings with Sheverdnadze before Malta at which I had become convinced that the 
Soviet leadership was real when they were talking about reform and when they were 
talking about renouncing the use of force. President Bush needed to hear that and see 
that and experience that himself with the head of the Soviet Union.
In the Malta negotiations, how did the Baltic crisis affect Bush's support of 
Gorbachev?
Well, look, that is such an expansive question. Again, I would simply refer you to my 
book because it comes back all the time. There were two or three incidents in the 
Baltics from the time, in the aftermath of Malta until the Gulf War. In fact, there was a 
real period o f doubt in our minds on January 12or 13,1991, just before the Gulf War 
when the Soviets sent their interior Oman troops into the Baltics and seized radio 
stations and stuff like that, and we thought maybe they were trying to capitalize on the 
fact that we were so committed in the Gulf. And that was way up in January of 1991.. 
. but I go into all that stuff in exquisite detail, and I just can’t do it here on the phone.
Did the Bush administration agree at anytime to back off of the commitment to 
SDI in order to achieve Soviet concessions in other arms reduction talks?
No.
They stayed committed to SDI?
Yeah.
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President Bush assigned you the task of working toward the reduction of 
chemical weapons stockpiles. Considering that had not really been on the Reagan 
agenda, is that an achievement of the Bush administration?
Well, it was a treaty that was negotiated that was concluded during the Bush 
administration and, you know, people today will still argue whether it’s verifiable, 
whether it’s a good treaty or not a good treaty. I think it’s a good treaty, and it was 
certainly an accomplishment of the Bush administration. And President Bush and I 
both worked in ’94 or ’95, whenever it was, I guess ’96 or ’97, to get it ratified. We 
helped the Clinton administration get ratification of i t
In February of 1990, you met with Gorbachev to explain the Two-plus-Four 
process. What was his overall reaction to that process?
I don’t think he had a real problem with the process. I think they were interested in a 
treaty of peace. I think they were interested in seeing Germany unified outside of 
NATO, at least with respect to the eastern part of Germany.
How was the Bush administration finally able to convince Gorbachev a unified 
Germany should remain in NATO?
Well, I think we took advantage of a very narrow window of opportunity. Unification 
of Germany as a member of NATO was one of the distinct and lasting 
accomplishments, I think, of the Bush administration, much more important probably 
than the chemical weapons convention. I think, if you look at the unification of 
Germany, the management of the collapse of communism and the implosion of the 
Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the Middle East peace process, those are the major 
foreign policy accomplishments of the four years of the Bush administration.
Moving to your close working relationship with Shevardnadze, was 
Shevardnadze more inclined than Gorbachev to take risks to end the Cold War 
and stand up to the hard-liners in the Soviet Union in order to push for things 
like German unification, arms control, and other issues?
The answer’s yes, although he wasn’t pushing for German unification in NATO. That 
was a very tough topic. But the answer to your question is yes.
Was personal diplomacy really the key to shaping the post-Cold War world?
Well, I don’t  know. That’s an overstatement Personal diplomacy was very important.
I think President Bush believes in i t  I certainly believe in it, and personal diplomacy 
to me does not mean that you put personal relationships ahead of principle or ahead of 
your party’s or country’s interests. It just means that if  you can trust a person on the 
other side of the table, you have a lot better chance of getting things done. I have a 
whole chapter on that in the book by the way.
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Did Bush’s relationship with Gorbachev cause him to be slow in reacting to the 
rise of Yeltsin?
The answer to that is an emphatic no. The press loved that argument and they used to 
write it. They also wrote that Clinton was stuck with Yeltsin too long. But when 
you’ve got a reformer in power and things are going the way you want ’em to go, then 
you stick with that person, particularly when they’re freely elected, as Yeltsin was. So 
that’s just a fun and games exercise by the press that don’t know what they’re talking 
about. I would ask you this in your research. What did we lose by hanging in there 
with Gorbachev and Sheverdnadze? When Yeltsin came to power, he embraced us 
even more whole-heartedly. We didn’t lose a damn thing. And we gained a lot. So 
we’ll shoot that one down. That is the dumbest thing and it keeps cropping up.
So it was more a fabrication of the press that was really just trying to attack Bush 
on the domestic front?
Well, I don’t know if the press were attacking him. I’m not going to say that. But all 
I’m saying is that argument is just totally without foundation or without rational or 
reason. If you look at what happened, yes, we stuck with Gorbachev. He was the 
General Secretary and then President of the Soviet Union. And when Yeltsin came 
onboard. . .  when I went over there in December of ’91 before the implosion of the 
Soviet Union, I met with Yelstin. He met with me in St. Catherine’s Hall. Why’d he 
do that? To stick it in Gorbachev’s eye. But certainly his embrace of the United States 
was total and complete, 100 percent, every bit as much as Gorbachev. We didn’t lose 
anything by doing that.
Would you point to the reunification of Germany as the main achievement of the 
Bush administration?
Well, I’d point to that. But I would also point to the fact that the Cold War ended 
peacefully. And it didn’t have to end peacefully. And it was President Bush’s adroit 
management—diplomacy and political management—of the process that permitted it 
to end peacefully. Now, those are the accomplishments with respect to the Soviet 
Union and the Cold War. And there were other accomplishments, which I mentioned 
like the Gulf War, the Middle East peace process, the Madrid conference, and those 
things. But, you know, when the Soviets stood up in August of 1990, Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait and Iraq was a big Soviet client state. And I flew back, I happened to 
be in Mongolia at the time, I flew back through Moscow. And Shevardnadze, without 
even clearing it with Gorbachev, joined with me in a statement condemning the 
invasion and calling for an arms embargo of Iraq. Now that was historic. The first time 
ever that the Soviet Union foreign minister and the Secretary of State of the United 
States would ever have a joint press conference condemning the action of a Soviet 
client state. And so in my book what I say is that’s the day, at least to me, it was quite 
clear, if it wasn’t clear the day the wall fell, it was certainly clear that day that the
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Cold War was over. But that’s the kind of cooperation we were able to achieve from 
them. I mean nobody could conceive of that happening.
The cooperation fostered by the Bush administration, that is really the true 
achievement as far as the end of the Cold War because it completely changed the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union?
That’s correct
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-Appendix C- 
Brent Scowcroft Interview
I  spoke with General Brent Scowcroft via telephonefrom his office in Washington, 
D.C., on May 23,2000. Scowcroft served as national security advisor to President 
Bush, 1989-1992.
How did you first meet George Bush?
Well, I first met him in 1972 when he was Representative to the United Nations and I 
was military assistant to President Nixon. And I’ve been sort of close to him ever 
since.
And when did he ask you to be his National Security Advisor?
He asked me on the week before Thanksgiving in 1988.
The Tower Commission, which you served on, found that Reagan’s National 
Security Council experienced a lack of accountability and direction. What steps 
did you take when you became the National Security Advisor to improve on this?
Well, before I became National Security Advisor I talked both to Frank Carlucci, who 
was Reagan’s National Security Advisor or became his National Security Advisor, and 
I talked to Carlucci at length about the problems I saw in the Reagan administration 
that had let the Iran-Contra thing grow, and made some suggestions. And Carlucci did 
some of them and passed the rest on to Colin Powell, who was Carlucci’s successor.
So by the time I got there there wasn’t much left. One of the things I did do is make 
sure in my morning meetings with the president that there was always somebody else 
there to make a note of what I was asked to do and what I told the president, so that we 
would have some kind of record by a third person of that kind of operational meeting, 
which had not always been the case in the Reagan administration.
You’ve said that President Bush in private made clear that he wanted to take 
charge of the foreign policy agenda and try to shape events rather than be shaped 
by them.
Yes.
That completely goes against the public perception of him as being very cautious. 
Why was there such a difference between the public perception of him and the 
way he went about foreign polity in private?
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You know that’s a good question. . .  that’s a good question. I’m not sure that I know 
the answer to that He was much more decisive in moving out in private than he 
appeared in his public persona. I think he was deeply affected by his mother who used 
to tell him all the time, “George, don’t brag.” And so I think he tended in public to 
underplay things. That’s the only explanation I can give. He was not a great strategist 
but he had wonderful instincts and he wanted to move out and get things done. And so 
when you’d give him an idea, if it was a good one, he was ready to charge off on it  
and did frequently. I can’t give you any better explanation for that.
You are quoted in a book saying that President Reagan’s rush toward 
disarmament had been a “mighty dubious objective for grown-ups in this 
business.” Was the policy review in 1989 an effort to slow down the rush toward 
disarmament and make sure that it was accomplished in a very careful and 
prudent manner?
No, it wasn’t really designed to slow down. It was designed for two things. First of all, 
to review where we were going. The Reagan administration had put the emphasis on 
numbers, reducing numbers and getting rid of certain kinds of weapons. I didn’t think 
that was the overall goal in arms control. I thought the goal in arms control was to 
improve stability, to reduce the chances that in a crisis either side would resort to the 
use of nuclear weapons for fear of some vulnerability in the nuclear arsenal. So that’s 
what I wanted to do, and numbers had nothing to do with that So I wanted to rethink 
where we were going and see if we wanted to modify the arms control proposals that 
Reagan had left before the Soviet Union. But there was another and even more 
important thing that I wanted to accomplish. For the 20 years before the Reagan 
administration, the chief issue between us and the Soviet Union was arms control. I 
say issue. . .  the thing we talked about. . .  that was the only thing that we had to talk 
about. And I wanted to change that a little and to focus on Eastern Europe. There was 
ferment in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland. And I wanted to take advantage of 
that ferment to try and get the Soviet army out of Eastern Europe, or at least reduce 
their presence to allow the Eastern Europeans to develop in a progressive way. So I 
wanted to put arms control on the back burner for a time until we had gotten our 
Eastern Europe strategy underway and moving.
During this policy review, was there disagreement between the Defense 
Department, the State Department, and the White House concerning how the 
arms control progress should be made?
No, not a great deal. The chief problem with the policy reviews is that they didn’t 
produce anything. They were sort of bureaucratic exercises, and it’s not surprising that 
the bureaucracy thought everything was going well because they had designed the 
policy. So mostly we got back studies that said do more of the same. That was the 
principle problem, and as a result, we just fashioned policies ourselves within the NSC 
and then debated them in the NSC.
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Because of his extensive experience with foreign policy, did President Bush intend 
to make the final decision by himself, or was it more of a collective decision?
Well, it was never a collective decision. He always made the decision, but he liked to 
debate it with his advisors. He liked to ask questions; he liked to provoke people to 
defend their views and so on and so forth. That helped him clarify the issues in his 
own mind. So, rarely did he make major decisions without a lot of back and forth with 
his advisors in order to set things in his own mind. I can’t answer the question how 
much was he influenced by other people, because he always had an open mind. But in 
the end, he’s the only decision-maker in the executive branch.
SDI was a much-criticized program domestically. But it was used by both the 
Reagan and Bush administrations to bring Gorbachev to the bargaining table. 
Marlin Fitzwater told me in an interview a couple of weeks ago that every 
meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan ended with a plea toward getting us to 
drop SDI. How would you characterize the importance of SDI as a leverage tool 
in negotiations with the Soviets?
Honestly, this will probably disappoint you, I don’t think very much. I think they were 
afraid of SDI because. . .  not so much because they thought it would work, but that if 
we went down that path, they would have to follow and it was too expensive for them. 
They didn’t have the resources. That did i t  But my sense is that it tended rather than 
to use as leverage to get other things we wanted, it tended to stymie the negotiations 
because we would never put SDI on the table. So the Russians tended to drag their feet 
because of that
You said in your book that U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe was not a catalyst 
for change. That it merely provided solid encouragement and allowed the U.S. to 
react property to events. Would you please elaborate on this?
We did not stimulate ferment in Eastern Europe. We had done that earlier in the ’70s 
and indeed in the ’50s when we helped stimulate the Hungarian revolt and so on. That 
turned out to be counter productive because when we turned people out in the streets, 
we weren’t prepared to support them. So what we tried to do was to encourage reform 
at a level that we thought would be below that that the Soviet Union would think they 
would have to crush i t  So we wanted to keep it going but we didn’t want it smashed, 
as was usually the case with revolt in Eastern Europe with all of the leaders killed or 
put in prison. And that’s what we tried to do and it turned out you know, because of 
our skill or because of luck it turned out that that was very effective in this case.
What were President Bush’s goals for the Malta conference? Was it meant to be 
more of a trust-building meeting?
It was primarily more of a trust-building meeting. He had wanted from the outset of 
his administration to talk with Gorbachev and I think Dick Cheney had held him back
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because historically the Soviet Union always profited by summits because there was 
an atmosphere that, you know the Cold War was over; we didn’t have to worry. And 
that always made it harder for us to get appropriations through Congress and so on. So 
we didn’t want—I didn’t want, and Cheney didn’t want—a summit until we had 
something specific to get from it, that is an arms control agreement or something else. 
And early in the administration we didn’t have anything yet. So the president 
acquiesced in holding off a summit. Then in the summer of ’89, as a result of his trip 
through Eastern Europe and what he saw there and his meeting with his European 
allies at the G-7 summit, he decided that he had to talk with Gorbachev, that things 
were moving too fast, that there was too much danger o f misunderstanding, and so he 
had to talk with Gorbachev. But he, in fact, he didn’t even want to call it a summit. He 
wanted to call it an exchange of views, not to make agreements, which summits 
usually are, but just to exchange views. And he was delighted with the idea of a 
summit out away from everybody where the press couldn’t be hovering around and 
where there would be little pressure for either side to try to make negotiating points or 
debating points.
Is that why the negotiations leading up to the Malta conference were kept secret? 
He didn’t want to build it up too much?
That was part of i t  The other is that we couldn’t find a place to hold it.
How did the collapse of the Berlin Wall affect the Malta negotiations?
They were set by the time the Berlin Wall came down, and I think that what it did is 
mostly underscore the importance of the two leaders talking because unexpected 
events could turn into a crisis very easily. Gorbachev was very frightened by the fall 
of the Berlin Wall.
Can the Malta meeting in 1989 be seen as the point when our relationship with 
the Soviets truly changed?
I think the relationship between the two leaders changed. That was the most dramatic . 
. .  that they got comfortable with each other, and from that time on . . .  there was a 
rough patch in the spring of 1990 over the Baltic states. . .  but the two knew each 
other as individuals. They would occasionally call each other on the phone and so 
forth. So the personal relationship changed, and that was very beneficial.
In your book, yon identify the Bush-Kohl meeting after Malta as a turning point 
Why was that meeting so pivotal?
It was pivotal because Kohl was sort of out on his own, both inside Germany. . .  
Genscher, they had a free democratic party, was worried about moving too fast and 
wanted a different kind of relationship between East and West Germany. The other 
allies didn’t want German unification, so Kohl was kind of feeling his way. And they
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had this meeting and the president said, you know, “I’m not worried. I like your ideas. 
You go ahead; I’ll back you. I’ll keep everybody else off your back.” So he gave, in 
essence, a blank check to Kohl to move ahead. And from then on it was a pretty steady 
course.
What were the problems surrounding reunification that had to be resolved 
before the process could move forward?
Well, there were two problems. First o f all, there was the problem of unification itself. 
And that is that East Germany was the crown jewel of the Soviet bloc. That was the 
major achievement, if you will, out of World War II. And so it was difficult to say, 
“Yes, we failed there.” And secondly, it was the heart of the Warsaw Pact It’s pretty 
hard to have a viable Warsaw Pact if East Germany is not in it. So that was the 
problem with unification. Then there was an added problem is suppose you let 
Germany unify—What do you do about membership in NATO? Because East 
Germany was in the Warsaw Pact West Germany was in NATO. And that was a very 
hard pill for Gorbachev to swallow. And in the end I think that he swallowed it only 
because he didn’t have a better alternative. He toyed around with the idea of a neutral 
Germany, but I think he decided that that would be more dangerous—to have a neutral 
Germany loose in Europe, than one tied down by the United States. So those are the 
major issues.
What problems were created for the U.S. when, because of the August coup, 
much of Gorbachev's power shifted to Yeltsin?
Well, the problems that were created is that from then until the end of the Soviet 
Union most everything turned into a struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin. And 
Yeltsin was determined to destroy Gorbachev. And so we had little affect on internal 
developments during that period because he was determined to do that. And he 
succeeded.
Did President Bush prefer to have at least some form of the Soviet Union survive 
rather than face the possibility of chaos because a strong central government 
could at least maintain reliable control over the nuclear arsenal?
No, we had a long debate about what our preferences were, and Baker was on one side 
of the arguments that you just made; Cheney was on the other side saying we actively 
ought to try to split up the Soviet Union. And we debated and came to no firm 
conclusion, so we redly didn’t have a position. We just let nature take its course.
Why did President Bush recognize Ukrainian independence four days before the 
Ukrainians themselves voted on the issue? Didn't that really upset Gorbachev?
It was domestic politics.
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He just felt the pressure to move?
Yes.
Did President Bush phone Yeltsin and Gorbachev to persuade them to peacefully 
work together during the transition?
Weil, I don’t recall him making a special call with that in mind. But he certainly did 
his best to ensure a peaceful transfer. And he talked to both of them frequently during 
that period.
Marlin Fitzwater told me that the Malta conference was the point at which the 
U.S. first recognized that Communism was changing and might collapse. In the 
conversation I had with James Baker, he points to a joint press conference that 
he had with Sheverdnadze just prior to the Persian Gulf War as being the 
moment when the Cold War was clearly over. What moment would you identify 
as being the pivotal point in the changing relationship between the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union?
Well, I would say, the point at which I was willing to say the Cold War is over is when 
Gorbachev in July of 1990 . . .  Kohl went over to visit him . . .  and Gorbachev said it 
was alright if a unified Germany could belong to NATO. To me that was the end of 
the Cold War.
So once he recognized the reunification of Germany, that was the end?
Yeah. Now later on, certainly, the fact that, as Baker says, the fact that we were on the 
same side against aggression in the Persian Gulf, that certainly cemented it  But I 
thought that. . .  the Cold War was really about Eastern Europe. And with the 
unification of Germany and its membership in NATO, that really finished the Cold 
War.
In a talk that I had yesterday with James Baker, he said that the main 
accomplishment of the Bush administration was “seeing to it that the Cold War 
ended with a whimper and not a bang.” Is that the real legacy of the Bush 
administration that President Bush was able to bring incremental change rather 
than allowing the Cold War to end in some big, and perhaps dangerous, 
moment?
Well, I think, yeah, that’s basically i t  Dying empires rarely go out peacefully. And I 
think that President Bush recognized historic change was taking place. He didn’t 
create the change. But what he did is manage it in a way that these really cataclysmic 
changes in the world structure took place without a shot being fired.
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Everyone takes it for granted now, but the Cold War did not have to end 
peacefully. There was still a great deal of uncertainty when President Bush took 
office.
Absolutely. The Cold W ar. . .  well, you know the Reagan administration tends to 
think they ended the Cold War. I think the Cold War was not at all ended when Bush 
came into office. Eastern Europe was still divided just like it was before. The Soviet 
army was still manning barricades and so on. No, it happened under President Bush, 
and it happened the way it did in considerable part because of his great skill at 
diplomacy about eliciting cooperation from people, both friends and opponents.
Marlin Fitzwater told me that he felt the country was very fortunate to have 
Reagan president when he was because he was the ultimate cold warrior and we 
needed that warrior, we needed that symbolic leader at that time for the peace 
through strength program. But when President Bush took office what we realty 
needed was a skillful diplomat who excelled at personal diplomacy and help wrap 
things up peacefully. Would you agree with that?
Yes, I think that’s true. I think Reagan. . .  The Carter administration w as. . .  well, 
they had a tough time. But in a way it was sort of a disaster because everything was 
going wrong for us and it was the end of Vietnam and Watergate, and the Soviet 
Union was talking about the correlation of forces and the world was changing in their 
favor and so on. So what we needed was Reagan to restore American spirits and to 
have us stand up and stand up tall. But it took Bush to bring it to an end. Yeah.
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-Appendix D- 
Colin Powell Interview
I  spoke with General Colin Powell via telephone from  his office in Alexandria, 
Virginia, on August 7 ,2000. Powell served as national security advisor to President 
Reagan, 1987-88, and chairman, Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff under President Bush, 1989- 
92.
My first question concerns the 1988 meeting in New York between Gorbachev, 
President Reagan, and President-elect Bush. What was the purpose of that 
meeting and were there signs at the meeting that the Bush administration would 
be more cautious with Gorbachev than Reagan?
The meeting was really as a result of a request from President Gorbachev. I was 
national security advisor and we were not expecting to have any more summits or 
meetings. Really, it was not a summit In fact, we carefully did not call it a summit 
But we were not planning to have any more meetings with Gorbachev, and suddenly 
he said, “Well, I’m going to be in the United Nations” . . .  September wasn’t it? 
September of ’8 8 ? ... “I’m going to be at the United Nations for the general session 
and would like to meet and have one final go at it, to talk.” And so it was hard to say 
no at that point. Wait, I’m sorry. It wasn’t September. It was after the election, so it 
was December. It wasn’t the general assembly meeting; then it must have been some 
other UN appearance. But, be that as it may, he initiated it and, of course, we accepted 
it. No reason not to accept it. We made it clear to the Soviets, however, that we were 
not looking for a substantive exchange. It was a good way to say goodbye Reagan- 
Gorbachev and also say hello to President Bush. There was nervousness on the part of 
President Bush and his associates that perhaps the Soviets might try to throw some 
proposal at us that they would have to deal with before they had even come into office. 
And so, yes, there was nervousness on the Bush side.
Brent Scowcroft and Janies Baker told me that the National Security Council 
during the Bush administration operated more smoothly than it had during the 
Reagan administration, especially prior to the changes made after Iran-Contra. 
Do you think that was the case and what would you attribute that to?
Yeah, now after Iran-Contra it was still the Reagan-Bush administration. My own 
view is that, and this is a very self-serving view as you can imagine, that when Mr. 
Carlucci took over and I was his deputy, we restored a sense of process and discipline 
to the National Security Council and its functioning. Then there were some additional 
changes in personality when Mr. Carlucci went to die Pentagon and Mr. Weinberger 
left And a more cooperative relationship emerged between the State Defense and the 
NSC. And I would say that it continued into and through the Bush administration. But
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I’m not going to bite and say that the Bush administration was better than the last two 
years of the Reagan administration. That would not be right, sir.
Was it easier to work for President Bush because of his knowledge and 
experience in foreign affairs and did he take charge of his meetings with his 
advisors more than Reagan who you describe in your book as having a passive 
management style?
They were different people, and so I don’t want to compare them in that way because 
it is not the right comparison. President Reagan relied more on his advisors to shape 
issues for him, and President Bush got a little more deeply involved in the shaping of 
the issues but didn’t constrain his staff. And he wanted to hear more of the in and out, 
up and down debates and dialogues over the various issues than President Reagan. But 
it doesn’t mean that President Bush was better at it. It’s just two different styles. And 
President Clinton was yet a different style altogether.
In your book, you write that you saw your main mission as chairman of the JCS 
to be able to move the armed forces onto a new course. You called this strategic 
overview, “When You Lose Your Best Enemy.5* Would you please explain your 
basic goals in the overview and describe how it evolved into the concept of a 
“base force”?
Yeah, for 40 years or there abouts we had built our armed forces against a single 
contingency, and that was war with the Soviet Union. We fought other wars 
meanwhile in Korea and Vietnam, but it was always part of a possible conflict with 
the Soviet Union. These were sort of surrogates for the great war that might be 
coming. Our research and development was always trying to build a new tank better 
than the latest Soviet tank, build a new airplane better than the latest Soviet airplane. 
Build a 600-ship navy, why? So we could cross the Atlantic under threat of all of those 
Soviet submarines. Everything we did related to what we thought the Soviets might be 
doing and how we might have to fight them. And this dominated defense thinking, 
defense research and concurment, our base structure, our National Guard and reserves, 
were all structured for this long war. We had depot facilities all over the country to 
rebuild equipment during this long war. We built up our nuclear weapons, tactical 
nuclear weapons especially. . .  thousands of them, to fight this war. And then 
suddenly, they quit. The Soviet Union went away, and this war was not going to be 
fought; it was never going to be fought And there we were with a structure and a 
philosophy and a theology that was based on that conflict with that enemy. And so I 
thought it was our responsibility, the military leaders of the department working with 
our political leaders, to reshape the armed forces and begin to modify them to 
recognize this change. And we’d better do it quickly because there’d be a thousand 
people out there with better ideas, they thought, than we had as to how to do it and 
because the Congress and the American people were rightfully, rightfully demanding a 
peace dividend, meaning that if you have lost this enemy, then you shouldn’t have to 
spend as much on defense. And if you still want to spend on defense, then what for. So
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the what for became the two major regional contingency answer, which I think made 
sense then and still makes sense. We might have to fight a regional war, not World 
War m , but a regional war in either the Persian Gulf area or in Northeast Asia. 
Saddam Hussein helped make that thesis come true a few months later and that still 
remains national strategy even though people attack it constantly; it still remains the 
strategy. And then we downsized the force. And people have criticized the way we did 
that and I have been criticized that it wasn’t a bold enough set of changes. But people 
remember that when we started to downsize the force, there still was a lingering 
potential threat from the declining Soviet Union and even from the new Russia. So we 
were doing it during a time of historic change. Would they reverse? Would it go back 
the other way? And we did it prudently, got down to that lower size. Unfortunately, 
the current administration has made it even lower. And I think there is some distress 
within the force, but it’s still the best in the world.
Did the Goldwater-Nichols authority help you speed up the process and allow you 
to push for force reductions even over the objections of some of the chiefs?
To the extent that Goldwater-Nichols did not require me to speak with the corporate 
voice. In other words, I can speak in my own right as principle military advisor. All 
the other chiefs are military advisors to the president as well. But, because the 
chairman is the principle military advisor, I did not need the chiefs to vote on what my 
advice should be for the corporate body. That was of enormous help. But the great 
influence that I was able to use was the influence given to me by my superiors. The 
fact that Mr. Cheney found the ideas that we came up with useful and that the 
president found them useful and relevant to the challenges they had is really what 
made it work more so than bureaucratic imprimatur of Goldwater-Nichols.
During the Persian Gulf War, Secretary Baker suggested Soviet military 
participation in coalition efforts as a way of demonstrating that the Cold War 
was over. Most of the administration objected to this and thought it was 
premature to invite them in. Would you go over some of the discussions that took 
place, including your opinion on the subject?
I don’t even know what he’s . . .  what you’re talking about. I read the questions and so 
I don’t know who these other people are that you say “most of the administration 
objected to this.” What’s the basis for that?
Brent Scowcroft, in his book for example, and in a conversation I had with him 
said that he thought it was too soon.
That’s one.
Bush mentions it in his book.
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But they all invited the Soviets to do something with us in the Persian Gulf War and 
they didn’t do much, but they were certainly on our side voting. So even though there 
may have been reservations, we didn’t stiff them. And I don’t know that we asked for 
a lot from the Soviets. So I don’t know that I have anything to add to this, and I 
certainly don’t remember any particular conversations.
Secretary Baker told me in an interview that when he announced at a joint press 
conference with Sheveradnadze that both countries were denouncing the Iraqi 
invasion, that was the point when he was willing to say the Cold War was over. 
When were you willing to say the Cold War was over?
I don’t know that I was a precise one; I had been saying since 1988 that it’s starting to 
end. I gave a speech in the spring of 1988 [1989], after I became the Forscom 
commander and after I gave up the NSC post, where I tried to share with my fellow 
senior Army generals the fact that I thought that this was all going to be radically 
different in a few years. And I even. . .  to have a little interest in my speech and to 
give them something to put their teeth into, I said in that speech, and you can find it in 
my book somewhere, “If tomorrow morning we opened NATO for membership, I 
wouldn’t be surprised to see every member of the Warsaw Pact apply.” Well, they 
didn’t know whether to put me in a loony bin or rubber room or just ignore me. But as 
early as then, I could see that these changes were historic. But the end of the Soviet 
Union, the end of the Cold War, I guess for me as a finite date in time was Christmas 
1991 when the Soviet Union ended.
Yon made a trip to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1991 and wrote a report 
for the president stating that there was deep disaffection in the upper reaches of 
the Soviet military. Would you briefly explain your findings?
He was going to be following me through the Soviet Union a few weeks later, and he 
wanted my observations. . .  I think it was only a couple of days behind me. You 
probably know. I don’t recall off the top of my head. . .  And so after traveling across 
the Soviet Union and talking to a lot of their generals, many of whom just didn’t 
understand the reality o f the situation they were in . . .  I still remember lecturing a 
bunch of Soviet generals at the general staff academy, and afterwards when I was 
through, my colleague, my counterpart General Moiseyev and all the others just 
leaping up and not really facing the realities. I said, “You guys, you’re going to have 
to cut back sharply; you’re probably going to have to go to a volunteer force,” and 
they just kept dismissing i t  And so there was a lack of reality to the situation they 
were in. I also could sense deep, deep uncertainty and discomfort among the senior 
ranks of the Soviet military leaders. They were also very troubled over what they saw 
in Desert Storm and in what they saw in terms of the sophistication of the West and 
what we could do, and we were no longer that weak sistered, soft, not terribly 
competent military that they might have been counting on. And finally, I just saw 
generation after generation of Soviet weaponry abandoned in airfields. Every time 
they brought in a new generation of equipment, they just left the other generations
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laying around. And I could see that the Red Army was essentially bankrupting the 
country, and it could not continue; it was not sustainable.
Did you prefer some sort of confederation or central authority to control nuclear 
weapons when the breakup of the Soviet Union was coming?
Well, yeah, and I was glad that there was a central authority. I mean the Soviet rocket 
forces never, they never wavered in their diligence of protecting and accounting for 
their nuclear weapons. And I was very pleased when ultimately in the next 
administration, American administration, all those weapons from Kazakhstan and 
Belarus and Ukraine were moved back into Russia. Even though there had been 
occasional reports and a lot of scary stories from time to time, nobody can demonstrate 
that they have lost anyone of those nuclear weapons.
How would you describe the foreign policy legacy of President Bush in terms of 
the end of the Cold War?
He is the one who guided the Cold War to its end, and he did it with great skill. The 
unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union without us gloating about it 
was very wisely done by the president, certain magnanimity in the manner in which he 
dealt with Gorbachev and then Yeltsin, and I think that he played a key role at the end. 
A lot of things came together to cause the end to come. And your last question asking 
who should be given credit for the end of the Cold War. . .  well, there are so many 
events, people, and situations that led to the end, but I would just site two, just to be a 
little provocative: One, they were living a lie. You can’t live a lie forever. So the lie 
eventually caught up with them. But, two, you want to know what really broke the 
Soviet Union? It was the Red Army. They bankrupted the country. They couldn’t 
afford i t  The Red Army continued to insist that they had to be afforded, and 
Gorbachev is the one who realized this can not keep going. And he tried to reform it 
but he couldn’t reform it fast enough and he turned loose forces that were 
uncontainable. Remember, the reason he wanted. . .  the reason he allowed Germany 
unified, the reason he wanted good relations with the W est the reason he was willing 
to watch the Warsaw Pact breakup is because he had to breakup the rationale for the 
Red Army. Once you broke the rationale for the Red Army, you could use those 
resources to do for your country what your country needed done—rebuild a society, 
figure out how to make washing machines, not tanks. And so the only way he could 
bring the Red Army under control and divert those resources was to get rid of the war.
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-Appendix E- 
Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Interview
I spoke with Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr., in a coffee house at the Marriott 
Hotel in Boston, Massachusetts, on January 6,2001. Matlock served on President 
Reagan’s National Security Council, 1983-86, and as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union under both Reagan and President Bush, 1987-91.
The first thing I want to ask you about is something you referenced in your 
speech, and that is you said the date the Cold War ended in you mind was 
Gorbachev’s UN speech and then the Governor’s Island meeting. You said that 
was primarily because the ideology of the Cold War ended.
That’s correct, and I distinguish between the ideological end to the Cold War and, as I 
say, all of the cleanup diplomacy, which was important. It’s sort of like something 
happening at the end of a crisis, but you don’t know if there’s going to be a relapse if 
you’re speaking in medical terms. So it had to be confirmed, but it was confirmed over 
the next two years. But I would say. . .  another reason is that the diplomacy changed 
totally because from January, from the Bush administration on, we really espoused the 
same goals—we wanted peace, and we wanted to free up the countries in Eastern 
Europe, and Gorbachev thought they would stay socialist even if they went free. When 
they didn’t, he was willing to accept it, so he was as good as his word, so to speak, 
later when the push came to shove. And German reunification. . .  in the final analysis, 
he didn’t stand in the way, and he even blessed it, which was something that would 
have been hard to predict. So I think that, in general, we no longer had totally 
antagonistic goals. After all, the Cold War was conceived as a zero-sum game—any 
gain for one was [a loss for] the other—and then suddenly we started looking at how 
can we disengage, how can we serve the interests of everybody. In that sense, that’s 
why I say I think it ended ideologically. That’s not to deny that there was a lot of 
important diplomacy to be done to clear up the remnants of the Cold War, the results. I 
also think the Cold War started when the Bolshevik Revolution succeeded in Russia. I 
don’t think it started in 1945 or 1946, only when geopolitical and in the form of a 
military confrontation. But it was there inherently from the time the Bolsheviks took 
over what was then Russia and turned it into the Soviet Union because their whole 
philosophy was based on the class struggle—the victory of the proletariat Even 
though they didn’t talk about it that much after WWII, this was inherent in their 
philosophy if you look at what they understood. So in effect, there was a Cold War. 
Even when we were Allies during WWII, Stalin treated us as almost enemies in the 
sense that he didn’t allow any real contact with his people. If they had contact with 
westerners in Moscow, he sent them off to prison camps and so on because he wanted 
to close off the country because he thought they were in a life or death struggle with 
the rest of the world, and of course, eventually they would prevail. That’s why they 
never had any hesitation in using military force when they thought they could. They
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could be circumspect about it, but in Africa and other areas if it was a matter of 
supporting somebody who claimed to represent sort o f the proletariat against the 
imperialists, they were quite willing to support them if they thought they had any 
chance at all. And, o f course, they started this in the 1920s, except at that time the 
British were considered the main enemy. So, yeah, I think the Cold War started when 
a political party based on a Marxist ideology took power in Russia and turned it into a 
Socialist state, which was to be a vanguard of the world proletariat and the future 
world state. Until that philosophy on which that rested, which was the Marxist class 
struggle, was dropped, the Cold War would have been there. It could have been more 
intense or less intense, but the feeling that they were in a zero-sum conflict with the 
rest of the world would have persisted.
So you saw it a based on ideology. President Reagan saw the Cold War based on 
ideology. But when I did an interview with Brent Scowcroft, he said that he and 
President Bush did not see the Cold War as being about ideology. He pointed to 
the division of Europe that George Kennan described, and he said for them that 
was the basis as they saw the Cold War. So he said when they were trying to 
resolve issues, that’s what they were looking at rather than the ideology. So does 
that explain really the differences in philosophy between the Reagan 
administration and the Bush administration? That maybe they saw the Cold War 
itself as having a different definition?
There were some differences, but I’m not sure that Brent would disagree with the way 
I would put it. I don’t deny that, sure, I think they could say that we’re not sure the 
Cold War is over until these things happen—that is that Europe is united and what 
not—but I would say that the* Cold War was not fundamentally about the division of 
Europe. The division of Europe occurred because of the Cold War, and that, sure, 
people are not going to perceive that it is over until that division stops—and they were 
right to concentrate on that, that’s right But what I’m saying is, and what took diem a 
while to recognize—in fact they really didn’t recognize it until December when they 
got to Malta, in the meeting in Malta—was, that Gorbachev had already accepted. In 
other words, they didn’t really test him early on because Scowcroft still thought the 
Cold War was not over. Well, you know, I would say in Gorbachev’s mind it was 
over, and that was the important thing. Now, you know, that didn’t mean that 
automatically we were going to be able to solve these problems, only if  it turned out 
that under different circumstances, in the push, he would live with what he said. But it 
turned out he would. So, I’m not saying we had full confirmation that it was over. 
Clearly, we couldn’t say. . .  we couldn’t say it was over until we saw all the results 
that it was over. But having seen that, you can look back and say, okay, the back was 
broken at this point And after that, the diplomacy was no longer zero sum; it was how 
to solve problems. And I think somewhat to Bush’s surprise and Scowcroft’s, 
Gorbachev agreed with alacrity—in fact, he offered at Malta that he wasn’t going to 
use force in Eastern Europe. And it rather surprised them that he would make that 
commitment He would have made that commitment in February or March, but they 
didn’t ask him. They kept putting off the summit for various reasons. So they didn’t
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really push things along very fast or it could’ve happened even sooner, some of these 
things. But, in any event, I think what we’re saying is not necessarily contradictory. I 
don’t say that all the results of the Cold War ended in December ’88. What I say is I 
think that was when Gorbachev officially discarded—and this was a process, the 
discarding—that ideology had happened step by step. It didn’t just happen suddenly, 
but that’s when he officially confirmed that the ideology was going to be different and 
that their policy was going to be based on what he called the common interests of 
mankind. Now you could still argue about what the common interests were. It was still 
politically difficult for him to give up Eastern Europe. He was not going to take the 
initiative there. But what he could do, once East Europeans understood that the Soviet 
Union was not going to intervene militarily, they could take matters into their own 
hands, which is what they did. So I don’t think we’re saying different things. It’s just 
that we use different words to express it. But I do think that they were a little slow on, 
you might say, testing Gorbachev’s words, and they were right to say we can’t put a 
lot of stock in it until these other things happen.
How would you explain the foreign policy review at the beginning of the Bush 
administration, the Pause? Would it be part of that lack of recognition or other 
factors?
Partly that. I think it was largely to reassure the right wing of the Republican party, 
which never really trusted Bush.
In your book you mention that during the Reagan administration there were 
differences between what you call the Bush people and the Reagan people. Were 
those differences in personnel or just in philosophy?
Mainly in personnel. I mean you had Jim Baker as Chief of Staff. . .  but, I mean, I 
was a professional, so I wasn’t really identified with either, although probably the 
Bush people thought of me more Reagan than Bush simply because I was brought on 
by Reagan first But I didn’t even realize that that acutely until Bush was elected and 
purged almost everybody from the top ranks of the government At one point I know 
Baker had told me in a private meeting, when he asked me to stay on in Moscow, that 
well, you know, they had run three political campaigns and he’s got a lot of people 
that he has to take care of. Now clearly he didn’t consider the people who had worked 
for Reagan their people. So I think they did look at their own backers as distinct from 
the Reagan backers. And their political task was not having the Reagan backers defect. 
Since many of the right-wing Republicans had thought Reagan had gone soft his last 
year or so, you know Bush had to sort of stand up and, I think, show that he was 
tougher.
Why was the Malta conference Important?
Because of the understanding regarding Eastern Europe.
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Did it have anything to do with image?
Yeah, I think it was image also. I think that finally Gorbachev convinced Bush that he 
wasn’t going to intervene in Eastern Europe, and Bush convinced Gorbachev that he 
wasn’t going to make political hay out of it—dance on the wall—and that was very 
important
It was important to have a face-to-face meeting where they could really 
understand each other.
Right. And they had this discussion—I told about it in my book—not to talk about 
Western values, but to talk about democratic values. That was very important because, 
one thing, I think the Bush people generally—somehow they never asked me, I guess I 
would have explained it to them—they didn’t quite grasp Gorbachev’s point that 
Western values made things seem as if he was the loser. Whereas, since the Soviet 
Union had claimed to be democratic, even though it wasn’t, you could use the term 
democratic values, and it was actually Jim Baker that came up with that suggestion.
It was important to Gorbachev to present the image of a mutual understanding 
rather than of a winner and a loser.
That’s right. . .  absolutely. And I think that wasn’t fully grasped by the Bush people 
because I think, you know, they understood that. . .  they would have understood that 
theoretically, yeah, you don’t want to make him seem the loser. But somehow they 
didn’t grasp as instinctively as Reagan would have—he had a much more instinctive 
feel o f these things, you know the professional relations and how another politician 
feels. And I think it took Gorbachev to tell them, and then when they thought it 
through, they understood and went on. Yes, absolutely because that did set the course 
for the liberation of Eastern Europe.
In your book you mention that the four-part agenda of the Reagan 
Administration did not include an economic side. When Bush came to power, you 
felt that it was time to implement an economic side, but he didn't. Could you talk 
a little bit about the failure you saw in the Bush administration for not doing 
that?
I think at first, in ’89, there was a fear, particularly on Baker’s part, that the Soviets 
would simply get into the international financial and other organizations as 
troublemakers, as spoilers, and he didn’t want to let them in. And it was true that many 
of these organizations were setup for market economies, and they did not have a 
market economy. But I think that’s also a reflection of the fact that Baker hadn’t quite 
grasped that the Cold War really was over and they were looking for advice and help 
on how to become a capitalist society, though they didn’t want to use that word. And I 
think they were very slow in grasping that But I thought in that first group of cables, 
which have been declassified and actually are available to researchers, that I wrote that
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I knew he would want something new, and I thought that given his background in 
business and whatnot, to make economic cooperation to bring the Soviet Union into 
the world economy and to create a market economy there could be, you might say, the 
watchword o f the Bush administration. So I was trying to give him something new. 
But I think they didn’t really grasp the potential until too late. They began to talk 
about it by the fall of ’90—particularly after the invasion of Kuwait and so on when 
Gorbachev went along, and then that’s when Bush sent down the businessmen and so 
on—but this was without any strategy and without any real briefing about what we 
wanted to encourage. They hadn’t really given any thought to that, and whereas 
Gorbachev never came up with something worthy of support, at the same time we 
never gave him any coherent advice either. And the time to give him that advice was 
’89, and ’90 at the very latest. By 1991 it was too late—things had fallen apart too 
much. But there could have been a lot more direct support for the reformers there if 
we’d have gotten involved earlier. So I think this was a case that probably—again who 
could know for sure—if Reagan in his prime had still been president, he probably 
would have been willing to take that risk, particularly if he could handle the Right- 
wing, whereas Bush, I think, either because he didn’t fully understand how far 
Gorbachev was probably willing to go or else he just didn’t have the imagination to 
see the potential. He said it himself he really didn’t have that vision thing, whereas he 
had a lot more facts at his command than Reagan did, but Reagan had a vision—that 
was the difference in the two of them.
You mentioned that many of Gorbachev’s concessions—going along with the 
Gulf War, allowing Germany to be reunified in NATO—were directly or 
indirectly linked to economic aid. Near the end, was obtaining economic aid the 
thing most important to Gorbachev?
It was. And what he was offering, as I said, wasn’t worthy of it, but we hadn’t given 
him any real help in formulating i t  I tried to give my idea of what was going through 
his mind in that imaginary dialogue.
Considering the huge budget deficits, could the Bush administration have 
provided Gorbachev with the level of economic aid that he needed. Could they 
have found the money if they wanted to?
I think they could have found the money if they wanted to. Obviously this made it 
more difficult that there were budget deficits. But I think they could have, and this is 
what Thatcher, in effect, when she was no longer Prime Minister in her conversation 
with me and I’m sure others, she was pressing them to do: You know, George, we 
need to do it and you don’t have to do it all. But, you know, press the Germans. And, 
by the way, Major was willing to give that very substantial support in January and 
February ’92 after the Soviet Union collapsed. It was no longer Gorbachev, and it was 
Bush who turned it down. And it was finally Richard Nixon who had to make an issue 
of this in 1992. Yeah, I mean they had their problems and he had raised taxes and they 
had the recession. But, you know, I think the running scared is what did him in in that
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election. If he had shone a little more leadership—to say, yeah, these are not easy 
times but look at what the stakes are; we have to make that investment. I think he 
could have carried it if  he had done the leadership. But if instead, you know, your 
concept is just simply to manage a corporation so to speak and you’re not willing to 
take risks, then I think it was that—it wasn’t  just this issue—but that inability to take a 
risk for something that might prove to be unpopular that people saw as a weakness 
eventually and gave Clinton his opening.
Could you explain the reason for Bush’s reluctance to provide economic aid?
Was he fearful of change?
No, he was not comfortable with change if he wasn’t sure what it was going to be. But 
I think. . .  first of all, what Gorbachev was asking for was not rational. And you 
couldn’t place a lot of aid on that. Where the failure was was the failure to see earlier 
on that this guy needed some help and you had to find a way to help him whether he 
asked for it or not in putting together an organization. Now I would have thought if, 
for example, you say: Look, the world doesn’t really need the OECD the way it’s 
currently constituted. Why don’t we get an agreement to change this into an 
international organization to back transition economies—all of them, Eastern Europe 
and the others that had been Communist—to a market system, and we’ll have their 
representatives, we’ll have others, and a number of countries will put some solid funds 
in it to help this process. Now, if we had started that late ’89 early ’90 ,1 think we 
would have had much more substantial thing than saying: OK, IMF do it or World 
Bank. They were set up for different purposes and more limited purposes. And nobody 
had a road map. You couldn’t . . .  you really had to put a lot of heads together and you 
had to have some way to provide political and, if need be at times, financial support to 
do things that were going to be difficult politically, as we’ve seen in Russia. I just 
think there wasn’t the imagination to do that at a time when it would have worked. By 
’90, late ’91, it was late, but in ’92 he could have helped the reformers a lot by going 
along with the money they needed then, and I think that would have passed in the 
United States. It was not unpopular. People understood, you know, they were no 
longer an enemy; we had spent hundreds of billions on arms—we didn’t need to do 
that anymore. . .  OK, it’s tough but let’s find a way to do i t  And it seems to me that 
ways could have been found, and you could have pressed the Japanese and Germans 
also to do a lot.
In your speech you said the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable, and in 
your book you said the reasons why it collapsed were all internal. Do you think 
the U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union merely guided or perhaps 
affected the timing of the collapse of the Soviet Union?
Well, I think. . .  obviously, some of the things we pushed for to end the Cold War, 
such as opening up the country, bringing in democratic processes, supporting the 
election process, were things that made the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union 
possible. I mean, as long as the Communist party was in power and we certainly
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favored steps to take them out of power, though we didn’t do it, and if we’d tried to do 
it with pressure, it wouldn’t have worked. You open up a country and this tends to 
bring the dictators down—something we didn’t learn in regards to Cuba and we 
haven't learned regarding Iran and Iraq. But you’re much more apt to bring them 
down if you open up the country in Iraq. So in that sense, by opening up the country, 
encouraging them to open up and so on, we created conditions under which when they 
could not deal with these other pressures, the state collapsed. So I’m not saying that 
none of our policies had any relevance. I’m just saying we didn’t bring it about. We 
didn’t have die power to bring it about It was brought about internally. Some of these 
internal forces had been encouraged by the United States and the West in general, not 
so much by a direct action, although by that to, but by our very existence. After all, as 
long as we existed as free societies and democratic societies with economies that 
seemed to work, we were a threat to the Soviet system. And what their task was to try 
to be more like us without admitting i t  And we were really in favor of that. It turned 
out that they couldn’t. Well, that was their problem, and that’s what I was trying to say 
in the book.
You said that President Bush and Gorbachev were both in favor of a 
confederation, a democratic Soviet Union. Why were they not successful in 
pushing forward that type of Soviet Union?
Well, there were several reasons. One was that the nationalists in several of the 
republics wanted independence for their own reasons, and the Communists in other 
republics, once they saw that the Communist party was losing power, wanted 
independence in order to save themselves and stay in power. This happened in central 
Asia. You ended up with five dictators in central Asia in those five central Asian 
countries and keeping the old system primarily open; therefore, with all of their talk of 
opening up the economies, they were basically a totalitarian political system in the 
way they controlled things. I think that is why I think Bush was right when he said 
don’t confuse independence with freedom. In other words, if you have freedom and 
you want independence, eventually you’re going to get i t  But if you take 
independence under conditions before you get freedom, you could be deprived of 
freedom for a long time, and that’s happening in a lot of the republics. In fact in all of 
them, except the Baltic states, it’s happening. Now, I think we understood that we 
couldn’t do it for them. It’s something they had to do for themselves. And I’m just 
saying from the standpoint of U.S. interests that I think it was accurate to feel that it 
was easier to deal at least with a well disposed Soviet Union that had a monopoly on 
nuclear weapons than a lot of states, several of which might have gotten them 
separately. Of course, our big push after it broke up was to make sure that all the 
nuclear weapons went to one country, that is to Russia. It took a lot of pressure in 
Ukraine to achieve that and in general the pressure is much more. . .  and I think that 
that also recognizes something we haven’t been clear about since then that, you know, 
it’s not in our geopolitical interests to vie with Russia for influence in these other areas 
of the Soviet Union; it just isn’t  It’s just going to create problems. And, you know, if 
you could be democratic and accepted and Moscow has a certain hegemony and, you
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might say, benign rule over these, I don’t think it bothers us at all. In fact, I think the 
present world where you’ve got so many small states, many of which are not 
democratic, there is a much greater problem in the long run.
You said ending the Cold War could not be attributed to any single one person, 
so how would you just briefly define the role of Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush? 
What credit should each be given for the end of the Cold War, if any?
Well, I think that Reagan in setting up conditions, which were fair and not against the 
interests o f a peaceful Soviet Union, and refusing to reduce arms and end the arms 
race until the country began to reform, he created conditions that encouraged 
Gorbachev. In fact, he gave him little choice, if he wanted to reform, but to open up 
the country and start the reform. Gorbachev deserves the credit for understanding this 
had to be done and that it was in the interest of his country that it could be done and 
for having the political skills to pull it off. Bush deserves credit for some very fine 
clean-up diplomacy in cleaning up the remnants of the Cold War, but not for breaking 
the back of i t
Thank you.
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